and that too without respect to the moral character of the wit

nesses.

In the second place, testimony derives force from the character of the witnesses, for veracity and competency; and this too is susceptible of infinite accumulation.

Men naturally tell the truth; and although motives of interest and passion may lead them to swerve from it, sometimes, there is also implanted in the human breast a moral feeling which resists the motives to falsehood, and gives more or less weight to the testimony of honest men, even when they are tempted to utter a falsehood. Regard to reputation is another powerful check upon the motives to falsehood. A liar is one of the most infamous characters in society. Mankind feel the necessity of maintaining truth with one another. Therefore they brand the false witness as a dangerous character, and point at him with the finger of scorn. But nature prompts even liars to tell many more truths than falsehoods; and nature and moral principle and regard to reputation combined, give a general character of truth to the testimony of mankind; at least of substantial truth, even when interest or prejudice causes it to be somewhat disfigured.

But men may err in their testimony through incompetency to observe and report correctly the facts of which they testify. Due allowance must be made for this in estimating the credibility of a witness. When the facts are simple and obvious to the senses, almost any man is competent to testify about them. He can tell what he plainly saw and heard and felt, though he may not be qualified to reason on the subject.

To demonstrate that testimony may have force sufficient in the personal credibility of the witnesses, it is not necessary to assign to each witness a high degree of credibility. Let it only be probable that a witness will tell the truth, and the force of the testimony will, as in the former case, be multiplied by every additional witness. Let the probability be only as two to one, that a single witness will tell the truth; then the probability will be as four to one that the testimony of two such witnesses, when they concur, is true; and so on the probability of truth will be doubled by each additional witness. But when the witnesses are honest, conscientious men, you will readily admit that the probable truth of their testimony is far greater. When such a man is not very powerfully tempted to swerve from the truth, you will allow that 1000 to 1 is a very low estimate of the probable truth of his tes

timony. Then let two such witnesses concur, and the probability is a thousand thousands, or a million to one, that their testimony is true; and every additional witness of this character will multiply the probability a thousand-fold. Now suppose that twelve such witnesses concur; if you calculate the force of their united testimony, it mounts up to an almost inconceivable quantity,-to a moral certainty of truth so powerful, that no degree of improbability in the fact attested, can resist its force. Yet the number of witnesses is supposed to be only twelve: what if it were a hundred or a thousand?

Observe that we put the probability of truth in one scale of the balance, and the improbability of the fact in the other, as Mr. Hume directs; and then give our judgment in favor of the side which preponderates. We must therefore allow the testimony its full weight independently of the nature of the fact; taking care not to let the improbability of the fact itself detract anything from the testimony, until we put them into the scales.

If any one should be at a loss to understand how the addition of one witness can in this case so multiply the force of the testimony, I ask his attention to this observation. When the question is whether a particular event has or has not occurred, if we can believe any one witness, who testifies that it has occurred, then we must consider the fact as established. All that we need, therefore, to justify our belief of the fact, is to feel morally sure that one witness out of all who testify can be relied upon as true. Then it matters not whether we can rely upon the rest, or not; for if any one tells the truth, then it follows that all who concur with him, also tell the truth in that case, though they should falsify in other cases. In this case, if one be true, all must be true; and it is only on the supposition that all concur at once in the same Calsehood, that their testimony can be discredited.

From this observation, it may be easily understood, when witnesses are probably honest, how an addition to their number not only increases but multiplies the force of their testimony, because it multiplies the chances that some one among them can be relied on as a true witness, or what is the same thing, multiplies the improbability that they should all concur in the same falsehood.

I have now shown satisfactorily, I trust, that human testimony is susceptible of two sorts of force, each of which may be wig

mented to any extent necessary to overcome the improbability of any conceivable event.

What shall we say, then, of the force of testimony, when it combines these elements of strength;-when the force of undesigned coincidence in the testimony is multiplied by the force of honesty and good faith in the witnesses? Yet these elements of strength may be, and often are, combined. How miserably diseased with skepticism must a man's intellect be, who can affirm, as Hume did, that no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle! But I need not urge the force of testimony any further; for this same skeptical philosopher, after elaborating an argument by which the force of all possible testimony for miracles was to be paralyzed, does in the same Essay give up the point, by admitting that the most stupendous miracle might be proved by the testimony of men;-no less a miracle than this, namely, that at a certain time, ages ago, the sun was totally darkened for the space of eight days. If testimony might, as Hume says, have force enough to prove such an awful derangement in the course of nature, how much less would be sufficient to prove that a teacher sent from God had miraculously healed some diseased persons, and had himself risen from the dead?

