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τοῦ καθεύδοντος, οἶσθ ̓ ὅτι τελευτῶντα πάντ ̓ ἂν λῆρον τὸν ̓Ενδυμίωνα ἀποδείξειε καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἂν φαίνοιτο, διὰ τὸ καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ταὐτὸν ἐκείνῳ πεπονθέναι, καθεύδειν· κἂν εἰ ξυγκρίνοιτο μὲν πάντα, διακρίνοιτο δὲ μή, ταχὺ ἂν τὸ τοῦ ̓Αναξαγόρου γεγονὸς εἴη, ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα. Ωσαύτως δέ, ὦ φιλε

length. Matthiæ Gr. s. 557. 4.

Τελευτῶντα πάντ ̓ ἂν λῆρον, κ.τ.λ.] i. e. All things coming to an end would render the fable of Endymion a mere jest, and he should no longer be considered of importance because all nature would then be circumstanced like himself, and he would be no longer remarkable for the singularity of his situation. Heindorf correctly understands ὁ Ενδυμίων as the subject of φαίνοιτο, and compares the construction, as supr., with Euthyd. s. 10. φοβούμεθα περὶ αὐτοῦ-μή τις φθῇ ἡμᾶς επ ̓ ἄλλο τι ἐπιτήδευμα τρέψας αὐτοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν, καὶ διαφθαρῷ (sc. αὐτός.) Wyttenbach explains the passage: tandem omnia fabulam Endymionis nugas esse ostenderent et nusquam apparerent; making πάντα the subject of both verbs; but the former interpretation is the more effective, and equally admissible. The beauty of Endymion, whose slumbers were proverbial for their continuance and soundness, captivated Diana, and induced the enamoured deity to visit the object of her love upon Latmos, a mountain of Caria, the favorite place of his repose. Cf. Olympiod. Ελέγετο δὲ οὗτος ἀεὶ καθεύδειν, διότι ἀστρονομῶν ἐπ ̓ ἐρημίας διέτριβε· διὸ καὶ φίλος τῷ Σελήνῃ· ὃ δὴ καὶ περὶ Πτολεμαίου φασίν· οὗτος γὰρ ἐπὶ μ ̓ ἔτη ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις πτεροῖς τοῦ Κανώβου ᾤκει ἀστρονομίᾳ σχολάζων· διὸ καὶ ἀνεγράψατο τὰς στήλας ἐκεῖ τῶν εύρημένων αὐτῷ ἀστρονομικῶν δογμά


Τὸ τοῦ ̓Αναξαγόρου γεγονὸς εἴη.] See Apol. Socr. c. 14. Diog. Laert. ii. 6. records the opening doguna of the system of Anaxagoras; Πάντα χρήματα ἦν ὁμοῦ, εἶτα νοῦς ἐλθὼν αὐτὰ διεκόσμησε. Adhering to the principle, ex nihilo nihil fit, he admitted the existence of a chaotic matter, the constituent elements of which, always united

and identical, (τὰ ὁμοιομερῆ), are incapable of being decomposed; and by the arrangement of which, and dissemination, he undertook to account for the phenomena of the natural world: adding, that this chaos, which he conceived surrounded by air and ether, must have been put in movement and animated, at the first, by the Intelligent Principle. Νοῦς he defined to be the ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως. From this principle he deduces motion, at first circular; the result of which rotation (he maintained) was the separation of the discordant particles; the union and amalgamation of those which were homogeneous ; and, in fine, the creation of symmetry and order. Anaxagoras was more inclined to the study of physics than of metaphysics, for which he is blamed by Plato; see infr. c. 46.; and by Aristotle, Metaph. 1. 4., who accuses him of using the Deity only as a machine in his philosophy. Accordingly he explained, on physical principles, the formation of plants and animals, and even of the heavenly bodies, as in Apol. Socr. loc. cit. supr. which drew on him the reproach of atheism. He admitted, to a certain extent, the validity of the

evidence of the senses; but reserved for

reason (λόγος) the discrimination of objective truth. Tennemann's Hist. of Philos. sect. 106. By some, Anaxagoras is asserted to have been the disciple of Hermotimus, of Clazomenæ, who is said to have recognized a superior Intelligence as the author of nature, and to whose mystical revelations the former is supposed to have been considerably indebted.

