ταῖς μὲν δεῖ τῶν δοξῶν προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, ταῖς δὲ οὔ· ἢ πρὶν μὲν ἐμὲ δεῖν ἀποθνήσκειν καλῶς ἐλέγετο, νῦν δὲ κατάδηλος ἄρα ἐγένετο ὅτι ἄλλως ἕνεκα λόγου ἐλέγετο, ἦν δὲ παιδιὰ καὶ φλυαρία ὡς ἀληθῶς. ἐπιθυμῶ δ ̓ ἔγωγε ἐπισκέψασθαι, ὦ Κρίτων, κοινῇ μετὰ σοῦ, εἴ τί μοι ἀλλοιότερος φανεῖται, ἐπειδὴ ὧδε ἔχω, ἢ ὁ αὐτός, καὶ ἐάσομεν χαίρειν ἢ πεισόμεθα αὐτῷ. ἐλέγετο δέ πως, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ἑκάστοτε ὧδε ὑπὸ τῶν οἰομένων τι λέγειν, ὥς περ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι τῶν δοξῶν ὡς οἱ ἄνθρωποι δοξάζουσι, δέοι τὰς μὲν περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι, τὰς δὲ μή. τοῦτο πρὸς θεῶν, ὦ Κρίτων, οὐ δοκεῖ καλῶς σοι λέγεσθαι; σὺ γάρ, ὅσα γε τἀνθρώπεια, ἐκτὸς εἶ τοῦ μέλλειν ἀποθνήσκειν αὔριον, καὶ οὐκ ἄν σε παρακρούοι ἡ παροῦσα ξυμφορά. σκόπει δή· οὐχ ἱκανῶς δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι ὅτι οὐ πάσας χρὴ τὰς δόξας τῶν ἀνθρώπων τιμᾷν, ἀλλὰ τὰς μέν, τὰς δ ̓ οὔ; οὐδὲ πάντων, ἀλλὰ τῶν μέν, τῶν δ ̓ οὔ; τί φῄς; ταῦτα οὐχὶ καλῶς λέγεται ; ΚΡ. Καλώς. Ειμαι ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστὰς τιμᾷν, τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς μή; ΚΡ. Ναί. Wieland, Mus. Attic. iii. 2. p. 159. sqq. would omit ἢ οὔ, and understand καλῶς ἐλέγετο after ἀποθνήσκειν ironically. In the text ἢ οὔ refers to καλῶς preced. Νῦν δὲ—ἐγένετο.] Νῦν, signifying time either actually present, or bordering on the present, is often placed in contraposition to πριν, τότε, or other particles expressive of time past. With a past tense, as supr. it means lately, just now, as in Phædon. οὐκοῦν ὅπερ νῦν προύθέμεθα σκέψασθαι-σκεπτέον. Cf. Horat. Od. i. 37. 2. "Nunc taliaribus Ornare pulvinar deorum Tempus erat dapibus.' See Matthiæ Gr. s. 506. V. Κατάδηλος, sc. ὁ λόγος. *Αλλως.] Idly, vainly. Matthiæ Gr. 5. 597. Ένεκα λόγου, for argument's sake.—Επειδὴ ὧδε ἔχω, postquam mor tis periculum mihi imminet, postquam veni in periculum vita. STALL. Τι λέγειν.] Οpp. to παιδιά και φλυαρία preced. Όσα γε τἀνθρώπεια.] h. e. ut quis dem sunt res humanæ, i. e. quantum quidem ex iis, quæ hominibus solent fere contingere, conjicere licet. STALL. Παρακρούοι.] Παρακρούειν, Hesych. interpr. ἐξαπατᾷν, πλανᾷν: Fisch. facere, ut quis male statuat, et existimet, ut erret, ut non ponderet satis et examinet aliquid ; properly, to trip in wrestling, or to cheat by touching the beam in weighing. Stallbaum explains the passage: Te enim prasens calamitas non ita conturbaverit ut a recta judicandi ratione abduci te patiaris. Τιμᾷν.] Το respect. ΣΩ. Χρησταὶ δὲ οὐχ αἱ τῶν φρονίμων, πονηραὶ δὲ αἱ τῶν ἀφρόνων ; ΚΡ. Πῶς δ ̓ οὔ; §. 7. ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, πῶς αὖ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐλέγετο ; γυμναζόμενος ἀνὴρ καὶ τοῦτο πράττων πότερον παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἐπαίνῳ καὶ ψόγῳ καὶ δόξῃ τὸν νοῦν προσέχει, ἢ ἑνὸς μόνου ἐκείνου ὃς ἂν τυγχάνῃ ἰατρὸς ἢ παιδοτρίβης ὤν; ΚΡ. Ἑνὸς μόνου. