ages of darkness and depravity to roll on ere that Christianity arose upon our world, and still leaves the great majority of our race unvisited and unblessed by her illuminations-we confess ourselves too unequal to the explanation of such phenomena as these, for confidently saying that because man needed a revelation, therefore, as a matter of necessary inference, a revelation was in all likelihood, if not in all certainty, to be looked for. For ourselves, we do not feel the strength of this argument, and can therefore have little or no value for it."

The argument which Dr. Chalmers thus depreciates, is confessedly, one of inference, and it may be granted, that we know too little of God and his government to explain every phenomenon, in his dealings with men, or to pronounce with confidence, what he would do in certain given circumstances. But if in many things, his ways are unsearchable, and his "judgments a great deep," must we thence conclude, that nothing can be argued a priori from his attributes-no inferences can be confidently drawn from what He is? Are our notions of wisdom, goodness and justice, so inapplicable to Jehovah, that we cannot certainly expect the adaptation of means to an end; a benevolent regard to the condition and wants of his creatures, and all necessary arrangements whereby transgressors shall be made, ultimately, to feel and acknowledge the equity of his government? It is not necessary to the validity of arguments thus derived, that by a similar process of reasoning, we should be able to explain, much less to anticipate all the phenomena of the Divine administration. From those attributes which enter into our very idea of a God, we may confidently infer certain results, and yet be unable to conclude anything as to the time, or the mode of their accomplishment. It may be perfectly logical, to infer from the character of God, and the wants of mankind, that a revelation would be granted, and yet for the extent of that revelation, the mode, and the means of its universal diffusion, we may have no other light than that which is derived from its own teachings. Yea, in regard to these things, and such as these, we may be left in the dark even there, and yet it shall militate nothing against the just conviction, from the necessities of the creature, and the known attributes of the Creator, that a revelation of some sort, and at some time, would result. We hold, that from what may be learned of God by the light of nature, together with the demon

* Chalmers' Evidences, book iii, ch. 1.

strated necessity to mankind of a superior revelation, this inference is fair, is logical, and unavoidable. Dr. Chalmers objects to this, our limited knowledge of the Divine government, and in stances some mysterious phenomena, in the actual bestowment of this revelation. That is to say, because we cannot precisely determine, a priori, when and how a revelation would be given, therefore, we have no right to the primary inference, that it would be given at all. We may not conclude in favor of the general truth, because the same information will not warrant us, in predicating subordinate, particular truths. But it is obvious, that the two supposed conclusions, stand upon entirely different grounds. The one may baffle our inquiries, and be as far beyond our reach as the wisdom of God is superior to that of man, whilst the other may lie entirely within the scope of legitimate speculation, and be fairly deducible from the known attributes of Jehovah.

I may justly conclude, from the character of a parent, that he will relieve the necessities of a child, and yet with the utmost knowledge of even human nature, I may be unable to decide in advance, how, or when, his parental affection will be manifested. He may have reasons of which I am ignorant, that would vindicate both his wisdom and kindness, in withholding for a time the necessary aid; or if he have many children, he may, in like manner, vary their allotments, and yet give no ground to question his parental affection, to any one who should be admitted into his secret councils. Now, it is not ours to inquire into those deep things of God, which govern his unequal dispensations to mankind. And yet, without trenching at all upon this forbidden ground, assured of his wisdom, goodness, and justice, we may infer, and safely infer, that Jehovah would not leave his erring creatures, wholly and forever, without some surer guide, and higher revelation, than that which they by searching can find out.

It may be admitted, that this argument does not carry with it the urgency of a demonstration, and, to some minds, it has not the force of many others, in the extended and cumulative evidences of Christianity. But it ought not, therefore, to be needlessly given up, for it amounts at least to a presumption, and in some of its aspects, as we hope to show, it becomes a very strong probability, which may not be lightly set aside, by either the advocates or the rejecters of revelation. It may, indeed, be but one of the outworks, which surround the citadel of truth. And regarded with the eye of unbelief, by those who take only distant

and cursory views, of the bulwarks of our faith; or on the other hand, with the feelings of security, common to those who are strongly fortified within the true position and importance of the argument may be easily overlooked. But in a day like this, when the skeptical tendencies of our nature have the most unbounded scope and license, and our holy religion is menaced, by every variety of stratagem and assault; it becomes us to stand upon the outposts, and yield no point to the pretensions or the arts of unbelief, until it has been fairly proved to be untenable.

