δέ τινα τρόπον τοῦτον· ἐάν τίς τι ἕτερον ἢ ἰδὼν ἢ ἀκούσας ἤ τινα ἄλλην αἴσθησιν λαβὼν μὴ μόνον ἐκεῖνο γνῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕτερον ἐννοήσῃ, οὗ μὴ ἡ αὐτὴ. ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ ̓ ἄλλη, ἆρ ̓ οὐχὶ τοῦτο δικαίως λέγομεν ὅτι ἀνεμνήσθη οὗ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἔλαβεν; Πῶς λέγεις ; Οἷον τὰ τοιάδε· ἄλλή που ἐπιστήμη ἀνθρώπου καὶ λύρας. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Οὐκοῦν οἶσθα ὅτι οἱ ἐρασταί, ὅταν ἴδωσι λύραν ἢ ἱμάτιον ἤ τι ἄλλο οἷς τὰ παιδικὰ αὐτῶν εἴωθε χρῆσθαι, πάσχουσι τοῦτο· ἔγνωσάν τε τὴν λύραν καὶ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔλαβον τὸ εἰδος ποῦ παιδὸς οὗ ἦν ἡ λύρα; τοῦτο δ ̓ ἐστὶν ἀνάμνήσις ̇ ὥς πέρ γε καὶ Σιμμίαν τις ἰδὼν πολλάκις Κέβητος ἀνεμνήσθη, καὶ ἄλλα που μυρία τοιαῦτ ̓ ἂν εἴη. Μυρία μέντοι νὴ Δί ̓, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Οὐκοῦν ἦ δ ̓ ὅς, τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀνάμνησίς τίς ἐστι; μάλιστα Εάν τίς τι ἕτερον.] i. e. If one should, by sight or hearing, or any other perception, receive an idea of some one object distinct from any other, (as the idea of a lyre, which is distinct from that of its owner,) and along with this idea should receive another impression, (that of the owner of the lyre,) of which the knowledge is equally distinct as in the former instance, how is it not justly argued that he remembered that of which the latter impression was so received? V. Cousin renders the passage; Par exemple, lorsqu'un homme en voyant ou en entendant quelque chose, en l'apercevant par quelque autre sens, n'acquiert pas seulement l'idée de la chose aperçue, mais en même temps pense à une autre chose dont la connaissance est pour lui d'un tout autre genre que la première, ne disons-nous pas avec raison que cet homme se ressouvient de la chose à laquelle il a pensé occasionelle ment. Οἱ ἐρασταί, ὅταν ἴδωσι λύραν, κ.τ.λ.] Cf. Maxim. Τyr. Diss. xvi. 7. p. 185. ἤδη τις καὶ λύραν ἰδὼν ἐμνήσθη τῶν χρησαμένων τῷ λύρᾳ· κοῦφον γάρ τι χρῆμα ἀνάμνησις καὶ εὔκολον. viii. 10. αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο τὸ τῶν ἐρώντων πάθος, οἷς ἥδιστον μὲν θέαμα οἱ τῶν αν παιδικῶν τύποι, ἡδὺ δὲ εἰς ἀνάμνη- Πάσχ. τούτο.] i. e. Are thus affected. Μέντοι νὴ Δί.] Μέντοι is of frequent occurrence in answers, ir the sense of certainly, very true, indeed, Matthiæ Gr. 622. 6. 1 μέντοι ὅταν τις τοῦτο πάθῃ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἃ ὑπὸ χρόνου καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐπισκοπεῖν ἤδη ἐπιλέληστο; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Τί δαί; ἦ δ ̓ ὅς· ἔστιν ἵππον γεγραμμένον ἰδόντα καί λύραν γεγραμμένην ἀνθρώπου ἀναμνησθῆναι, καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα γεγραμμένον Κέβητος ἀναμνησθῆναι ; Πάνυ Οὐκουν καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα γεγραμμένον αὐτοῦ Σιμμίου ἀναμνησθῆναι; Ἔστι μέντοι, ἔφη. γε. §. 