TRESPASS.

1. (Pleadings-Distributive issue.) On a plea of a right of way to fetch water and goods from a river, the jury found the right to fetch water, and negatived the right to fetch goods. The Court ordered judgment to be entered for the defendant as to the right to fetch water, and for the plaintiff as to the right to fetch goods. (1 M. & W. 216.)—Knight v. Woore, 3 Bingh. N. C. 3.

2. (Costs.) Trespass by husband and wife for assault, battery, and imprisonment of the wife. Pleas, first, not guilty; secondly, that the female plaintiff was not the wife of the other plaintiff. Verdict for plaintiff on both issues, with a farthing damages: Held, that a battery was not admitted on the record, so as to preclude the judge from certifying under the 43 Eliz. c. 6.—Wilson v. Lainson, 3 Bingh. N. C. 307.

TROVER.

1. (Pleading-Conversion--Effect of not guilty.) In trover, since the new rules, the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict on the plea of not guilty, if on the trial a conversion in fact be proved, although it appear from the evidence, that at the time of such conversion the plaintiff had parted with his property in the goods.

Where a party, to whose order goods were lying at a wharf, gave the wharfinger an order to deliver them to A., but afterwards, with A.'s concurrence, gave him a fresh order to deliver them to B., which he did : Held, in an action of trover by A., against the wharfinger, that the defendant might avail himself of such transfer to B., under a plea that the plaintiff was not possessed of the goods as in the declaration mentioned. (2 C., M. & R. 1.)—Vernon v. Shipton, 2 M. & W. 9.

2. (Conversion-Jurisdiction of the Vice Admiralty Court.) A vessel having run ashore on the coast of Essex, was assisted by the owner of a smack, who put down an anchor and a hawser attached to the vessel, for the purpose of securing her. The smack then left her for the purpose of carrying away some of her stores, with the intention however of returning. The owner of another smack came to her afterwards, and finding no one in or near the vessel, and her deck under water, took away the anchor and hawser, and delivered them up to the deputy vice-admiral of Essex : Held, that the anchor and hawser were not parted with, or left and abandoned, within the meaning of the 1 & 2 G. 4, c. 75, s. 1, aud that the deputy vice-admiral was not justified in detaining them until salvage was paid, or security given for its payment.

The deputy vice-admiral, who received the anchor and hawser, alleged to have been left at sea, from the finder, refused, on application by the real owner, to deliver them up until the salvage was paid, or security given for the payment of it: Held, that this was a conversion: but that if he had merely refused to deliver them up until it was ascertained whether salvage was due or not, it would not have amounted to a conversion.--Clark v. Chamberlain, 2 M. & W.78.

And see FIXTURES; PLEADING, 19.

TURNPIKE ACTS.

1. (Compensation under-Certiorari.) The certiorari with respect to proceedings under the 3 G. 4, c. 126, is not taken away by the 4 G. 4, c.95. Where a jury is impanelled under the General Turnpike Act, 3 G. 4, c. 126, to assess the value of land taken by the trustees, belonging to B., C., D., and E. respectively, they being separately interested as lessees, the jury must find, and the inquisition must specify, the sum to which each is respectively entitled.

Semble, the inquisition should set out the notice given to the parties of the intention to impanel a jury.

A defect in the inquisition cannot be remedied by any subsequent proceedings.-Rex v. Trustees of Norwich and Watton Roads, 1 N. & P. 32. 2. (Poor rute on tolls.) The 3 G. 4, c. 126, s. 51, which exempts all persons from assessments to the poor's rate in respect of tolls or toll-houses, applies to the trustees of the tolls of a road made under a local act, although they are beneficially interested in the receipt of the tolls, and although some of the provisions of the local act are inconsistent with the general act.-Rex v. Trustees of the Great Dover Road, 1 N. & P. 157. VENDOR AND PURCHASERS.

P. agreed verbally to grant R. a lease for sixty years. R. paid part of the consideration, but P. died before the contract was carried into effect. His executors then granted the lease, which recited that P.'s agreement had been treated as void by the Court of Chancery, and that the lease was granted pursuant to a proposal of the executors thereinafter mentioned. The executors having paid their own attorney his charges for drawing the lease: : Held, that they were entitled to sue R. for money paid, in their own right. (2 Bingh. 177; 10 Bingh. 51; 8 T. R. 308; 4 Taunt. 189; 5 B. & Ald. 521; 2 Y. & J. 83; 4 N. & M. 770.)-Grissell v. Robinson, 3 Bingh. N. C. 10.

VENUE. See INFORMATION.

VICE ADMIRALTY COURT. See TROVEr, 2.

WARRANT OF ATTORNEY. See INSOLVENT, 2.

WITNESS,

1. (Competency.) In ejectment brought to determine a tenancy at rackrent, a person interested in the reversion is not an incompetent witness for the plaintiff, until it is shown that he is interested in putting an end to the tenancy. Doe d. Higgs v. Cockell, 6 N, & M. 185. 2. (Same-Incompetency, how removed.) Where a witness, being examined on the voir dire, admits a disqualification, but asserts that his competency has been restored, such assertion is not conclusive. (1 Esp. N. P. C. 160; 2 Stark. N. P. C. 433.)

The incompetency of a witness interested as a member of a corporation, is not removed by a release of such interest exécuted by him to the corporation. (2 Lev. 231, 236; 1 Ventr. 351; 3 Y. & J. 19.)

