τούτῳ κάθηται ὁ δικαστής, ἐπὶ τῷ καταχαρίζεσθαι τὰ δίκαια, ἀλλ ̓ ἐπὶ τῷ κρίνειν ταῦτα· καὶ ὀμώμοκεν οὐ χαριεῖσθαι οἷς ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ δικάσειν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους. οὔκουν χρὴ οὔτε ἡμᾶς ἐθίζειν ὑμᾶς ἐπιορκεῖν οὔθ ̓ ὑμᾶς ἐθίζεσθαι· οὐδέτεροι γὰρ ἂν ἡμῶν εὐσεβοῖεν. μὴ οὖν ἀξιοῦτέ με, ὦ ἄνδρες Αθηναῖοι, τοιαῦτα δεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς πράττειν, ἃ μήτε ἡγοῦ μαι καλὰ εἶναι μήτε δίκαια μήτε ὅσια, ἄλλως τε πάντως νὴ Δία, μάλιστα μέντοι καὶ ἀσεβείας φεύγοντα ὑπὸ Μελίτου τουτουί. σαφῶς γὰρ ἄν, εἰ πείθοιμι ὑμᾶς καὶ τῷ δεῖσθαι βιαζοίμην όμωμοκότας, θεοὺς ἂν διδάσκοιμι μὴ ἡγεῖσθαι ὑμᾶς εἶναι, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ἀπολογούμενος κατηγοροίην ἂν ἐμαυτοῦ ὡς θεοὺς οὐ νομίζω. ἀλλὰ πολλοῦ δεῖ οὕτως ἔχειν· νομίζω τε γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Αθηναῖοι, ὡς οὐδεὶς τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέπω καὶ τῷ θεῷ κρῖναι περὶ ἐμοῦ ὅπῃ μέλλει ἐμοί τε ἄριστα εἶναι καὶ ὑμῖν. §. 25. Τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Αθηναῖοι, ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ γεγονότι, ὅτι μου κατεψηφίσασθε, Ἐπὶ τούτῳ—ἐπὶ τῷ καταχαρίζεσ.] When the demonstrative pronoun precedes the infinitive, it seems to increase the attention to what follows. Matthiæ Gr. s. 472. 2. b. Καταχαρίζεσθαι τὸ δίκαιον, justitiam donare gratia, jus negligere, quo alteri gratum facias. STALL. §. 25. Τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν.] In the Athenian court, when the plaintiff and defendant had concluded their harangues, the public crier called upon the judges to announce their verdict. In the case of trial for crimes for which penalties had been assigned by the laws, ἀγῶνες ἀτίμητοι, a single verdict, declaring the guilt or innocence of the accused was sufficient; but in cases which were not so cognisable by the laws, αγώνες τίμητοι, if the accused was found guilty, a second sentence was required to determine the punishment due to the offence. To the latter class the cause of Socrates must have belonged. All that he had already advanced in his behalf was with a view to the primary verdict of the judges, as to his being actuIntell. ally guilty or not guilty of the charges preferred against him by Melitus: upon Καὶ ὁμώμοκεν.] Pollux, viii. 122. Ὁ δὲ ὅρκος ἦν τῶν δικαστῶν· περὶ μὲν ὧν νόμοι εἰσὶ, κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ψηφιεῖσθαι· περὶ δὲ ὧν μὴ εἰσι, σὺν γνώμη δικαιοτάτη Μὴ οὖν ἀξιοῦτε.] Nolite igitur putare. STALL. ̓Αλλως τε πάντως—μάλιστα μέντ. κ.] h. e. quum alias omnino, tum mazime nunc, quum impietatis accusatus sum a Melito. STALL. Εἰ πείθοιμι - βιαζοίμην.] χαρίζεσθαί μοι τὰ δίκαια. ἄλλα τέ μοι πολλὰ ξυμβάλλεται, καὶ οὐκ ἀνέλπιστ τόν μοι γέγονε τὸ γεγονὸς τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλ TO λον θαυμάζω ἑκατέρων τῶν ψήφων τον γεγονότα ἀριθμόν. οὐ γὰρ ᾤμην ἔγωγε οὕτω παρ ̓ ὀλίγον ἔσεσoù θαι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ πολύ· νῦν δέ, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἰ τρεῖς μόναι μετέπεσον τῶν ψήφων, ἀποπεφεύγη ἄν. Μέ which, in the first instance, the judges decided against him; it remained then for Socrates, in compliance with the usual form, intended, in some degree, to exonerate the judges, and confirm their