his choice or pleasure, and being capable of doing those things which are in the highest sense praiseworthy."

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It is proper to remark, that those who contend, that there is a self-determining power in the will of man, admit that this power is entirely dependent on Him by whom it has been given: that it may at his pleasure, whose gift it is, be enlarged, or diminished, continued or withdrawn. No power in the creature can be independent of the Creator. His hook is in its nose; he can give it line as far as he sees fit, and, when he pleases, can restrain it, or turn it whitherso ever he will. Let this always be understood when we ascribe liberty to man, or to any created being. Supposing it, therefore, to be true that man is a free agent, it may be true, at the same, that his liberty may be impaired or lost by vicious habits: it may, in particular cases be restrained by divine interposition."

That we are moral agents and accountable for our conduct, is maintained by the parties on both sides of the question. And the following considerations adduced in proof of the moral agency of man, will, I apprehend, be admitted alike by the advocates of the doctrines of liberty and by the Necessarians.

Man, by his constitution, has a conviction that he acts freely; he is conscious of many voluntary exertions. His deliberating, whether to perform an action, or to refrain from it, implies a conviction that it is in his power. His promising or contracting to act at some future period agreeably to his engagement, shews that he himself believes it to be in his power to perform what he promises. He feels himself to be

blameworthy when he violates his word. But were he impelled by an irresistible necessity, why should he criminate himself. With as good reason might he blame himself for being a man, or for dying. Blame supposes a wrong use of power; and when a man does as well as it was possible to do, wherein is he to be blamed?

There are, besides, many proofs of the great selfcommand which it is possible for man to acquire. The Canadian savage can acquire the power of defying death in its most dreadful forms, and of braving the most exquisite torments. The martyr can look unappalled on the instruments of torture, and can say, None of these things move me." The existence of this magnanimity in any case is a proof of its possible existence in all.

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Further; that man is endowed with moral liberty, is proved by those principles that are proclaimed by every man's conscience: such as, that there is a real and essential distinction between right and wrong conduct, between just and unjust; that the most perfect moral rectitude is to be ascribed to the Deity; that man is a moral and accountable being, capable of acting right or wrong, and answerable for his conduct to him who made him, and who has assigned him a part to act on the stage of life. These are principles upon which the systems of morality and natural religion, as well as the system of revelation are grounded, and which have been generally acknowledged by those who hold contrary opinions on the subject of human liberty.

Another argument adduced to prove that man has

power over his volitions and actions is, that he is capable of carrying on wisely and prudently a system of conduct, which he has before conceived in his mind, and resolved to prosecute. If man has the wisdom to plan a course of conduct, and the power over his own actions which is necessary to carry it into execution, he is a free agent. Should it be said, that this course of determinations was produced by motives, it may be replied, that motives have not understanding to conceive a plan, and intend its execution. We must therefore go back beyond motives to some intelligent being who had the power of arranging those motives, and applying them in their proper order and season, so as to bring about the end.

The principles which I have now stated are admitted alike by the advocates of the two great doctrines maintained concerning the freedom of the will. They decidedly differ, however, as to the following characteristics (as some call them) of free agency :-namely, a power in the mind by which it can control and determine its own volitions; liberty of indifference, or that state of the mind in which it is said to be in equilibrio; and contingence. The arguments by which the Necessarians attempt to prove that these are not properties of free agency will be noticed in a following chapter.

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CHAPTER XII.

NECESSARIANS DISTINGUISHED INTO TWO CLASSES.

Ir should be carefully noticed, that there are two classes of Necessarians, whose opinions are extremely different. The doctrines of the one are avowedly at variance with man's accountableness, and are, consequently, most dangerous to society; while those of the other, however inconsistent they may appear to some with moral agency, are believed, by those who hold them most perfectly, to harmonize with this principle.

Of the former description are those who maintain that man acts by a physical necessity; and that as he only does what he is physically impelled to do, his conduct is neither virtuous nor vicious. They cannot accuse themselves of doing wrong, because they only yield to an irresistible impulse. They have nothing to do with confession, repentance, and pardon, since these are adapted to a fallacious view of things.

There are others, usually denominated Necessarians, who view this doctrine with abhorrence; and who, though they are classed with Necessarians, in consequence of their holding moral agency and accountableness to be compatible with moral necessity, or, as I would call it, moral certainty, contend that every accountable creature has physical power to the extent of his accountableness. Whether their opinions

on this subject are right or wrong, they are, at least, perfectly harmless; as will appear from the brief review which I shall take of them in the following chapters.

CHAPTER XIII.

A BRIEF STATEMENT OF THE DOCTRINES OF THE NECESSARIANS.

WHAT is the immediate cause of determining the mind's volition? To this question it is answered, on the one hand, that it is solely the self-determining power residing in the mind itself; on the other, it is affirmed, that the will is influenced in its determinations by what appears to be the greatest apparent good. But it is admitted that the apparent good may be different from the real good. The question returns, What is the cause of this difference? Few will deny that this is owing, generally, to the state of the mind. The elections of the will are always according to the existing dispositions of the heart. A mind in a pure and holy state perceives the objects that are presented to its moral choice as they really are, and its volitions will be accordingly. A mind fallen from its original rectitude will see objects as different from what they really are, in proportion to its deviation from the line of purity and holiness.

The question, What is the cause of the mind's departure from a sinless state? leads us directly to the origin of moral evil; but it would divert us too much from our subject to enter on that inquiry at present.