Ωσαύτως δὲ.] Referring to olov preced. as οὕτως δὲ, (not δὴ) is generally used after ὥσπερ. Cf. Soph. Αntig. 423. ̔Η παῖς ὁρᾶται κἀνακωκύει πικράς ̓́Ορνιθος ὀξὺν φθόγγον, ὡς ὅταν κενῆς Εὐνῆς νεοσσῶν ὀρφανὸν

Κέβης, καὶ εἰ ἀποθνήσκοι μὲν πάντα ὅσα τοῦ ζῆν μεταλάβοι, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀποθάνοι, μενοι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι τὰ τεθνεῶτα καὶ μὴ πάλιν ἀναβιώσκοιτο, ἆρ ̓ οὐ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη τελευτῶντα πάντα τεθνάναι καὶ μηδὲν ζῇν; εἰ γὰρ ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων τὰ ζῶντα γίγνοιτο, τὰ δὲ ζῶντα θνήσκοι, τίς μηχανὴ μὴ οὐχὶ πάντα καταναλωθῆναι εἰς τὸ τεθνάναι; Οὐδὲ μία μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖς παντάπασιν ἀληθῆ λέγειν. Ἔστι γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ὡς ἐμοι δοκεῖ, παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτω, καὶ ἡμεῖς αὐτὰ ταῦτα οὐκ ἐξαπατώμενοι ὁμολογοῦμεν, ἀλλ ̓ ἔστι τῷ ὄντι καὶ τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων τοὺς ζῶντας γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὰς τῶς τεθνεώτων ψυχὰς εἶναι, καὶ ταῖς μέν γ ̓ ἀγαθαῖς ἄμεινον εἶναι, ταῖς δὲ κακαῖς κάκιον.

§. 18. Καὶ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης ὑπολαβών, καὶ κατ ̓

βλέψῃ λέχος. Οὕτω δὲ χ ̓ αὕτη—γόοισιν ἐξώμωξεν. Εlectr. 25. "Ωσπερ γὰρ ἵππος εὐγενὴς- Ἐν τοῖσι δεινοῖς θυμὸν οὐκ ἀπώλεσεν, ̓Αλλ ̓ ὀρθὸν οὖς ἵστησιν· ὡσαύτως δὲ σὺ Ἡμᾶς τ ̓ ὀτρύνεις, &c. HEIND.

̓Εκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων.] i. e. From any thing else; not from what once had lived for a time, and then died; but had what lived been once in any way produced, and subsequently died without revival, it would be impossible but that all things should have come to an end, as the source of life should be wasted and destroyed. So Heindorf explains the phrase, to obviate the necessity of Dacier's emendation, εἰ γὰρ ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων τὰ ζῶντα μὴ γίγνοιτο.

Τίς μηχανὴ.] i. 4. Οὐδεμία μηχανή; whence μὴ οὐ is correctly used as in ordinary after a negative. Cf. c. 37. sub. mn. δοὺς δὲ ταῦτα ἐκεῖνο μηκέτι συγχωροίη, μὴ οὐ πονεῖν, &c. and intr. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει οὐδενὶ προσήκει θάνατον θαῤῥοῦντι μὴ οὐκ ἀνοήτως θαῤῥεῖν, &c.-Καταναλωθῆναι εἰς τὸ τεθνάναι, i.e. what remedy is there against all things being destroyed by death? So Epicurus, in Epist. ad Herodot. Diog. Laert. x. 39. καὶ εἰ

εφθείρετο δὴ τὸ ἀφανιζόμενον εἰς τὸ
μὴ ὂν, πάντα ἂν ἀπολώλει τὰ πράγ-
ματα, οὐκ ὄντων τῶν εἰς ἃ διελύε-
το.—Οὐδὲ μία ; more emphatic, as Stall-
baum observes, than οὐδεμία, which
signifies simply, none, but the former,
none at all, none whatsoever.

Ἔστι τῷ ὄντι—τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι.]
From what has preceded, Socrates draws
his conclusion of a resurrection from the
dead, which is to be followed by the
judgment, and the distribution of rewards
and punishments, according to the meed
of the immortal souls. Compare with
the text, as supr. St. Paul, Corinth. i.
15. 35. sqq.

