ร βὼν ὁ Κέβης ἔφη Ὦ Σώκρατες, τα μὲν ἄλλα δοκεῖ ἔμοιγε καλῶς λέγεσθαι, τὰ δὲ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πολλὴν ἀπιστίαν παρέχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, μὴ ἐπειδὰν ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος οὐδαμοῦ ἔτι ᾖ, ἀλλ ̓ ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ διαφθείρηταί τε καὶ ἀπολλύηται ᾗ ἂν ἄνθρωπος ἀποθάνῃ, εὐθὺς ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος, καὶ ἐκβαίνουσα, ὥς περ πνεῦμα ἢ καπνὸς διασκεδασθεῖσα, οἴχηται διαπτομένη καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ᾖ, ἐπεὶ εἴ περ εἴη που αὐτὴ καθ ̓ ἑαυτὴν ξυνηθροισμένη καὶ ἀπηλλαγμένη τούτων τῶν και κῶν ὧν σὺ νῦν δὴ διῆλθες, πολλὴ ἂν ἐλπὶς εἴη καὶ καλή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἀληθῆ ἐστὶν ἃ σὺ λέγεις. ̓Αλλὰ τοῦτο δὴ ἴσως οὐκ ὀλίγης παραμυθίας δεῖται καὶ other; unless it is to be supposed that here the law of nature is infringed, and these two principles exempted from its sway. But this is not so, and to understand the former position more clearly it is to be observed, that of every change there are three stages: the first, when the change begins; the second, while it is in progress; and the third, when it is complete. For instance, waking and sleeping are the two extremes, the intermediate state, or progress from one to the other, is that of falling asleep. So between sleeping and waking there is the middle stage, becoming awake. In like manner, that one should be alive or dead, it is necessary to have passed through the intermediate states of coming to life and dying, which states, as in the case above, must be alternated again, for if sleeping were not reciprocated by waking, all things should at last be buried in unbroken slumber, and equally if dying and death were not reciprocated by becoming alive and life, all nature should eventually sink and be destroyed. Wherefore the soul does not perish by death, but passes to another state, a future life, embittered to the evil, and enjoyed by the good. argument is founded upon a certainty and an uncertainty. It is certain that in nature nothing new is produced, nor is what does exist destroyed. The production or destruction of anything does This not arise from creation or annihilation, but from the union or disunion of its parts. It is uncertain whether all souls existed before their junction with the body, whether they were created in the first instance by the Deity himself, or consisted of material particles. But that the soul, if created by the Deity, does not perish with the body, follows, as well from the rest of the Platonic doctrine, as from what has preceded upon the subject of a divine Providence.To remove this uncertainty, then, it is to be proved that the thinking faculty of the mind does not arise from a combination of the parts of matter, which will be made appear in the course of the dialogue. Εὐθὺς ἀπαλλαττομένη.] Statim ut discedit a corpore. HEIND. Ωσπερ πνεῦμα ἢ καπνὸς.] Cf. Lucret. iii. 456. "Ergo dissolvi quoque convenit omnem animai Naturam, ceu fumus in altas aëris auras." Hom. Iliad. . 100. ψυχὴ δὲ κατὰ χθονὸς ἡὔτε καπνὸς Ωἴκετο τετριγυῖα. Οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ λ.] Nil amplius usquam sit, omnino nihil sit, funditus perierit. WYTT. Cf. Cic. de Senec. 