Now the argument which we are to examine, may be regarded as a reply to the pretensions of unbelief, claiming the sufficiency of the human reason, as a guide to truth and duty, and therefore rejecting revelation as unnecessary. In this point of view, as a weapon of defence, the argument, if it can be made out, is certainly unexceptionable and conclusive. But it does not stop here, nor should we be content with disproving the boastful claim, wherewith reason would justify her neglect, and rejection of inspired truth. If the insufficiency of her teachings can be shown, that fact more than meets her cavil against revelation, and becomes at once a positive and valid evidence in its favor. We have then "the necessity of a revelation," and this, coupled with what reason teaches us of God and his government, constitutes one, and not the least among the probabilities, that a revelation has been granted. In this its affirmative aspect, the argument is two-fold, and its different parts mutually strengthen each other. There is first, the presumption, from the known attributes of God, that he would grant a revelation, to meet the pressing wants of mankind. This, by itself, would only warrant the expectation of some supernatural divine communication, and decides nothing as to the authority of any book claiming that distinction. But it falls also within the scope of the general argument, to mark the adaptations of Scripture, to meet the necessities of our condition, and this, while it adds probability to the foregone presumption, carries with it also, the force of a positive conclusion, that the Bible is indeed a revelation from God.

As to the uses of this argument then, there can be no dispute about the first named. If the light of human reason is not adequate to meet the felt necessities of our nature, there is an end, at once, to the grand assumption upon which all Deistical writers proceed. That there is force also in the presumptive evidence derived from this fact in favor of a revelation. We argue

1. From the strenuous efforts of the most philosophical skeptics, in every age, to disprove it.

Though the language of these men is like that of the builders of Babel, a confusion of tongues, yet their object is the same: the subversion of the truth, by superseding its necessity, and erecting a fabric of human folly, pride and power, which shall reach unto the heavens. Let the necessity of a Divine revelation be granted, or proved, and the entire superstructure of these self-styled philosophers will crumble to the earth. Its foundation is laid in the assumption, that nature contains sufficient notices of God, and his government, and sufficiently discernible to the human intelligence, to lead us on to virtue and happiness. In the vaunted fulness and sufficiency of this universal code, they affect to find prima facie evidence, that any other must be the invention of designing men, and dishonoring to the Almighty. Some, therefore, to depreciate the disclosures of revelation, exalt their own discoveries. Others, compelled to concede the narrow limits of human knowledge, would persuade us to rest satisfied in our ignorance. And others still, find the goal of all intellectual achievements and the end of all inquiry, in the murky darkness of universal doubt and uncertainty. These, contending that darkness is better than light; these, that the glimmer of a few straggling stars, is all that we ought to desire; and those, that the dim twilight of reason is brighter than the noontide splendors of the Gospel.

Now, whence this effort to extinguish the felt necessity of a revelation, and to supersede its teachings, but from the conviction, that this necessity acknowledged, would carry with it, also, a presumption and probability, of a revelation actually given? The historical argument, indeed, has not been left unassailed, and not a few have been the efforts to impeach the Divine authority of the Scriptures, from their own contents. But underlying all these attempts has been the assumption, that a revelation was unnecessary, and therefore not to be looked for. If the contrary can be shown, as to the premises of this proposition, the converse to the conclusion must also follow, our enemies themselves being judges.

2. The presumption drawn from the necessities of our condition, acquires additional force, from the actual expectation, based upon these necessities, of the best cultivated minds of ancient heathenism, that a revelation would be given.

The mind struggling after truth unrevealed, soon finds the limit

of its attainment, and longs for superior aid. It is when the discoveries of revelation are connected with unwelcome truths, and its authority enforces ungrateful precepts, that a human philosophy seeks some pretext to discard it. Then, often availing herself of so much of its light as shall serve to define her own vague impressions, she vaunts her ability, in discovering the rudiments of religion, and elaborating these, into an attenuated system of morality, she arrogantly propounds it, as the perfection of wisdom. It was not among those who were left only to its guidance, that the sufficiency of the human reason was asserted. It was not till called to grapple with the claims of the Bible, as an inspired book, that men learned to deny the necessity of a Bible. So far as there is any speculation upon the subject, man's need of supernatural guidance is felt, where it is not enjoyed, and the religions of heathenism, universally, contain the formal confession of this need. The only vitality which they have, and which for so long has animated the enormous mass of their monstrous errors, is the perverted truth of God in communication with man. It is because the mind yields to this truth, with almost instinctive readiness, that the mystic leaves of the Sibyl, and the vague responses of the raving Pythoness, obtained any credit in the world. We may wonder at the credulity of even a classic age, which could be decided, upon the most momentous undertakings, by the casual flight of a bird; the relative position of the stars; or the yet more indeterminate auguries derived from the entrails of a beast. But the foundation for a belief so absurd, is laid deep in the constitution of our nature. These were but the erratic goings forth of the mind, after a supernatural guidance, from the impressed conviction that man needed, and might expect, the direction of Heaven. The sagacity of civil rulers enabled them to practise upon this impression, and invest their enactments with the sanction of Divine authority. Much more have the founders of false religions always claimed for their teachings a direct revelation, and found the claim easily admitted. If a few gifted minds, in an age bordering upon "the fulness of the times," were able to discover, and to discard this empty pretence, it was not without a confession of the actual and apparent necessity upon which it was based; it was not without the expression of a hope, more prophetic than the oracles, that that necessity would, at some time, be met. In the monuments of the brightest minds of antiquity, there are found several passages, containing, at once, the confession of their ignorance,