regarded as able, and free from all finifter defign. He must be efteemed prudent, judicious, uniform in his activity, found in his calculations, and conftant in his vigilance. He must be supposed to have that acuteness which may prevent him from being deceived by others, and that fobriety which may defend him from being duped by himself. It is alfo to be defired that he should be fuppofed faithful to his truft, and actuated by an earnest defire for the profperity of the interefis committed to him. Perhaps no man ought to feek or accept a delegation, who is unpopular with, or diftrufted by, those whom it concerns.

Such is the value of, and fuch the benefits arifing from, reputation. No reasonable man will feel himself indifferent to the character he bears. To be in want of the fanction derived from the good opinion of others, is an evil greatly to be deprecated.

Yet on the other hand it is an error to be acutely anxious about reputation, or, more accurately speaking, to fuffer our conduct to be influenced in effential particulars by a confideration of the opinion of others.

The world is in this refpect like certain individuals of the female fex, whom, if a man would gain to favour his addreffes, he must not seem too anxious to pleafe. No fooner do they find

T

4

him completely in their power, than they delight to treat him with harfhnefs and tyranny. The world appears to be imbued with a fecret perfuafion, that its opinion is too little difcerning to be worth the courting, and that an habitual regard to this opinion is a motive that degrades the man that fubmits to it.

may

An erect and dignified virtue leads us to confider chiefly the intrinfic and direct nature of our actions, and to pay a very subordinate attention to the accidents that attend upon upon them. An elevated temper will induce us to act from our own reflections, and not from the judgment of others. He that fuffers himself to be governed by public opinion, fubftitutes the unfteadiness of a weathercock, instead of the firmness of wisdom and juftice.

If a degree of reputation is fometimes fecured by this fervility, it cannot however be a folid and lafting one. It may anfwer the purpose of him who defires to impofe upon others a temporary delufion, but a man of generous ambition will fpurn it from him with contempt. Nothing is more mortifying than that species of reputation, which the leaft difcernment would fhow us was immediately to be fucceeded by infamy or oblivion.

He that would gain in any valuable fense

the

the fuffrage of the world, muft show himself in a certain degree fuperior to this fuffrage.

But, though reputation will never conftitute, with a man of wisdom and virtue, the first and leading motive of his actions, it will certainly enter into his confideration. Virtue is a calculation of confequences, is a means to an end, is a balance carefully adjusted between oppofing evils and benefits. Perhaps there is no action, in a ftate of civilifation and refinement, that is not influenced by innumerable motives; and there is no reafon to believe that virtue will tend to diminish the fubtlety and delicacy of intellectual fenfation. Reputation is valuable; and whatever is of value ought to enter into our eftimates. A juft and reasonable man will be anxious so to conduct himself as that he may not be misunderstood. He will be patient in explaining, where his motives have been misapprehended and mifconftrued. It is a fpirit of falfe bravado that will not defcend to vindicate itself from mifrepresentation. It is the refuge of indolence; it is an unmanly pride that prefers a mistaken fuperiority to the promotion of truth and usefulness. Real integrity ought not indeed. to be fore and exafperated at every petty attack. Some things will explain themselves; and in that cafe defence appears idle and injudicious.

A de

A defence of this fort is an exhibition of mental difcafe, not an act of virtue. But, wherever explanation will fet right a fingle individual, and cannot be attended with mifchief, there explanation appears to be true dignity and true wisdom.

ESSAY

ESSAY VIII.

OF POSTHUMOUS FAME.

THE diftribution of personal reputation is de

termined by principles in a ftriking degree capricious and abfurd. Thofe who undertake to be the benefactors of mankind from views of this fort, are too often made in the clofe of their carreer to devour all the bitterness of disappointment, and are ready to exclaim, as Brutus is reprefented to have done, "Oh, virtue! I followed thee as a fubftantial good, but I find thee to be no more than a delufive fhadow!"

It is common however for perfons, overwhelmed with this fort of difappointment, to confole themselves with an appeal to pofterity, and to obferve that future generations, when the venom of party is fubfided, when their friendships and animofities are forgotten, when mifrepresentation fhall no longer disfigure their actions, will not fail to do them justice.

Let us enquire into the foundness of this opinion. The more we confider it, the more per

haps