sentence, by obliging the accused to acknowledge his guilt, to condemn himself to one of three penalties, perperpetual imprisonment, a fine, or banishment. Such a confession, however, should have seriously involved the character of Socrates, and impaired, in no small degree, the truth and sincerity of his previous defence. Accordingly, in the triumph of conscious innocence, instead of submitting to a penalty, he demanded a reward, and was only prevailed on at length, from a desire of gratifying the wishes, and tranquillizing the apprehensions of his friends, to amerce himself in a fine, which, being incompetent himself, they undertook to pay. It has been questioned whether this trial, founded upon such an indictment, should not rather have been classed with the ἀγῶνες ἀτίμητοι, but there were criminal causes, and degrees of the guilt imputed, in which, as well as in civil causes, the punishment was discretionary with the judge. Of such a character, it is plain, was the present trial, in which, as Cicero remarks, de Orat. 1. 1. "Socrates was not only condemned by the first sentence of the judges, which determined whether the criminal should be condemned or acquitted, but by that, also, which the laws obliged them to pronounce afterwards." According to Xenophon, Apol. Socr. p. 25, Socrates, in asserting his innocence, subsequent to his condemnation, declared that if every charge had been completely proved, still, all together did not amount, pursuant to any known law, to a capital crime. In the Public Economy of Athens, by Boeckh, one of the most valuable works in classical litera ture, the subject of damages, fines, and penalties for illegal acts is ably and comprehensively discussed. And though with a particular view, as affecting the public revenue, still the general question is made easily intelligible. See vol. ii. 97. sqq. Παρὰ πολὺ.] h. e. non sperabam futurum ut numerus calculorum, quibus absolverer, tam parum differret ab eorum quibus damnarer, numero: immo putabam, numerum calculorum absolutoriorum longe superatum iri damnatoriorum numero. FISCH.-ñaρ' ¿λiyov, so little different; aλλа παρа жоλv, but different by a great excess. Viger. c. ix. s. 6. v. 7. Matthiæ Gr. s. 588. c. Εἰ τρεῖς μόναι.] According to Fischer, who has taken considerable pains in comparing and reconciling the conflicting authorities, the judges of Socrates were in number 556. Of these, 281 were for conviction, and 275 for acquittal; had three more from the former been added to the latter, the votes on either side had been equal, and, according to the Athenian law, he should have been discharged. Eurip. Elect. 1265. and Iphig. Tauric. 1469. Stephens, Dacier, and others, read Tptákovтα тρɛîç, of which Fischer justly disapproves; as it is scarcely possible that such a majority could have been followed by μόναι.-Μετέπεσον, had fallen to a different side: μɛrañíжTEL, aliter cadere, h. e. in aliam urnam incidere. FISCH. The judges took the or pebbles, which were succeeded by the σóvovλot, small balls of brass, and later, by the rváμot, beans, all employed for a similar purpose, and cast them through a small tunnel, called knμòs, into two urns, one for receiving the condemning, and the other, the absolving, votes, called kádo or κadiokoι; whence the meaning of the term, as supr. is obviously correct. Cf. Potter, Grec. Antiq. 