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν φοβεῖσθαι χρὴ τοὺς ψόγους καὶ ἀσ πάζεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους τοὺς τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐκείνου, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν. ΚΡ. Δηλα δή, εάν ΣΩ. Ταύτῃ ἄρα αὐτῷ πρακτέον καὶ γυμναστέον καὶ ἐδεστέον γε καὶ ποτέον, ᾗ ἂν τῷ ἑνὶ δοκῇ τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπαΐοντι μᾶλλον ἢ ᾗ ξύμπασι τοῖς ἄλ λοις. ΚΡ. Ἔστι ταῦτα. αυ ΣΩ. Εἶεν. ἀπειθήσας δὲ τῷ ἑνὶ καὶ ἀτιμάσας αὐ τοῦ τὴν δόξαν καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους, τιμήσας δὲ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν καὶ μηδὲν ἐπαϊόντων ἀρα οὐδὲν κακὸν πείσεται ; ΚΡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; 14: ΣΩ. Τί δ ̓ ἔστι τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο; καὶ ποῖ τείνει, καὶ εἰς τί τῶν τοῦ ἀπειθοῦντος ; §. 7. Γυμναζόμενος ἀνὴρ καὶ τοῦτο πράττων.] i. e. Practising athletic ex"ercises, and wholly intent upon them: —τοῦτο πράττε, a proverbial form, the Hoc age of the Latins. v. Horat. Sat. ii. 3. 152. Ὃς ἂν τυγχάνῃ—ών.] i. e. whoever he may be that is, &c. See Viger, de Id. Gr. viii. 2. 1. sqq.—Ιατρὸς ἢ παιδοτρίβης. The former gave the necessary directions for the diet, &c. of the future athletes, whence ἐδεστέον γε καὶ ποτέov infr. The office of the latter consisted chiefly in exercising the bodies of their (kaku2) ΚΡ. Δῆλον ὅτι εἰς τὸ σῶμα τοῦτο γὰρ διόλ λυσιν. ΣΩ Καλῶς λέγεις. οὐκοῦν καὶ τἆλλα, ὦ Κρίτων, οὕτως, ἵνα μὴ πάντα διίωμεν. καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν δι καίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ αἰσχρῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, περὶ ὧν νῦν ἡμῖν ἐστὶν ἡ βουλή, πότερον τῇ τῶν πολλῶν δόξῃ δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἐπεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι αὐτήν, ἢ τῇ τοῦ ἑνός, εἴ τίς ἐστίν ἐπαΐων, ὃν δεῖ καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ξύμπαντας τοὺς ἄλλους; ᾧ εἰ μή ἀκολουθήσομεν, διαφθεροῦμεν + ἐκεῖνο καὶ λωβησόμεθα, ὃ τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ βέλτιον ἐγίγνετο, τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ ἀπώλλυτο. ἢ οὐδέν ἐστι τοῦτο; that philos. η ΚΡ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες. §. 8. ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, ἐὰν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ μὲν ΚΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Αρ' οὖν βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστὶ μετὰ μοχθηροῦ καὶ διεφθαρμένου σώματος ; ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς. ΣΩ. ̓Αλλὰ μετ ̓ ἐκείνου ἄρα ἡμῖν βιωτὸν διεφθαρ Επεσθαι.] i. q. προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν supr. Τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ βέλτιον ἐγίγνετο.] i. e. βέλτ. γίγνεσθαι ἐλέγομεν. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 505. 2. whence it will appear that the proposed emendation of Buttmann, who reads, after Theodoret, (Θερ. Παθ. p. 27.) ἐγένετο—ἀπώλετο, is wholly unnecessary. Tr. was being improved, was in progress towards improvement, by justice, &c. The imperfects, according to Lange, bear a distinct and definite relation to the period at which this subject came first under discussion, whence he explains the passage; quod justo quidem melius fiebat (sc. ex sententia, priusquam in mortis pericu- §. 