The incompetency of a witness interested in the event of the suit, can

not be removed by the indorsement of his name on the record, under the 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 42, s. 26.- Bailiff of Godmanchester v. Phillips, 6 N. & M.

211.

3. (Competency.) Where a witness has a direct interest in obtaining a verdict for the party for whom he is called, he is incompetent, although he may have a greater uncertain and contingent interest the other way.

Therefore, where in an action against A., on the joint and several note of A. and B., B. was called as a witness for A., to prove the illegality of the note, it was held to be no answer to an objection to his competency, that before the commencement of the action he had paid a moiety of all that was due, with the exception of a year's interest, and that if A. obtained a verdict, he, B., might be sued for the whole amount remaining due on the note. (2 Bingh. 133; 6 Bingh. 181.)-Slegg v. Phillips, 6 N, & M. 360.

4. (Commission for examination of.) The affidavit in support of an application for a commission to examine a witness out of the jurisdiction of the Court, need only state the name of the witness, that he is a material witness, and that he is out of the jurisdiction.-Norton v. Lord Melbourne, 3 Bingh. N. C. 67; 5 D. P. C. 181.

5. (Competency.) On A. and B. entering into partnership, A. borrowed a sum of money of C., for which he gave her his promissory note, payable six months after demand. A. and B. subsequently dissolved partnership, and C. gave A. notice to pay the note, and afterwards indorsed it to B., who continued the business. In an action by A. against B., on a covenant in the deed of dissolution for the payment of a sum of money to A., B. set off the note. C. being called as a witness for B., to prove the loan to A., the demand of payment, and the delivery of the note to B., stated on the voir dire, that she did not wish to take the money out of the business; that she considered the note to belong to B., but expected her principal and interest: Held, that she was a competent witness, for that B.'s liability on his engagement to her was wholly independent of the result of the action.-Hatcher v. Seaton, 2 M. & W.47.

WRIT OF ERROR. Sec PRACTICE, 5.

WRIT OF INQUIRY.

(Good jury.) Where it appears that a common jury is improper to assess damages on a writ of inquiry before the sheriff, the Court will direct the sheriff to summon a jury to be taken from the special jury book.-Price v. Williams, 5 D. P. C. 160.

WRIT OF TRIAL.

Semble, that the Court will not set aside a trial before the sheriff, on the ground that the case was not within the 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 42, s. 17, at the instance of the party who obtained the order for the writ of trial.

The first count of the declaration stated, that in consideration that the plaintiff would send a pony to the defendant, and would sell and deliver it to A., the defendant undertook that he was authorized by A. to purchase it on his behalf; that the plaintiff sent the pony to the defendant,

and was willing to sell it to A., but that the defendant had no authority from A. to purchase it. The second count was a similar one, but stating that the defendant himself undertook to purchase the pony. There was also an indebitatus count for a pony sold and delivered :—Held, that this was a record which might be sent by writ of trial before the sheriff, under the 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 42, s. 17.—Price v. Morgan, 2 M. & W. 53, 2. The Court held that an under-sheriff was justified in laying down a rule, that no person except a barrister or an attorney should act as an advocate before him on a writ of trial.—Tribe v. Wingfield, 2 M. & W. 128.

REGULA GENERALIS.

MICHAELMAS TERM, 3d Nov. 1836.

IT IS ORDERED, that from and after the last day of this term, all rules upon sheriffs, other than the sheriffs of London and Middlesex, to return writs either of mesne or final process, and rules to bring in the bodies of defendants, be eight day rules instead of six day rules.

(Signed by all the Judges.)

VOL. XVII.

EQUITY.

[Containing Mylne & Craig, Part 3; and 7 Simons, Pait 1.}

ALIMONY.

It is doubtful whether a bill by the executors of a married woman, against her husband, to recover arrears of alimony due at her death, is sustainable. (See Hoffey v. Hoffey, 14 Ves. 261.)-Stones v. Cooke, Sim. 22.

APPEAL.

Upon a bill for discovery in aid of the defence to an action at law, an order having been made for the production of documents in the hands of the defendant, the execution of the order was stayed, pending an appeal to the House of Lords; upon the ground that not only would the execution of the order render the appeal useless, but also that the effect of suspending the order would be to delay the demand of the defendant himself, who was the plaintiff at law. Leave was given to the plaintiffs in equity to suggest any precaution as being necessary to prevent irreparable loss to them from the delay; as the death of witnesses or loss of documents.-Storey v. Lord George Lennox, M. & C. 685.

BANKRUPT.

An order was made (without a reference), confirming a compromise between a bankrupt and his assignees, by which the bankrupt agreed to abandon all further litigation with respect to the validity of the commission, in consideration of a sum of money paid to him out of the estate, such compromise being approved by more than three-fourths in number and five-sixths in value of the creditors who had proved, and also by a considerable body of creditors who had not proved under the commission, and none of the creditors dissenting.—In the matter of Chambers, M. & C. 509.

BENEFICE.

The decision in this case, 6 Sim. 224, 15 L. M. 199, was affirmed on appeal.-Metcalfe v. Archbishop of York, M. & C. 547.

BILL OF DISCOVERY.

1. A bill was filed by an assignee of alleged patents, to restrain the infringement of the patents, and for an account of the profits made by their use; the defendants insisted that the patents were originally invalid; or, if originally good, that they had been made void by subsequent acts of the patentee. On the hearing of the cause the bill was retained for three