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μεῖζον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ἀλλὰ καὶ ξύμπαντα τὰ τοιαῦτα; οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἴσου νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν μᾶλ λόν τι ἢ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ὁσίου, καὶ ὅ περ λέγω, περὶ ἁπάντων οἷς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα τοῦτο, ὃ ἔστ τι, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσιν ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν ἀποκρινόμενοι. ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν εἶναι τούτων ἁπάντων τὰς ἐπιστήμας πρὸ τοῦ γενέσ θαι εἰληφέναι. Ἔστι ταῦτα. Καὶ εἰ μέν γε λαβόντες μὴ ἑκάστοτε ἐπιλελήσμεθα, εἰδότας ἀεὶ γίγνεσθαι

γεν ]

Tum ante ortum nostrum, tum statim ut nati eramus. STALL.

Περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ.] Beauty, Plato considered to be the sensible representation of moral and physical perfection; consequently it is one with truth and goodness, and inspires love (ἔρως) which leads to virtue. (Platonic love.) De Legg. p. 62. sqq. p. 89. sqq. Phædr. p. 301. Euthyphr. p. 20.

“Ο περ λέγω.] See Apol. Socr. c. 5.

sub. fin.

Οἷς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα τοῦτο, ὃ ἔστι.] h. e. Quibus τῆς οὐσίας signum impri mimus, qua nomine essentia insignimus. STALL. Upon which we set the seal of substance, οὐσία, or real existence, τὸ όν, as opposed to the φαινόμενον οι apparent truth. The source of knowledge, Plato pronounces to be not the evidence of our senses, which are occupied with contingent matter, nor yet the understanding, but reason, whose object is that which is invariable and absolute (τὸ ὄντως ὂν.) He held the doctrine of the existence, in the soul, of certain innate ideas, νοήματα), which form the basis of our conceptions, and the elements of our practical resolutions. To these ideat, as he termed them, (the eternal παραδείγματα, types or models of all things, and the ἀρχαί, or principles of our knowledge,) we refer the infinite variety of individual objects presented to us (τὸ ἄπειρον, and τὰ πολλά). Hence it follows that all these details of knowledge are not the result of experience, but only developed by it. The soul recollects the ideas in proportion as it becomes acquainted with their

copies (ὁμοιώματα), with which the world is filled; the process being that of recalling to mind the circumstances of a state of pre-existence. Inasmuch, as the objects thus presented to the mind correspond in part with its ideas, they must have some principle in common that principle is the Divinity, who has formed these external objects after the model of the ideas. Tennemann's Man. of Phil. s. 132.

Ερωτῶντες καὶ ἀποκρινόμενοι.] So intr. c. 25. a med. ἡ ουσία, ἧς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἀποκρινόμενοι, i. e, διαλεγόμενοι, discussing or arguing in the form of question and answer. Cf. Theat. p. 146. C. ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ δεῖ ἐρωτῶντας τε καὶ ἀποκρινομένους ἀλλήλοις σπουδάσαι αὐτ τοῦ περὶ τὸν λόγον.

Καὶ εἰ μὲν λαβόντες — εἰδέναι.] Socrates had already arrived at the conclusion, that those ideas which constituted knowledge had been received by the mind before birth. He now unfolds the subject more fully and expressly, and argues, that if this knowledge, having been once received, was not in every instance lost at the time of birth, we should be born with it, and possess it through life, for to know anything is to retain the knowledge of it when once acquired, as oblivion or forgetfulness is to lose it afterwards. If, then, we were possessed of this knowledge before being born, and are unconscious of it at the period of our birth, and that it is subsequently so called into operation as to convey a satisfactory proof of its preexistence in the mind, it should be