But whilst he thus concedes that testimony is of force to prove an unheard-of miracle, void of all moral use and signification, he resolves that religion shall not benefit by his concession, for he expressly excepts religious miracles as wholly incredible, because mankind have been often imposed on by stories of such miracles. He summarily disposes of religious miracles forever, by declaring that they ought to be universally rejected without examination. But if the frequency of imposture in relation to a class of facts be a sufficient reason for scouting the whole as incredible, then we ought to reject all reports of cures by medicine, because mankind are daily imposed on by the worthless nostrums of advertising quacks.

And this, at last, is the result of Hume's Essay on Miracles, which has given so much trouble to writers on the Evidences of Christianity. After packing together a mixture of sound principles and miserable sophisms into the form of an infallible argument against miracles, the author himself virtually abandons his argument, and falls back upon the last refuge of a despairing skeptic, a resolution not to believe in Christianity, whatever may be its evidence, and to scout all religious miracles without exami

nation. This resolution shows that he found it very hard to disbelieve the miracles of Jesus Christ.

II. I come now to the second head of the general subject, which is to consider the nature and the evidence of the mighty works ascribed to our Saviour Jesus Christ. I confine myself to these among all that are recorded in the Bible, in order, by simplifying the discussion, to reduce it to the narrow limits of a lecture; nor is it necessary to go beyond them; for these are obviously the test miracles, by which the Christian religion must, so far as its Divine authority is concerned, either stand or fall.

First, then, let us examine the nature of these mighty works, and determine whether any of them were really miraculous or not. I say, any of them, because even one undoubted miracle is sufficient to prove the Divine interposition, and to establish the doctrines of the great teacher. The certainty, also, that one or a few were real miracles, will also determine the nature of those which, if considered by themselves, might be in some degree questionable.

In determining the nature of the mighty works ascribed to Jesus Christ, we must take the facts as they are related in the evangelical records; for we are not considering whether those facts actually occurred, but whether, supposing them to have occurred, they were really miraculous or not.

In respect to some of them, it is easy to determine that they could not have resulted from natural causes: they must, therefore, have been miraculous. Of this sort was Christ's walking upon the sea (Matt. xiv. 25); his feeding thousands with a few small loaves and fishes (Matt. xiv. 15.); his giving sight to a man born blind by the application of clay moistened with spittle (John ix.); his raising Lazarus from the tomb (John xi.), and his own resurrection from the dead and visible ascent to heaven.

Next to these is a sort of cases, which, if taken singly, are not demonstrably supernatural, but when taken collectively and in connection with the circumstances, must also be considered as unquestionably miraculous. Of this sort are the numerous cases in which Christ instantaneously healed men of diseases, which were almost, if not quite incurable by natural means, such as inveterate leprosies, palsies, epilepsies, lunacy, &c. (Matt. viii. Luke v. Mark v. John v.) Admitting that in some rare instances, persons deeply affected with such diseases, might naturally recover, I think that you will esteem it impossible for any man without

miraculous power to effect instantaneously many cures of this sort in succession, and without a failure, as often as the patients presented themselves. What I have to say on a third sort of cases will apply with additional force to these also, and reinove any doubt that may linger in your minds.

In the third sort of cases, the events were such as might proceed from natural causes, and the only evidence of their miraculous character, consisted in the circumstances and manner of their production. Such was the sudden fall of the wind on Lake Tiberias, when Jesus commanded it to cease (Matt. viii. 18). The recovery of patients from ordinary diseases without the application of remedies, as in the case of Simon Peter's mother-in-law, who was ill of a fever (Luke iv. 38). Into this class I also put the cases of Jairus's daughter and the widow's son, who were resuscitated after apparent death (Luke viii. 41, Luke vii. 11, 12). For although cases of revival after apparent death are rare, yet as they do sometimes occur from natural causes, the mere occurrence of the fact is no evidence of a miracle.

But whilst events of this sort are not necessarily miraculous, neither are they necessarily the result of natural causes. The most common sort of event is miraculous, when it happens out of the regular course of nature,-when the cause on which it naturally depends is wanting, and its occurrence can be accounted for only on the supposition of a supernatural cause. A gust of wind may suddenly blow over,-a sick man may regain his health, and a blind man may recover his sight; and a man after lying breathless for hours may return to life; and though the cause may be unknown, yet the circumstances of the case may give no indication of a miracle. Before a miracle can be inferred, there must be a sign of supernatural agency. What was the sign in these cases? It was the wonderful coincidence between certain acts of Jesus and the events which immediately followed. According to the law of nature, the acts of Jesus could not have produced such effects; yet the events sprang forth instantaneously, as the effect springs from the cause, and quite as certainly and regularly as if all had occur red in the ordinary course of nature. A storm agitates the waters and threatens to overwhelm the frail boat in which Jesus lies asleep. He is wakened with the fearful cry, Lord save, or we perish! He rises, and commands the winds to be still. Instantly there is a great calm. A woman lies ill of a great fever. Jesus happens to arrive at the house, and seeing her condition, he takes