ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BOOK IV. INTRODUCTION. AVING treated of the virtues of and courage HAVING temperance, which, how different foever in many respects from each other, agree in this particular, that they both confift in the proper government of the irrational or merely fenfitive part of our nature, the author proceeds in the fourth book, to explain the nature of liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, meekness, courtesy, plain-dealing, and facetiousness. As things are best understood by comparison, he points out and defines the blameable extremes (for example, of niggardliness and profufion) which stand in direct oppofition to each other; and which are both of them contrary, though not always in a like degree, to the praiseworthy habit which lies between them. He shows that there is an intermediate, but anonymous habit, highly deserving of approbation, between the extremes of ambition and blameable infenfibility to honour: obferving on this and other occafions, that many of the virtues, as well as of the vices, are not accurately diftinguished by names; and that from this imperfection of language, much confufion refults; for when the intermediate and praifeworthy habit is nameless, each of VOL. I. G G the BOOK IV. BOOK the extremes will strive to thrust itself into the middle place, which is the poft of honour; and that habit which is approved as virtue by one class of men, will be condemned as vice by another. He examines whether fhame can be claffed with the virtues, fince it seems rather a passion than a habit. He explains what is meant by a conditional virtue, in opposition to virtue fimply and abfolutely; and proves that shame is at best only a virtue of the conditional and imperfect kind. BOOK IV. ARGUMENT. Liberality.-Vices oppofite thereto.-Magnificence; its contraries.--Magnanimity.-Meeknefs; its contraries.-Courtefy; its contraries.-Plain-dealing; its contraries.-Facetioufnefs; its contraries.-Shame. WE E proceed to speak of liberality, which feems to be that virtue which bears a peculiar relation to property. For the praise of liberality is not acquired by courage in war, moderation in pleasure, or juftice in judgment, but by the propriety of our behaviour in receiving or beftowing money, or whatever things can be measured by money; and principally in bestowing them. Of the propriety of our conduct in relation to property, prodigality and niggardlinefs are the two contrary and blameable extremes. Niggardlinefs always refers to those who fet more than a juft value on money: but prodigality is fometimes employed to exprefs extravagant profufion joined with inordinate intemperance; for those are called prodigals, who waste their fortunes in ruinous pleasures, and thus fignally debase themselves by complicated worthlessness. Yet prodigality more properly fignifies one fimple vice, that of ruining ourselves by our own fault; for he ruins himself by his own fault, who wastefully confumes his property, that is, the means by GG 2 BOOK by which his life is fupported; and in this acceptation IV. we take the word. Property falls under the description of things ufeful; which may either be ufed rightly or abufed; and he only can use them rightly, who is adorned with the virtue appertaining to them; namely, liberality. The ufe of money confifts in expending or beftowing it: for the taking or keeping of money relates to poffeffion rather than to use. The virtue of liberality therefore is more confpicuous in beftowing handfomely, than either in receiving what is our due, or in refufing what we ought not to accept. For virtue confists rather in acting our part well, than in avoiding what is amifs. This active virtue alone is the proper object of praise and gratitude; for it is more meritorious to part with what is our own, than to abstain from what belongs to another; which latter may be praised indeed as justice, but not as liberality; and to accept what is ftrictly due to us, is not entitled to any degree of praife. None are more beloved than the liberal, because their virtue is extensively useful, diffusing itself in benefits. But the motive from which their actions proceed, is what chiefly constitutes their excellence; for liberality, like every other virtue, muft keep the beauty of propriety in view; felecting its objects, and proportioning its extent, according to thofe rules which right-reafon prescribes. The critical moment for best conferring a favour must also be carefully ftudied; and they must be conferred cheerfully, at least not painfully: and when any one of these conditions is wanting, whatever acts of bounty a man may perform, he will not carry off the palm of virtuous and graceful liberality. If the gifts beftowed on others occafion pain to ourselves, it is a proof that we prefer money to the beauty IV. beauty of generous actions; and if we are rapacious in ac- BOOK quiring money, we cannot be truly liberal in employing it. A man of real beneficence will not be importunate in folicitation. He will be delicate as to accepting favours; but will enrich himself by the diligent management of his own affairs, that he may acquire materials for his bounty, which will be diftributed with caution, that it may never fail the deserving. It belongs to his character to be more provident for others than for himself; and to extend the measure of his beneficence far beyond thofe limits which the prudence of selfishness would prefcribe. But our liberality is relative to our wealth; it confifts, not in the value of our gifts, but in the temper and habit of the giver; and he who gives the least of all, may be the most liberal of all, if what he gives bears the highest proportion to his fubftance. Men of hereditary eftates are more inclined to liberality, than those whose fortunes are their own work; the former have never known the feverities of want; and all men are difpofed to love and cherish their own works, asparents and poets. It is not easy for a liberal man to be rich, fince he is nice in receiving money, not retentive in keeping it; and always ready to give it away, on no other account than that of the proper or beneficent purposes to which it may be applied. Fortune, therefore, is continually accused of enriching those who are leaft worthy of her favours. But this happens naturally, without the interference of fortune; fince wealth cannot well be poffeffed by thofe who employ not the ordinary means by which it is acquired and accumulated. Yet true * Verily I fay unto you, that this poor widow hath caft more in, than all they which have caft into the treafury. St. Mark, c. xii. v. 43. |