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καὶ ἀεὶ διὰ βίου εἰδέναι· τὸ γὰρ εἰδέναι τοῦτ ̓ ἐστί, λαβόντα του ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἀπολωλεκέναι. ἢ οὐ τοῦτο λήθην λέγομεν, ὦ Σιμμία, ἐπιστήμης ἀποβολήν; Πάντως δή που, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. Εἰ δέ γε, οἶμαι, λαβόντες πρὶν γενέσθαι γιγνόμενοι ἀπωλέσαμεν, ὕστερον δὲ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι χρώμενοι περὶ ταῦτα ἐκείνας ἀναλαμβάνομεν τὰς ἐπιστήμας ἃς ποτε καὶ πρὶν εἴχομεν, ἆρ ̓ οὐχ, ὃ καλοῦμεν μανθάνειν, οἰκείαν ἂν ἐπιστήμην ἀναλαμβάνειν εἴη; τοῦτο δέ που ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι λέγοντες ὀρθῶς ἂν λέγοιΠάνυ γε. Δυνατὸν γὰρ δὴ τοῦτό γ' ἐφάνη, αἰσθόμενόν τι ἡ ἰδόντα ἢ ἀκούσαντα ἤ τινα ἄλλην αἴσθησιν λαβόντα ἕτερόν τι ἀπὸ τούτου ἐννοῆσαι δ ἐπελέληστο, ᾧ τοῦτο ἐπλησίαζεν ἀνόμοιον ἂν ἤ ᾧ ὅμοιον. ὥστε ὅ περ λέγω, δυοῖν θάτερον, ἤτοι ἐπιστάμενοί τε αὐτὰ γεγόναμεν καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα διὰ βίου πάντες, ἡ ὕστερον οὖς φαμεν μανθάνειν, οὐδὲν ἀλλ ̓ ἢ ἀναμιμνήσκονται οὗτοι καὶ ἡ μάθησις ἀνάμνησις ἂν εἴη. Καὶ μάλα δὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Σώκρατες.

μεν ;

§. 21. Πότερον οὖν αἱρεῖ ὦ Σιμμία; ἐπισταμένους ἡμᾶς γεγονέναι, ἢ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι ὕστερον ὧν

called remembrance, if we would designate it correctly. This view of the passage appears to be borne out by the succceding portion of the chapter, which is devoted to a development of the same principle, and closes with a statement in sum of both sides of the question; either that we are born conscious of those ideas, and continue so through life, or, the knowledge is revived after a temporary loss; in other words, it is remembrance, which is the position to be proved.

̓Απολωλεκέναι.]

Cf. Horat. Epist. ii. 1. 84. "Vel quia turpe putant parere minoribus et quæ Imberbes didicere, senes perdenda fateri."

Επιστήμης ἀποβολήν.] Cf. Sympos. c. 26. λήθη γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἔξοδος. Nemes. de Nat. Homin. Ρ. 202. ed. Matth. λήθη δ' ἔστι μνήμης ἀποβολή.

Περὶ ταῦτα.] i. e. Τὰ ἐνταῦθα, τα

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πρότερον ἐπιστήμην εἰληφότες ἦμεν; Οὐκ ἔχω, Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἑλέσθαι. Τί δέ; τόδε ἔχεις ἑλέσθαι, καὶ τῇ σοι δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτοῦ; ἀνὴρ ἐπιστάμενος περὶ ὧν ἐπίσταται ἔχοι ἂν δοῦναι λόγον ἢ οὔ; Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὦ Σωκρατες. Η καὶ δοκοῦσί σοι πάντες ἔχειν διδόναι λόγον περὶ τούτων ὧν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν ; Βουλοίμην μέντ ̓ ἄν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι μὴ αὔριον τηνικάδε οὐκέτι ᾖ ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς ἀξίως οἷός τε τοῦτο ποιῆσαι. Οὐκ ἄρα δοκοῦσί σοι ἐπίστασθαί γε, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, πάντες αὐτά; Οὐδαμῶς. Αναμιμνήσκονται ἄρα ἅ ποτε ἔμαθον ; ̓Ανάγκη. Πότε λαβοῦσαι αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτῶν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἀφ' οὗ γε ἄνθρωποι γεγόναμεν. Οὐ δῆτα. Πρότερον ἄρα. Ναί. Ἦσαν ἄρα, ὦ Σιμμία, αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ πρότερον, πρὶν εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώπου εἴδει, χωρὶς σωμάτων, καὶ φρόνησιν εἶχον. Εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἅμα γιγνόμενοι λαμβάνομεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταύτας τὰς ἐπιστήμας· οὗτος γὰρ λείπεται ἔτι ὁ χρόνος. Εἶεν, ὦ ἑταῖρε ἀπόλλυμεν δὲ αὐτὰς ἐν ποίῳ ἄλλῳ χρόνῳ; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔχοντές γε αὐτὰς γιγνόμεθα, ὡς ἄρτι ὡμολογήσαμεν ἢ ἐν τούτῳ ἀπόλλυμεν ἐν ᾧ περ καὶ λαμβάνομεν; ἢ ἔχεις ἄλλον