§. 18. Καὶ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, κ.τ.λ.]
Socrates having established the point of
the soul's surviving the body, proceeds
now to argue in favour of its preexistence.
Knowledge or science (μάθησις) he as-
serts to be, in reality, but reminiscence
(ἀνάμνησις); because, in the first place,
it one is fairly questioned upon a subject
with which he is unacquainted, his an-
swer will evince a knowledge of, and
power of reasoning upon that, of the ex-
istence of which he was previously un-
aware. This is equally the case in
things sensible or corporeal, and in

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ἐκεῖνόν Ye τὸν λόγον, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ ἀληθής εστιν, ὃν σὺ εἴωθας θαμὰ λέγειν, ὅτι ἡμῖν ἡ μάθησις οὐκ ἄλλο

things abstract or intelligible. Of the latter there exist in the mind exemplars or types, by which qualities and degrees are recognized and decided. What is beautiful, for instance, is acknowledged from its conformity to the idea of beauty preconceived in the mind. So of an action which is perceived by the senses, the merits are weighed by a standard or test which is innate and incorporeal, that is, by a preexisting, abstract idea of the qualities of actions and their degrees of good and evil, not derived from the senses; besides it

is from these universal ideas that we arrive at the perception and knowledge of singulars. Consequently their preexistence, and independence of the body, infer that of the mind, which was also living and active before the body came to light. This doctrine, as Wyttenbach justly observes, however ingenious, is not unexceptionable, for it is possible for those abstract ideas to be attained in many ways during life. There are two opposite opinions of philosophers respecting their origin, the one maintained by Aristotle and Locke, that they are acquired through the medium of the senses, and introduced, like the notions of all things external, into the as yet unoccupied mind; the other maintained by Plato, who inculcates their innateness and preexistence, upon the grounds that the mind could not understand and acknowledge the appearance of what is presented to the senses, unless there was something within to which the external object might be referred, and with which it might be compared. This latter doctrine has been adopted by Leibnitz; but Plato uses it to prove that the mind existed, while the former would merely infer that it contained those ideas before its union with the body. According to Leibnitz, necessary truths are innate not that we are from our birth actually conscious of them, but are born with a capacity for them.. Sensible perceptions are indistinct; all precise knowledge being the property of the understanding.


The ideas which relate to objects without the soul, must have a correspondency with such ob

jects; otherwise they would be mere illusions. Tennemann's Manual of Philos. s. 347.

Μάθησις—ἀνάμνησις.] Cf. in Menon. c. 15. Ατε οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος τε οὖσα καὶ πολλάκις γεγονυῖα, καὶ ἑωρακυῖα καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε καὶ τὰ ἐν "Αιδου καὶ πάντα χρήματα, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅ τι οὐ μεμάθηκεν, ὥστε οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ ἄλλων οἷον τε εἶναι αὐτὴν ἀναμνησθῆναι ἅ γε καὶ πρότερον ἠπίστατο, &c. in Phædr. p. 249. C. TOUTO de doτιν ἀνάμνησις ἐκείνων, ἅ ποτ' εἶδεν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ συμπορευθεῖσα θεω ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι δ ̓ ἐκ τῶνδε ἐκεῖνα, où pádov ȧráoy, &c. Beth. in Consol. "Quod si Platonis Musa personat verum, Quod quisque discit immemor recordatur." This doctrine, which is imputed, as supr. by Plato, to Socrates, appears to have been borrowed from the Pythagoreans. V. Cic. Tusc. Disp. i. 24. and Davis in loc. Augustin. de Immortalitat. s. 6. t. i. p. 290. D. De Quantitate Anim. s. 34. p. 310. D. V. Cousin explains the argument, Œuvres de Plat. i. 165. "Toute science n'est que réminiscence: s'il en est ainsi, il faut que nous ayons su avant cette vie; il faut donc que l'ame ait existé avant de revêtir cette forme humaine; elle peut donc lui survivre.

"Par exemple, les sens nous decouvrent des choses que nous jugeons égales; savoir, des arbres, des pierres, &c.— Mais l'idée d'égalité renfermée dans le jugement que nous portons sur ces choses, d'où l'avons nous tirée ? L'égalité ne doit pas etre confondue avec les choses égales qui ne sont telles que par leur rapport à l'égalité. L'idée de l'égalité ne vient donc point des sens; il suit qu'il faut qu'elle naisse avec nous, ou que nous l'ayons eue avant cette vie, et qu'à l'occasion des objets extérieurs elle nous revienne à la mémoire. Estelle innée, et le seul fait de la naissance la developpe-t-il en nous ? Loin de là: ce n'est pas en entrant dans ce séjour des ténèbres qu'on découvre la lumière; on la perdrait bien plutôt ! Reste donc que nous ayons acquis l'idée de l'égalité avant notre naissance, et que nous ne