19. ̓Αρ ̓ οὖν οὐ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα ξυμβαίνει τὴν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι μὲν ἀφ ̓ ὁμοιων, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀπ ̓ ἀνομοίων ; Ξυμβαίνει. ̓Αλλ ̓ ὅταν γε ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἀναμιμνήσκηταί τίς τι, ἆρ ̓ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον τόδε προσπάσχειν, ἐννοεῖν εἴ τέ τι ἐλλείπει τοῦτο κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα εἴτε μὴ ἐκείνου οὗ ἀνεμνήσθη; ̓Ανάγκη, ἔφη. Σκόπει δή, ἦ δ ̓ ὅς, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει. φαμέν πού τι εἶναι ἴσον, οὐ ξύλον λέγω ξύλῳ οὐδὲ λίθον λίθῳ οὐδ ̓ ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἕτερόν τι, αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον, φῶμέν τι εἶναι ἢ μηδέν ; Φῶμεν μέντοι νὴ Δί ̓, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, θαυ Ὑπὸ χρόνου καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐπ.] i. e. Owing to length of time and want of observation. Αὐτοῦ Σιμμίου.] Simmias himself; as opposed to his picture, Σιμμίαν— γεγραμμένον, supr. §. 19. Τόδε προσπάσχειν, ἐννοεῖν. See Matthiæ Gr. 472. 2. b. Εἴ τέ τι ἐλλείπει τοῦτο—ἐκείνου.] i. e. Whether this, as far as regards the likeness, comes short in any respect, or not, of that which he remembered, Φαμέν πού τι εἶναι ἴσον.] See supr. c. 10. a med. τι εἶναι δίκαιον. n. c. 50. init. Socrates alludes here to the τὸ ἴσον παχυμερὲς, the equality supposed by the vulgar to exist between one thing and another, which were in reality unequal, and the τὸ ἀκριβὲς ἔσον, οἱ αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον infr., which is the idea of equality contained within the mind, and from which it is made apparent, that there is no actual equality or similitude between the things in nature; “Tantam enim,” says Quinctilian, In. Or. x. 11., “ difficultatem habet similitudo, ut ne ipsa quidem natura in hoc ita evaluerit, ut non res quæ simillimæ videantur discrimine aliquo discernantur.” Whence it appears that the ancients were not unacquainted with those views of the subject which have occupied the attention of more recent philosophers. GoTTL. Οὐ ξύλον ξύλῳ λέγω, κ.τ.λ.] Οlymp. Τὸ ἐνταῦθα ἴσον οὐκ ἀκριβές ἐστι. πῶς γὰρ ἀκριβῶς ἴσον τὸ καὶ ψαμμίου μεγέθους ἀφαιρεθέντος ἢ προστιθέν· τος ἴσον μεῖναν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁρῶμεν οὐδὲν ἀκριβὲς, οὐδὲ ἀκούομεν κατὰ τὸν αὐτοῦ λόγον. ἀπὸ οὖν τοῦ παχυμεροῦς ἴσον ἐπὶ τὸ ἀκριβὲς ἴσον ἐρ μαστῶς γε. Η καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα αὐτὸ ὅ ἔστιν ; Πάνυ γε, ἦ δ ̓ ὅς. Πόθεν λαβόντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην; αρ οὐκ ἐξ ὧν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἢ ξύλα ἢ λίθους ἢ ἀλλ ̓ ἄττα ἰδόντες ἴσα, ἐκ τούτων ἐκεῖνο ἐνενοήσαμεν, ἕτερον ὂν τούτων ; ἢ οὐχ ἕτερόν σοι φαίνεται; σκόπει δὲ καὶ τῇδε. ἆρ οὐ λίθοι μὲν ἴσοι καὶ ξύλα ἐνίοτε ταὐτὰ ὄντα τοτὲ μὲν ἴσα φαίνεται, τοτὲ δ ̓ οὔ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Τί δαί; αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα ἔστιν ὅτε ἄνισά σοι ἐφάνη, ἢ ἡ ἰσότης ἀνισότης; Οὐδεπώποτέ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες. Οὐ ταὐτὸν ἄρ ̓ ἐστίν, ἦ δ ̓ ὅς, ταῦτά τε τὰ ἴσα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον. Οὐδαμῶς μοι φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες. ̓Αλλὰ μὴν ἐκ τούτων γ ̓, ἔφη, τῶν ἴσων, ἑτέρων ὄντων ἐκείνου τοῦ ἴσου, ὅμως αὐτοῦ τὴν ̔Ο