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Εν ποίῳ ἄλλῳ χρόνῳ.] at what other time, sc. than that of our being born: the argument then is, we cannot receive these ideas at our birth, for that is the time when they are admitted to be lost; nor can any other period be made out in which we may be said to lose them. Olympiod. Exerp. Cod. i. p. 62. Ὅτι ἐν τῇ πρώτη γενέσει ἡ σφοδροτάτη μεταβολή ἐστιν· αὕτη δὲ ἐκπλήττει τὴν μνήμην καὶ ταράττου τα λήθην ποιεῖ· τότε ἄρα οὐκ ἂν ἐλάβομεν ἐπιστήμην· πρότερον ἄρα τοῦ σώματος· ἤτοι δὲ προσεχῶς, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν νεοτελῶν τῶν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας, ἢ καὶ ἐκ προγενεστέρων ἔτι βίων.

Οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔχοντές γε αὐτ.] In reference to Οὐκ ἄρα δοκοῦσι — ἐπί στασθαι-πάντες αὐτά, supr.

τινὰ εἰπεῖν χρόνον ; Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ ̓ ἔλαθον ἐμαυτὸν οὐδὲν εἰπών.

§. 22. ̓Αρ ̓ οὖν οὕτως, ἔφη, ἔχει ἡμῖν, ὦ Σιμμία ; εἰ μὲν ἔστιν ἃ θρυλοῦμεν ἀεί, καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη οὐσία, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πάντα ἀναφέρομεν, ὑπάρχουσαν πρότερον ἀνευρίσκοντες ἡμετέραν οὖσαν, καὶ ταῦτα ἐκείνῃ ἀπεικάζομεν, ἀναγκαῖον, οὕτως ὡς περ καὶ ταῦτα ἔστιν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχὴν εἶναι καὶ πρὶν γεγονέναι ἡμᾶς· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι ταῦτα, ἄλλως ἂν ὁ λόγος οὗτος εἰρημένος εἴη; ἆρ ̓ οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἴση ἀνάγκη ταῦ τά τε εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας ψυχὰς πρὶν καὶ ἡμᾶς γεγονέναι, καὶ εἰ μὴ ταῦτα, οὐδὲ τάδε; Ὑπερφυῶς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Σιμμίας, δοκεῖ μοι ἡ αὐτὴ ἀνάγ κη εἶναι, καὶ εἰς καλόν γε καταφεύγει ὁ λόγος, εἰς τὸ ὁμοίως εἶναι τήν τε ψυχὴν ἡμῶν πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς, καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἣν σὺ νῦν λέγεις. οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ἔγωγε οὐδὲν οὕτω μοι ἐναργὲς ὂν ὡς τοῦτο, τὸ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα εἶναι ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα, καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ἃ σὺ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες καὶ ἔμοιγε ἱκανῶς ἀποδέδεικται.

Ελαθον-οὐδὲν εἰπών.] Heindorf observes that the part. of the aorist is always joined to the aorist λαθεῖν, as in the form λάθε βιώσας, and quotes Protag. s. 31. ἐλαθεν αὐτὸν καταναλώσας τὰς δυνάμεις. Demosth. Leptin. c. 104. ἵνα μὴ λάθητε ἐξαπατηθεντες. &c. Stallbaum had expressed himself as nearly of the same opinion, ad Phileb. p. 86. but found reason to change it from the following passages amongst others; in Criton. c. 10. ἐλάθομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς παίδων οὐδὲν διαφέροντες. Theætet. p. 169. C. μὴ που παιδικόν τι λάθωμὲν εἶδος τῶν λόγων ποιούμενοι. de Repub. vi. p. 486. Α. μή σε λάθη μετέχουσα ἀνελευθερίας. Ibid. v. p. 457. Ε. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔλαθες · ἀποδιδράσκων,