1. c. 19. c. 21. λιτον μὲν οὖν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, καὶ νῦν ἀποπέφευγα, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀποπέφευγα, ἀλλὰ παντὶ δῆλον τοῦτό γε, ὅτι εἰ μὴ ἀνέβη ̓́Ανυτος καὶ Λύκων κατηγορήσοντες ἐμοῦ, κἂν ὦφλε χιλίας δραχμάς, οὐ μεταλαβὼν τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων. §. 26. Τιμᾶται δ ̓ οὖν μοι ὁ ἀνὴρ θανάτου. Εἶεν. ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ τίνος ὑμῖν ἀντιτιμήσομαι, ὦ ἄνδρες Αθηναῖοι; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι τῆς ἀξίας; τί οὖν; τί ἄξιός εἰμι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτῖσαι, ὅ τι μαθὼν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐχ ἡσυ χίαν ἦγον, ἀλλ ̓ ἀμελήσας ὧν περ οἱ πολλοί, χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ οἰκονομίας καὶ στρατηγιῶν καὶ δημη γοριῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ ξυνωμοσιῶν καὶ στάσεων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει γιγνομένων, ἡγησάμενος ἐμαυτὸν τῷ ὄντι ἐπιεικέστερον εἶναι ἢ ὥστε εἰς ταῦτ ̓ Κἂν ἄφλε χιλίας δραχμάς.] He should have been liable to a penalty of a thousand drachms, not having obtained a fifth part of the suffrages. Melitus escaped the fine to which those who, having commenced a prosecution, failed in obtaining a fifth of the suffrages, were liable, in consequence of Anytus and Lycon having devoted their interest and advocacy to the cause, which, without them, should have terminated in the discomfiture and disgrace of the promi nent accuser. §. 26. Τιμᾶται, κ. τ. λ.] The accuser was accustomed to subjoin to the indictment, ἀντωμοσία, whatever penalty appeared to him to have been deserved by the accused, unless the law had already prescribed what the precise penalty should be. For which τιμᾶσθαι, to estimate a crime at such a price, with a dat. of the person and a genit. of the punishment, was the technical phrase; and to which were opposed voτιμᾶσθαι, to estimate or assign a penalty for one's self, and ἀντιτιμᾶσθαι, which has a similar purport, Pollux. viii. 150. Xen. Apol. 23. Melitus, c. 11, supr. made death the consequence of Socrates' conviction. See Boeckh, Econ. of Athens. ii. 99. Παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτῖσαι.] The question put to the accused was, "Οτι χρή, or τί ἄξιος εἶ, παθεῖν, ἢ ἀποτίσαι: the former referring to corporeal, the latter to pecuniary punishment. Ο τι μαθὼν—οὐκ ἡσυχίαν ἡγον.] Quod non remisi a discendo. BOECKH. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 567. Ficinus misunderstands the passage altogether. Tr. What penalty do I deserve to suffer or pay, because [ὅ τι μαθών] during my life I have not kept quiet, etc. 'Ων περ οἱ πολλοί.] Intell. ἐπιμε λοῦνται; a word being sometimes obliged to be supplied of an opposite tendency to the preceding one expressed.Matthiæ Gr. 634. 3. Δημηγοριῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν.] Τῶν ἄλλων is used here as in Gorg. s. 54. ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων, h. e. ξένων ὄντων: δημηγορία, signifying a popular harangue, or the province of one who dealt in such, which could not be properly designated by αρχη. Fischer reads δημιουργιῶν, but on the strength of a conjecture, which he fails in establishing, that at Athens dnμápxo and δημιουργοί were synonymous. By ξυνωμοσιῶν καὶ στάσεων Socrates intends an allusion to the troubles of his own times, in which he was not otherwise engaged than, as has been already shown, in a manner which was creditable to his country and honorable to himself. Επιεικέστερον.] i. e. Supposing myself to be possessed of too much integrity ἰόντα σώζεσθαι, ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐκ ᾖα οἱ ἐλθὼν μήτε ὑμῖν μήτε ἐμαυτῷ ἔμελλον μηδὲν ὄφελος εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστον ἰὼν εὐεργετεῖν τὴν μεγίστην εὐεργεσίαν, ὡς ἐγώ φημι, ἐνταῦθα ᾖα, ἐπιχειρῶν ἕκαστον ὑμῶν πείθειν μὴ πρότερον μήτε τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μηδενὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι πρὶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμεληθείη ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστος καὶ φρονιμώτατος ἔσοιτο, μήτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως, πρὶν αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως τῶν τε ἄλλων οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. τί οὖν εἰμὶ ἄξιος παθεῖν τοιοῦτος ὤν; ἀγαθόν τι, ὦ ἄνδρες Αθηναῖοι, εἰ δεῖ γε κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μᾶσθαι· καὶ ταῦτά γε ἀγαθὸν τοιοῦτον ὅ τι ἂν πρέποι ἐμοί. τί οὖν πρέπει ἀνδρὶ πένητι εὐεργέτῃ, δεομένῳ ἄγειν σχολὴν ἐπὶ τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ παρακελεύσει ; οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅ τι μᾶλλον, ὦ ἄνδρες Αθηναῖοι, πρέπει οὕτως, ὡς τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτεῖσθαι, πολύ γε μᾶλλον ἢ εἴ τις ὑμῶν ἵππῳ ἢ ξυνωρίδι ἢ ζεύγει νενίκηκεν Ὀλυμπιάσιν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑμᾶς ποιεῖ εὐδαίμονας δοκεῖν εἶναι, ἐγὼ δὲ εἶναι καὶ ὁ μὲν τροφῆς to ensure my security by having recourse to such practices. Εὐεργέτη.] This was an honorary title conferred upon such as had deserved well of the state, and to which σωτήρ was not unfrequently joined: Dorvill. ad Charit. p. 317. ed. Lips. « Viri principes, immo reges reipublicæ Atheniensis εὐεργέτας τοῦ δήμου γραφῆναι ceu eximium decus adfectaverunt.” Μᾶλλον οὕτως ὡς.] This was not an unusual form with the Greek writers; Cf. Min. 318. Ε. Οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅ, τι τούτου ἀσεβέστερον ἔστιν, οὐδ ̓ οὔτω χρὴ μᾶλλον εὐλαβεῖσθαι, πλὴν εἷς θεοὺς καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ ἐξαμαρτάνειν. Dial. Eryx. p. 392. C. Ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν σμικρῶν τούτων ἂν μᾶλλον ὀργίζοιντο οὕτως ὡς ἂν μάλιστα χαλεπώτατοι εἴησαν. HEUSD. Ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτεῖσθαι.] This was one of the highest honours in the Athenian commonwealth; to be supported at the public expense in the Pry τι taneum, or common hall. Cic. Orat. i. 54. Demosth. de fals. Leg. ii. 267. Pollux. ix. 40. Ιππῳ ἢ ξυνωρίδι.] Horse-races were performed with single horses; whence ἵππῳ, supr., equus singularis, Fisch., which were called κελητες, or μονάμπυκες; chariot races, with a pair of horses yoked, ξυνωρίς, bige, Hesych. interpr. συζυγία, ἢ ἅρμα ἐκ δυοῖν ἵπ ποιν συνεζευγμένον. Suid. ἐκ δύο ἵππων: and with three or more, ζεῦγος, trigæ, quadriga, Hesych. interpr. πᾶν τὸ ἐζευγμένον, καὶ ὄχημα, καὶ ἐπὶ τριῶν, καὶ τεσσάρων, ἔτασσον. For the Olympic games see Potter, Grec. Antiq. 1. c. 22. The victors enjoyed little short of divine honours.-Ολυμπιάσιν.-The following distinction, arising from the accenting of this term, is stated by Phavorinus, from the Scholast in Aristoph. Vesp. p. 361. Ολυμπίασι· νῦν προπαροξύνεται λέγεται γὰρ περὶ τόπου· ἐὰν περὶ πράγματος ᾗ δηλοῦσα ἡ λέξις, οἷον ὡς εἰ λέγοι οὐδὲν δεῖται, ἐγὼ δὲ δέομαι. εἰ οὖν δεῖ με κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς ἀξίας τιμᾶσθαι, τούτου τιμῶμαι, ἐν πρυ τανείφ σιτήσεως. §. 27. Ἴσως οὖν ὑμῖν καὶ ταυτὶ λέγων παραπλησίως δοκῶ λέγειν ὥς περ περὶ τοῦ οἴκτου καὶ τῆς ἀντιβολήσεως, ἀπαυθαδιζόμενος· τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ ἄν δρες Αθηναῖοι, τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε μᾶλλον. πέπεισμαι ἐγὼ ἑκὼν εἶναι μηδένα ἀδικεῖν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ ὑμᾶς τοῦτο οὐ πείθω· ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον ἀλλή λοις διειλέγμεθα, ἐπεί, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, εἰ ἦν ὑμῖν νόμος, ὥς περ καὶ ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις, περὶ θανάτου μὴ μίαν ἡμέραν μόνην κρίνειν ἀλλὰ πολλάς, ἐπείσθητε ἄν νῦν δ ̓ οὐ ράδιον ἐν χρόνῳ ὀλίγῳ μεγάλας διαβολὰς ἀπολύεσθαι. πεπεισμένος δὴ ἐγὼ μηδένα ἀδικεῖν πολλοῦ δέω ἐμαυτόν γε ἀδικήσειν καὶ κατ ̓ ἐμαυτοῦ ἐρεῖν αὐτὸς ὡς ἄξιός εἰμί του κακοῦ καὶ τιμήσεσθαι τοιούτου τινὸς ἐμαυτῷ. τί δείσας ; ἢ μὴ πάθω τοῦτο, τις, δέκα Ολυμπιᾶσιν ἐφεξῆς ἐνίκη σεν ὁ δεῖνα, προπερισπάται. Τούτου τιμῶμαι.] h. e. si confiteri me oportet, quam æstimationem maxime commeruerim, fateor, me meruisse, ut quotidianus mihi in Prytaneo victus publice præbeatur. FISCH. Cf. Lucian. Prometh. iv. p. 188. tom. 1, ἐφ' οἷς ἔγωγε τῆς ἐν Πρυτανείῳ σιτήσεως, εἰ τὰ δίκαια ἐγίγνετο, ἐτιμησάμην ἂν ἐμαυ τόν. §. 27. Ισως οὖν ὑμῖν, κ. τ. λ.] Perhaps in addressing you thus, I appear to express myself with a similar presumption as on the subject of pity and supplication. v. c. 23. Αντιβολεῖν, 1. q. κετεύειν, whence ἀντιβόλησις, i. 4. ἱκε τεία. STALL. Εκὼν εἶναι.] h. e. quantum quidem a mea pendeat voluntate. STALL. 'Exών είναι non est simpliciter sponte sed quantum quis sponte quid faciat. Ovde μὴν φίλοις γε, οὐδὲ ξένοις ἑκὼν εἶναι γέλωτα παρέχεις : Xen. Cyrop. ii. 2. 15. ut id quidem sponte facias, [by choice; if you can help it.] Hermann. ad Viger. p. 888. ̓Αλλήλοις διειλέγμεθα.] In allusion to the preceding portion of the Apology. "Ως περ.] Steph. ὅσπερ : adopted also by Ficinus and Forster. Μὴ μίαν ἡμέραν μόνην.] S. Petit enumerates in the Athenian code the following law: "Sol occasus suprema in judiciis tempestas esto." Potter, Grec. Antig. 1. p. 192. Είμι του.] Είμι του, h. e. τινος και κοῦ, Kahl. Bekk. Heind. in preference to τοῦ; the necessity of the correction being evident from c. 28. οὐκ εἴθισμαι ἐμαυτὸν ἀξιοῦν κακοῦ οὐδενός. δο crates expresses himself as supr. in Xenoph. Apol. s. 23. ὅτι τὸ ὑποτιμᾶσθαι ὁμολογοῦντος εἴη ἀδικεῖν. Τί δείσας; ἢ μὴ πάθω.] Through fear of what? [should I acquiesce in the order to assign a penalty for myself?] is it lest I should suffer what Melitus assigns me? i. e. Socrates would not allow the probability of his being sentenced to death, as proposed in the indictment, to divert him from the unwavering assertion of his innocence, which he felt that it would be an injustice to himself to render dubious, under the influence of fear, by a voluntary amercement. |