τι ἢ ἀνάμνησις τυγχάνει οὖσα, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον ἀνάγκη που ἡμᾶς ἐν προτέρῳ τινὶ χρόνῳ μεμαθηκέναι ἃ νῦν ἀναμιμνησκόμεθα. τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὴ ἦν που ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ πρὶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ εἴδει γενέσθαι· ὥστε καὶ ταύτῃ ἀθάνατόν τι ἔοικεν ἡ ψυχὴ εἶναι. Αλλ ̓, ὦ Κέβης, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας ὑπολαβών, ποῖαι τούτων αἱ ἀποδείξεις; ὑπόμνησόν με ̇ οὐ γὰρ σφόδρα ἐν τῷ παρόντι μέμνημαι. Ἑνὶ μὲν λόγῳ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, καλλίστῳ, ὅτι ἐρωτώμενοι οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἐάν τις καλῶς ἐρωτᾷ, αὐτοὶ λέγουσι πάντα ᾗ ἔχει· καί τοι εἰ μὴ ἐτύγχανεν αὐτοῖς ἐπιστήμη ἐνοῦσα καὶ ὀρθὸς λόγος, οὐκ ἂν οἷοί τ ̓ ἦσαν τοῦτο ποιεῖν. ἔπειτα ἐάν τις ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἄγῃ ἢ ἄλλο

fassions que nous en ressouvenir. Ce que nous disons de l'idée de l'égalité, il faut le dire aussi de l'idée du beau, du bien, du juste. Encore une fois, nous ne puisons pas toutes ces idées dans les impressions extérieures, mais nous les trouvons d'abord dans notre ame qui les possédait avant cette vie; il faut alors que notre ame ait existé avant cette vie; elle peut donc lui survivre.

“On voit que nous avons gardé ici a dessein, et avec un respect scrupuleux, les formes et la phraséologie sons laquelle cette théorie célèbre a paru pour la premiere fois dans le monde philosophique. Mais il faut percer ces enveloppes, pour entrevoir les hautes vérités qui sont dessous. La théorie de la science considerée comme remniniscence, ne nous enseigne-t-elle pas que la puissance intellectuelle prise substantiellement, et avant de se manifester sous la forme de l'ame humaine, contient déja en elle, ou plutôt est elle-inème le type primitif et absolu du beau, du bien, de l'égalité de l'unité, et que lorsqu'elle passe de l'état de substance a celui de personne, et acquiert ainsi la conscience et la pensée distincte en sortant des profondeurs ou elle se cachait à ses propres yeux, elle trouve dans le sentiment obscuret confus de la relation intime qui la rattache à son premier état comme à son centre et a son principe, les idées

du beau, du bien, de l'égalité, de l'unité,
de l'infini, qui alors ne lui paraissent pas
tout-a-fait des découvertes, et ressem-

blent assez à des souvenirs ? C'est
ainsi du moins que j'entends Platon."

Πρὶν ἐν τῷδε-εΐδει.] Explained by
Cicero, Tusc. i. 24. “ nisi aninus ante
quam in corpus intravisset, in rerum
cognitione viguisset."

Ενὶ μὲν λόγῳ καλλίστῳ.] i. e. To comprise all in one most admirable argument ; ἑνὶ λόγω is in frequent use for in sum.

Επειτα ἐάν τις.] Heindorf and Stallbaum object to έπειτα supr., as it is a new argument which is introduced, not the preceding one illustrated by an example. The former would read έπεί τοι, which is not sanctioned, however, by any of the copies.- Ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ; geometrical figures. Cic. Tusc. i. 17. Descriptiones, (explained by Fischer,) forma, figura, geometrica, Allusion seems to be made here to the passage already quoted from the Meno; where Socrates asks one of the attendant boys in Meno's train, a series of questions upon the properties of a square, to which he makes such answers as might be expected from his age, and at the same time is led, by the easy progress of the interrogatives, to evince such an acquaintance with the subject as might have been supposed cousistent with a previous knowledge