δε

§. 22. Καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν.] Vulg. καλόν τέ τι καὶ ἀγαθόν, which is nei

ther sanctioned by the best copies, nor
by the sense of the passage, the present
question not being whether any thing
deserved to be called beautiful and good,
but whether there was the αὐτὸ τὸ κα-
λoν and αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν, which alone
had a real existence; whence ουσία,
i. e. αὐτὸ ἕκαστον, ὅ ἐστι τὸ ὄν
Cf. Parmenid. p. 152. kaì μǹ ¿voía åpa
εἴπερ μὴ ἔστι.

Καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσ.] h. e. Et ad harum essentiarum notiones ea, quæ sensibus percipiuntur, omnia referimus. HEIND.

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Τί δὲ δὴ Κέβητι; ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης· δεῖ γὰρ καὶ Κέβητα πείθειν. ἱκανῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὡς ἔγωγε οἶμαι. και καρτερώτατος ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις. ἀλλ ̓ οἶμαι οὐκ ἐνδεῶς τοῦτο πεπεῖσθαι αὐτόν, ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς ἦν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή.

§. 23. Εἰ μέντοι καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν ἔτι ἔστ ται, οὐδ ̓ αὐτῷ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποδεδεῖχθαι, ἀλλ ̓ ἔτι ἔνέστηκεν, ὁ νῦν δὴ Κέβης ἔλεγε, τὸ τῶν πολλῶν, ὅπως μὴ ἅμα ἀποθνήσκοντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου διασκεδάννυται ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ αὐτῇ τοῦ εἶναι τοῦτο τέλος ᾖ. Τί γὰρ κωλύει γίγνεσθαι μὲν αὐτὴν καὶ ξυνίστασθαι ἀλλόθεν ποθὲν καὶ εἶναι πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπειον σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἀφίκηται καὶ ἀπαλλάττηται τούτου, τότε καὶ αὐτὴν τελευτᾷν καὶ διαφθείρεσθαι ; Εὖ λέγεις, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, ὁ Κέβης φαίνεται γὰρ ὡς περ ἥμισυ ἀποδεδεῖχθαι οὗ δεῖ, ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς ἦν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή· δεῖ δὲ προσαποδεῖξαι ὅτι καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν, οὐδὲν ἧττον ἔσται ἢ πρὶν γενέσθαι, εἰ μέλλει τέλος ἡ ἀπόδειξις ἕξειν. Αποδέδεικται μέν, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ νῦν, εἰ θέλετε συνθεῖναι

sible certainty.

Καρτερώτατος άνθρ.] Καρτεροί and μαλακοί are terms in frequent use with Plato, by whom they are applied, respectively, to those who are persevering and obstinate, or those who are easily convinced, and yielding in debate.

Οὐκ ἐνδεῶς.] Suficiently, satisfactorily.

§. 23. Εἰ μέντοι.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 617.5.

*Ετι ἐνέστηκεν.] Is still in the way. i. e. obstructs conviction. — Όπως μὴ, lest; see Viger, c. vii. s. 10. r. 4. Matthiæ Gr. 565. Obs. 2.-Διασκεδάννυται; a form of the subjunctive for διασκεδαννύηται, as c. 24. init. μὴ διαφυσᾷ καὶ διασκεδάννυσιν for διασκεδαννύμ. V. Buttmann. Gram. Ampl. i. p. 540.

3

Αλλόθεν ποθεν.] From some place or other. ἁμόθεν ποθ. Bekk.—Επειδὰν δε ἀφίκηται, Intell. εἰς ἀνθρώπειον σῶμα.

Προσαποδεῖξαι ὅτι καὶ ἐπ.] The second part of the argument Cebes as serts to be still wanting, the proof that the soul survives the body, and is not lost when it leaves it. This, Socrates answers, is sufficiently apparent to himself, for it is a natural consequence of what had been demonstrated already; since, if it be true that nothing in nature is destroyed, but merely undergoes a change, and if it be equally true that the mind is possessed of a certain knowledge without the aid of the body, it is necessary that the soul should survive the death of the body. But to remove all

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