δὲ Σιμμίας ἑτοίμως (ἔχει) τῷ εἶναι Πόθεν λαβόντες.] Sc. ἐπιστάμεθα. asks whether it does not sometimes oc- changeably the same. Socrates evidently intends to draw this distinction between the objects of sense, and their intelligible forms, that the latter only admit of being certainly known, and are the only tests of truth. This is the view taken of the passage by Stallbaum; Heindorf explains it: easdem lapides eademque ligna alii lapidi lignore æqualia apparere alii inaequalia : contra aquale ipsum, aὖτὸ τὸ ἴσον, semper esse aquale, nunquam inæquale ; and for φαίνεται would read δοκεῖ, but either is applicable to the objects of sense. He objects further to τοτὲ μὲν, and τοτὲ δέ after ἐνίοτε, and proposes τῷ μὲν—τῷ δέ instead. This is unnecessary, however, from the position which ἐνίοτε may be made to occupy in the interpretation of the sen tence which is thus given by Stallbaum ; annon interdum accidit ut lapides et ligna sibi aqualia, quamquam eadem sunt tamen modo æqualia, modo inæqualia videantur, h. e. sensibus apparent. This is decidedly preferable, the question being simply to decide upon the superiority of the ideal over the corporeal in the investigation and discernment of truth. Upon τοτὲ δ ̓ οὔ, see Matthiæ Gr. s. 608. 5. e. Αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα.] i. q. αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον, but used in the plural, as the affection, not of one, but several minds. So Olympiod Cod. i. ex Plut. t. v. p. 741. Wytt. Ὅτι ποτὲ μὲν ἴσον, ποτὲ δέ αὐτὰ ἴσα λέγει· ἢ εἰς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀποβλέπων νόας, ὧν ἐν ἑκάστω τὸ αὐτό ἴσον· ἢ τὸ μὲν ἐν τῷ νῷ ἀποδοτέον, τὸ δέ πεπληθυσμένου τῇ ψυχῇ· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὸ ἓν πολλὰ, διὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῇ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ὑπόβασιν. Cf. Parmenid. c. 7. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοιά τις ἀπέφαινεν ἀνόμοια γιγνόμενα ἢ τὰ ἀνόμοια ὅμοια, τέρας ἂν, οἶμαι, ἦν, &c. According to Heindorf, the plural may be used, because more than one object is involved in the notion of equality or similitude. Ταῦτά—τὰ ἴσα.] Applied, demnonstratively, to the individual objects submit ted to the senses. ἐπιστήμην ἐννενόηκάς τε καὶ εἴληφας; ̓Αληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις. Οὐκοῦν ἢ ὁμοίου ὄντος τούτοις ἢ ἀνομοίου; Πάνυ γε. Διαφέρει δέ γ, ἦ δ ̓ ὅς, οὐδέν. ὅταν οὖν ἄλλο ἰδὼν ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς ὄψεως,ἄλλο ἐννοήσῃς, εἴτε ὅμοιον εἴτε ἀνόμοιον, ἀναγκαῖον, ἔφη, αὐτὸ ἀνάμνησιν γεγονέναι. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, Τί δαὶ τόδ ̓ ; ἦ δ ̓ ὅς. ἦ πάσχομέν τι τοιοῦτον περὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ξύλοις τε καὶ οἷς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν τοῖς ἴσοις; ἆρα φαίνεται ἡμῖν οὕτως ἴσα εἶναι ὥς περ αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἴσον, ἢ ἐνδεῖ τι ἐκείνου τῷ μὴ τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἷον τὸ ἴσον, ἢ οὐδέν; Καὶ πολύ γε, ἔφη, ἐνδεῖ. η Οὐκοῦν ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν τίς τι ἰδὼν ἐννοήσῃ ὅτι βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο, ὁ νῦν ἐγὼ ὁρῶ, εἶναι οἷον ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων, ἐνδεῖ δὲ καὶ οὐ δύναται τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἷον ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλ ̓ ἔστι φαυλότερον, ἀναγκαῖόν που τὸν τοῦτο ἐννοοῦντα τυχεῖν προειδότα ἐκεῖνο ᾧ φησὶν αὐτὸ προσεοικέναι μέν, ἐνδεεστέρως δὲ ἔχειν; Ανάγκη. Τί οὖν; τὸ τοιοῦτον· πεπόνθαμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς, ἢ οὔ, περί τε τὰ ἴσα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον; Παντάπασί γε. ̓Αναγκαῖον ἄρα ἡμᾶς προειδέναι τὸ ἴσον πρὸ ἐκείνου τοῦ χρόνου, ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἰδόντες τὰ ἴσα ἐνενοήσαμεν ὅτι ὀρέγεται μὲν πάντα ταῦτ ̓ εἶναι οἷον τὸ ἴσον, ̔́Οταν οὖν.] Ἕως γὰρ ἂν ἄλλο, κ.τ.λ. ΒεκΚ. *Αλλο ἰδὼν---ἄλλο ἐννοήσῃς.] The distinction must be observed here between the perception of the eye and of the mind, which are both caused by the same glance. Both together constitute the ἀνάμνησις of Socrates, as he proceeds to prove.--Αὐτὸ ἀνάμνησιν γεγονέναι—αὐτό, i.e. τὸ ἄλλο ἰδόντα ἄλλο νοῆσαι. ̓Αρα φαίνεται ἡμῖν.] Added in explanation of ἦ πάσχομέν τι-τοῖς ἴσοις preced. Ἢ ἐνδεῖ τι ἐκείνου.] Sc. τοῦ ἴσου. Οτι βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο.] Βούλομαι, and ἐθέλειν, signify to intend, to aim or endeavour, and are used in this sense of things as well as persons. ̓Αναγκαῖον-τυχεῖν προειδότα ἐκεῖνο, κ. τ. λ.] Olymp. Ὅτι γὰρ δευτέρα ἐστὶ γνῶσις, δηλοῖ αὐτὴ ἡ μετάβάσις. εἰ γὰρ πρώτῃ ἦν, οὐδὲν προστιθέναι ὅλως ἠδυνάμεθα, οὐδὲ μετάβασις ἐγίγνετο. ὁ γαρ τὴν εἰκόνα Σωκράτους θεασάμενος, μὴ πρότερον δὲ τὸν Σωκράτην θεασάμενος, ἵσταται μέχρι τοῦ εἰκόνος.- ̓Αναγκ. που, either εἶναι may be understood here, or the construction explained by an anacoluthon. Τὸ τοιοῦτον πεπόνθαμεν.] i. e. Are we similarly affected ; as ἦ πάσχομεν τί τ. supr. Οτι ὀρέγεται μὲν πάντα τ. εἶν.] h. e. Hæc omnia, (rà ioa) appetere ipsi æqualitatis speciei fieri similia, nec tamen fieri posse. STALL. According to ἔχει δὲ ἐνδεεστέρως. Ἔστι ταῦτα. §. 20. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν λαβόντες αὐτὴν πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἔχοντες ἐγενόμεθα, ἠπιστάμεθα καὶ πρὶν γενέσθαι καὶ εὐθὺς γενόμενοι οὐ μόνον τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ Plato, when the objects submitted to the senses are compared, with respect to their qualities, with the intelligible forms, ἰδέαι, existing in the mind, they make an effort to attain the uniformity and perfection, of which, from the uncertainty and defectiveneness of their nature, they are proved to be incapable. Cf. infr. ὅτι προθυμεῖται μὲν πάντα τοιαῦτα εἶναι οἷον ἐκεῖνο, κ. τ. λ., whence Stephens would read πάντα τοιαῦτ ̓ εἶναι for πάντα ταῦτ ̓ εἶν. as supr. Ταὐτὸν δὲ πάντα ταῦτα λέγω.] So crates asserts that the senses had in this way no effect upon the point which he desired to prove, that whether the perception was awakened in the mind from the sight, the touch, or any other of the Πρός γὲ ὃ βούλεται δ.] i. e. Πρός Τοῦ ὃ ἔστιν ἴσον.] h. e. Τοῦ ὄντως ἴσου ὄντος, sc. idea æqualitatis.— STALL. ̓Ανοίσειν.] Put βραχυλόγως for ἀναφέροντες ἐνθυμεῖσθαι. HEIND. Γενόμενοι εὐθὺς.] At once, on being |