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σοι σκο

τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἐνταῦθα σαφέστατα κατηγορεῖ ὅτι τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει. Εἰ δὲ μὴ ταύτῃ γε, ἔφη, πείθει, ὦ Σιμμία, ὁ Σωκράτης, σκέψαι ἐὰν τῇδέ πῇ πουμένῳ συνδόξῃ, ἀπιστεῖς γὰρ δὴ πῶς ἡ καλουμένη μάθησις ἀνάμνησίς ἐστιν; ̓Απιστῶ μὲν ἔγωγ ̓, ἦ δ ̓ ὃς ὁ Σιμμίας, οὔ, αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔφη, δέομαι παθεῖν περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, ἀναμνησθῆναι ̇ καὶ σχεδόν γε ἐξ ὧν Κέβης ἐπεχείρησε λέγειν ἤδη μέμνημαι καὶ πείθομαι, οὐδὲν μέντ ̓ ἂν ἧττον ἀκούοιμι νῦν σὺ πῇ ἐπεχείρησας λέγειν. Τῇδε ἔγωγε, ἦ δ ̓ ὅς. ὁμολογοῦμεν γὰρ δή που, εἴ τίς τι ἀναμνησθήσεται, δεῖν αὐτὸν τοῦτο πρότερόν ποτε ἐπίστασθαι. ̓Αρ ̓ οὖν καὶ τόδε ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν ἐπιστήμη παΠάνυ γε, ἔφη. ραγίγνηται τρόπῳ τοιούτῳ, ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι; λέγω

of the principles of geometry; which is adduced by Socrates as a proof of his argument.

Κατηγορεῖ.] Sc. ὁ ἄγων ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα, or it may be taken impersonally in the sense of, it appears, like ἐδήλωσε, προσημαίνει, δείξει, &c.


̓Απιστεῖς γὰρ.] For you hesitate to admit, &c.

Δέομαι παθεῖν.] i. e. But I require to be made sensible of this very thing, which is the subject of the argument, that is, to be reminded. Simmias evidently refers here to the preceding ἀνάμνησις, with which Ficinus, who reads δέομαι μαθεῖν, understood ἀναμνησθῆναι, as synonymous, but incorrectly, as Serranus justly observes, as it should have been in this case preceded by the article rò, besides that the obvious bearing of the whole passage is against it. Simmias means to say, that he did not disbelieve the doctrine, but wished his memory to be refreshed upon it, whence he asks, as supr. ποῖαι τούτων αἱ ἀποδείξεις; ὑπόμνησόν με,


And he now addresses Socrates to a similar effect, and desires to be made recollect what had been previously argued upon the very subject of all our knowledge being nothing but recollection. All the copies read μαθεῖν, which


is adhered to by Wyttenbach, who
would insert ἢ before περὶ, and ex-
scil. πῶς ἡ καλουμένη μαθήσις ἀνα-
plains the passage : hoc autem ipsum,
minisci, de quo nunc loquimur.
μνησις ἐστιν, desidero discere, aut re-
Serranus first altered it to παθεῖν, which
is in every respect suitable to the sense
of the text as supr. and has been adopted
reading by comparing what follows
by Heindorf, who supports the present
shortly after:
ἀνάμνησίς τίς ἐστι ; μάλιστα μέντοι
ὅταν τις τοῦτο πάθῃ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἃ
Οὐκοῦν-τὸ τοιοῦτον
ὑπὸ χρόνου καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐπισκοπεῖν
ἤδη ἐπιλέληστο; c. 19. init. ἆρ ̓ οὐκ
ἀναγκαῖον τόδε προπάσχειν, ἐννοεῖν,
μᾶς ἀνερέσθαι ἑαυτούς, τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ
&c. c. 25. Οὔκουν τοιόνδε τι—δεῖ ἡ-
ἄρα προσήκει τοῦτο τὸ πάθος πάσ-
τοῦ ποίου τινὸς δεδιέναι, &c.
χειν, τὸ διασκεδάννυσθαι, καὶ ὑπὲρ

Nevertheless, I would now hear how you
Οὐδὲν μέντ ̓ ἂν ἧττον ἀκου.] i. e.
taken with ἀκούοιμι, as Stallbaum, after
essay to argue the subject; av being
Schafer, ad Gregor. Corinth. p. 1015.
correctly observes, and not as Wytten-
bach proposes, with μέντοι in the sense
of tamen. Heindorf, from Ficinus, v. Lat.
Int., would insert ἡδέως after ἧττον.
Ὅταν ἐπιστήμη, κ. τ. λ.]
c. 34. τὸ ἀδοξαστον.

See infr.

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