8. Πειθόμενοι μὴ τῇ] Fischer βιωτὸν.] i. q. βιωτὸς ὁ βίος. See μένου, ᾧ τὸ ἄδικον μὲν λωβᾶταὶ τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ὀνίνησιν; ἢ φαυλότερον ἡγούμεθα εἶναι τοῦ σώματος ἐκεῖνο, ὅ τί ποτ ̓ ἐστὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων, περὶ ὃ ἥ τε ἀδικία καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἐστίν ; ΚΡ. Πολύ γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα, ὦ βέλτιστε, πάνυ ἡμῖν οὕτω φροντιστέον ὅ τι ἐροῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ ̓ ὅ τι ὁ ἐπαίων περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων, ὁ εἷς, καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ἀλή θεια. ὥστε πρῶτον μὲν ταύτὴ οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἰσηγεῖ, εἰσηγούμενος τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης δεῖν ἡμᾶς φροντίζειν περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων. ἀλλὰ μὲν δή, φαίη γ ̓ ἄν τις, οἷοί το εἰσὶν ἡμᾶς οἱ πολλοὶ ἀποκτιννύναι ; τες. ΚΡ. Δῆλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα· φαίη γὰρ ἄν, ὦ Σώκρα 'Ωι τὸ ἄδικον μὲν λωβᾶται.] For the relative preceding verbs of different construction, ὀνίνημι always governing an accusative, see Matthiæ Gr. s. 391. Eusebius, Stephens, and others, read o, approved by Fischer, who construes λωβᾶσθαι with an accusative only, incorrectly. Cf. Phrynich. in Bekk. Anec. i. p. 50. Λωβᾶσθαι τόνδε καὶ τῷδε, αἰτιατικῇ καὶ δοτικῇ. Dion. Halic, Antiq. Rom. vii. 77. fin. p. 1561. ed. Reisk. (ή βουλὴ) ἀναζητήσασα τὸν τῷ θεράποντι λωβησάμενον. Η φαυλότερον.] Or do we imagine that to be of less importance than the body, whatever it is belonging to us, about which justice and injustice are concerned. If, in order to enjoy the many and important blessings connected with bodily health, we should conform to that regimen by which they might be best secured; arguing from its success the capabilities and skill of the adviser; that life should then be worth living, whose termination should be equally desirable, were the means of its enjoyment neglected, or the voice of the adviser to be mistrusted and con-temned. So with the soul, the TRUTH alone, the test of justice and injustice, should decide upon their effects in relation to this their primary object. Is it then possible to make light of a bodily infirmity which poisons life, and give no heed to its obvious cause? or is the soul more trivial still, and is the voice of the many to drown the solemn and sober dictates of this omniscient truth, which dispels the cloud of mental error, and so removes the possibility of moral taint ? “Ο τι ἐροῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἡμᾶς.] v. Apol. Socr. c. 9. Καὶ φαίνεται τοῦτ ̓ ού, κ. τ. λ. Οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἰσηγεῖ.] Εἰσηγεῖσθαι, legem vel conditionem aliquam ferre et suadere; auctorem esse alicujus rei.Sturz. Lex. Xenoph. s. h. v. Δῆλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα, κ. τ. λ.] Several editions ascribe δῆλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα to Socrates, which is approved by Buttmann. But it would seem strange for Socrates so to affirm his position in the first instance, that it should be consented to by Crito, and then confirmed anew.—ΣΩ. ̓Αληθῆ λέγεις, κ. τ. λ. Bekker's reading, as supr., obviates the difficulty. For when Socrates had as ΣΩ. ̓Αληθῆ λέγεις. ἀλλ ̓, ὦ θαυμάσιε, οὗτός τε ὁ λόγος ὃν διεληλύθαμεν, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἔτι ὅμοιος εἶναι τῷ καὶ πρότερον· καὶ τὸνδε αὖ σκόπει, εἰ ἔτι μένει ἡμῖν ἢ οὔ, ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζῇν περὶ πλείστου ποιητέον ἀλλὰ τὸ εὖ ζῆν. ΚΡ. ̓Αλλὰ μένει: ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ εὖ καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ὅτι ταὐτόν ἐστι, μένει ἢ οὐ μένει; ΚΡ. Μένει. §. 9. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων τοῦτο σκεπτέον, πότερον δίκαιον ἐμὲ ἐνθένδε πειρασθαί ἐξιέναι μὴ ἀφιέντων ̓Αθηναίων ἢ οὐ δίκαιον· καὶ ἐὰν μὲν φαίνηται δίκαιον, πειρώμεθα, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐῶμεν. ἃς δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις περί τε χρημάτων ἀναའ serted that the objection might possibly be made, that the opinion of the many ought to be rejected, because its influence prevailed, even to the deprivation of life, Crito caught up the idea, as favourable to his own views, and at once pronounces the argument to be valid. Socrates accepts his admission, but proceeds to show that the impression was false, and its result unfounded. Stephens and Cornarius read δηλαδή, but γὰρ, which is emphatically affirmative in the text, is to be found in all the editions, which would render the former superfluous. Οὗτος τε ὁ λόγος.] i. e. The discus sion which Socrates had just concluded, concerning the opinion of the multitude; one which he set no value on, nor thought the many a more competent judge because they exercised control over life and death. Especially as they had no power over the conduct of life, which was not to be desired for itself alone, but should rather be reckoned as consisting in the amiable development of chastened and virtuous feelings, which are always independent of external sway, and must reconcile all who are so actuated to the anticipation of that unwelcome reception in most instances, and that unmitigated persecution in many, to which excellence is ever liable from η Stallbaum powerful and petulant vice. By τῷ καὶ πρότερον, the philosopher must allude either to his previous argument on the subject, c. 3. which he subsequently discussed in detail, or to some debate which he had held with his disciples previous to his accusation. adopts the latter conjecture, which appears to be more in consonance with what follows; καὶ τόνδε αὖ σκοπεῖ εἰ ἔτι μένει, κ. τ. λ. For Socrates being about to speak of the love of life, and a due moderation of the passion to preserve it, desires Crito to consider further, whether what they had formerly agreed to on the subject ought still to be abided by as true. §. 9. Ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων.] h. e. ex iis, de quibus consentimus. STALL. Μὴ ἀφιέντων ̓Αθηναίων.] Without leave of the Athenians : ἀφιέναι, sinere, permittere. FISCH. Cf. Eurip. Med. 374. τήνδ' ἀφῆκεν ἡμέραν μεῖναί με, allowed me to remain this day. Cod. Tubing. ἐφιέντων as in c. 13. extr. Εῶμεν.] Let us give it over. Περί τε χρημάτων ἀναλώσεως.] See c. 4. a med.Καὶ δόξης; Ficinus appears either to have read καὶ τῶν πολλῶν δόξης, or to have given the sense of the text as supr. in full. Socrates alludes here to the argument of Crito, c. 3. init. κα |