22. "Nolite arbitrari, rarissimi filii, me, cum a vobis discessero, nusquam aut nullum fore." Plaut. Cistell. iv. 2. 18. "Nulla est neque ego sum usquam; perdita perdidit me." Παραμυθίας.] Persausion: παρα πίστεως, ὡς ἔστι τε ἡ ψυχὴ ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καί τινα δύναμιν ἔχει καὶ φρόνησιν. ̓Αληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Σωκράτης, ὦ Κέβης. ἀλλὰ τί δὴ ποιῶμεν; ἢ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων βούλει διαμυθολογῶμεν, εἴτε εἰκὸς οὕτως ἔχειν εἴτε μή; Ἔγωγ ̓ οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ἡδέως ἂν ἀκούσαιμι ἦν τινα δόξαν ἔχεις περὶ αὐτῶν. Οὔκουν γ ̓ ἂν οἶμαι, ἢ δ ̓ ὃς ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰπεῖν τινὰ νῦν ἀκούσαντα, οὐδ ̓ εἰ κωμῳδοποιὸς εἴη, ὡς ἀδολεσχῶ καὶ οὐ περὶ προσηκόντων τοὺς λόγους ποιοῦμαι. εἰ οὖν δοκεῖ, χρὴ διασκοπεῖσθαι. μυθία signifying, not merely consolation, but, as Wyttenbach justly observes, an assurance of the judgment, when it hesitates to admit an apparently improbable position. This Ὡς ἔστι τε ἡ ψυχή, κ. τ. λ.] sentence contains the Platonic doctrine of the immortality of the soul. - Tiva δύναμιν ἔχει καὶ φρόνησιν ; Olympiod. Τινὰ ζωὴν ἔχει καὶ γνωστικὴν ἐπιστήμην. ἡ μὲν γὰρ δύναμις τὴν ζωτικὴν ἐνέργειαν δηλοῖ, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τὴν ἐπιστημονικήν. STALL. Διαμυθολογῶμεν.] Olympiod. Τί οὖν μῦθος τὰ λεγόμενα ὑπὸ Σωκράτους; ἢ τὴν ἐξ ἐπομενου πίστιν μυθολογίαν ἐκάλεσεν ὁ Σωκράτης, οἷός ἐστιν ὁ προκείμενος λόγος ; κατασκευάζει γὰρ τὴν μὲν ἀθανασίαν τῆς ψυχῆς, οὐκ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας ὁρμώμενος, ἀλλ ̓ ἔκ τινος ἐπομένου τοῦ μεταβάλλειν τὸν θάνατον καὶ τὴν ζωὴν εἰς ἄλληλα. ταύτην οὖν μυθολογίαν εἶ πεν. Η δ ̓ ὅς ὁ Σωκράτης.] Infr. c. 18. a med. ἡ δ' ὃς ὁ Σιμμίας. Cf. Æschyl. S. C. Τh. 555. ἔστιν δὲ καὶ τῷδ' ὃν λέγεις τὸν ̓Αρκάδα, ἀνὴρ ἄκομπος. Οὐδ ̓ εἰ κωμῳδοποιὸς εἴη.] In allusion to Aristophanes, Amipsias; Diog. Laert. ii. 28; and Eupolis. Olympiod. τί βούλεται ἐνταῦθα τῷ Πλάτωνι ή μνήμη τῶν κωμῳδοποιῶν; ἢ τὸ λεγόμενον τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὅτι οὐ δώσω χώραν τοῖς κωμῳδοποιοῖς διαλοιδορεῖσθαι μοι· ὁ γὰο Εύπολις φησι περὶ Σωκράτους, Τί δῆτ ̓ ἐκεῖνον τὸν ἀδολέσχην καὶ πτωχὸν, Ὃς τ' ἄλλα μὲν πεφρόντικεν, Πόθεν δὲ καταφαγεῖν ἔχοι, Τούτου κατημέληκεν. The com mon taunt, τῆς ἀδολεσχίας περὶ τῶν μετεώρων, which the vulgar threw out against Socrates and the philosophers in general, was taken up by the comic poets, and occurs in several instances throughout the writings of Plato, in many of which the expression is evidently repeated in sarcastic ridicule of the ignorance and folly by which its proper meaning was abused. Cratyl. c. 39. κινδυνεύουσι γοῦν οἱ πρῶτοι τὰ ὀνόματα τιθέμενοι οὐ φαῦλοι εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μετεωρολόγοι τινὲς καὶ ἀδολέσχαι. Parmenid. c. 19. καλὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ θεία, εὖ ἴσθι, ἡ ὁρμὴ, ἣν ὁρμᾶς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους· ἕλκυσον δὲ σαυτὸν καὶ γύμνασον μᾶλλον διὰ τῆς δοκούσης άχρήστου εἶναι καὶ καλουμένης ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀδολέσχίας, ἕως νέος εἶ· εἰ δὲ μὴ, σὲ διαφεύξεται ἡ ἀλήθεια. So in that celebrated passage, de Repub. xi. p. 488, where the true philosopher is compared to the pilot of a vessel, and the ignorant mob in a state, to its mutinous crew, Socrates says: τοιούτων δὴ [i. e. the mutiny on board,] περὶ τὰς ναῦς γιγνομένων, τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς κυβερνητικὸν οὐκ ἡγῇ ἂν τῷ ὄντι μετεωροσκόπον τε καὶ ἀδολέσχην καὶ ἄχρηστόν σφισι κα λεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς οὕτω κατε σκευασμέναις ναυσὶ πλωτήρων ;-Οὐ δὴ οἶμαι δεῖσθαί σε ἐξέταζομένην τὴν εἰκόνα ἰδεῖν, ὅτι ταῖς πόλεσι πρὸς τοὺς ἀληθινοὺς φιλοσόφους τὴν διάθεσιν ἔοικεν. Cf. Aristoph. Nub. 1482. ἀλλ ̓, ὦ φίλ ̓ Ἑρμῆ, μηδαμῶς θύμαινέ μοι, μηδέ μ' ἐπιτρίψης ἀλλὰ συγγνώμην ἔχε, ἐμοῦ παρανοήσαντος ἀδολεσχίᾳ, &c. The term αδολεσχης, §. 15. Σκεψώμεθα δ ̓ αὐτὸ τῇδέ πῃ, εἴτε ἄρα ἐν ̔́Αιδου εἰσὶν αἱ ψυχαὶ τελευτησάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἴτε καὶ οὔ. παλαιὸς μὲν οὖν ἔστι τις λόγος, οὗτος οὗ μεμνήμεθα, ὡς εἰσὶν ἐνθένδε ἀφικόμεναι ἐκεῖ καὶ πάλιν γε δεῦρο ἀφικνοῦνται καὶ γίγνονται ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων. Καὶ εἰ τοῦθ ̓ οὕτως ἔχει, πάλιν γίγνεσθαι ἐκ τῶν ἀποθανόντων τοὺς ζῶντας, ἄλλο τι εἶεν ἂν ἡμῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἐκεῖ; οὐ γὰρ ἄν που πάλιν ἐγίγνοντο μὴ οὖσαι, καὶ τοῦτο ἱκανὸν τεκμήριον τοῦ ταῦτ ̓ εἶναι, εἰ τῷ ὄντι φανερὸν γένοιτο ὅτι οὐδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν γίγνονται οἱ ζῶντες ἢ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων. εἰ δὲ μή ἐστι τοῦτο, ἄλλου ἄν του δέοι λόγου. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. Μὴ τοίνυν κατ ̓ ἀνθρώπων, ἢ δ ̓ ὅς, σκόπει μόνον τοῦτο, εἰ βούλει ῥᾷον μαθεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ ζώων πάντων καὶ φυτῶν, καὶ ξυλλήβδην ὅσα περ ἔχει γένεσιν, περὶ πάντων ἴδωμεν, ἄρ ̓ ούτωσὶ whence ἀδολεσχῶ supr., had been originally applied to those who undertook to explain the difficulties and obscurities of natural phenomena, without an adequate knowledge of the subject of which they professed themselves competent to treat; it was subsequently used in a commendatory sense, but continued to be employed in the former by those who could only vituperate the virtues they did not care to possess. §. 15. Σκεψώμεθα.] Olympiod. O σκοπὸς τῷ προκειμένῳ λόγῳ δεῖξαι, οὐκ ἀθάνατον τὴν ψυχὴν, ἀλλ ̓ ἐπιδιαμένουσαν χρόνον τινὰ μετὰ τὸν χωρισμὸν τοῦ σώματος, καὶ οὐ καθάπερ Ἰαμβλιχος οἴεται ἕκαστον λόγον δεικνῦναι τὴν ἀθανασίαν τῆς ψυχῆς. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ ἐρωτῶν τοῦτο ἠρώτησε τὸ πρόβλημα, οὔτε ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος ἔδειξε τὴν ψυχὴν ἀθάνατον. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κέβης ἠρώτησεν, εἰ δυνατὸν τὴν ψυχὴν χωρισθεῖσαν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιδιαμένειν, καὶ μὴ δίκην πνεύματος διασκορπίζεσθαι. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης δείκνυσιν ὅτι ἐπιδιαμένει χρόνον τινὰ μετὰ τὸν χωρισμὸν τοῦ σώματος, οὐ μὴν ὅτι καὶ ἀεὶ, ἔδειξε. FORST. Αὐτὸ τῇδὲ πῃ.] Αὐτὸ is explained by εἴτε ἄρα ἐν ἄδ. and τῇδή πῃ refers to seqq. παλαιὸς μὲν οὖν, &c.HEIND. Παλαιὸς μὲν – τις λόγος.] See Herodot. ii. c. 123. where the historian evidently refers to the doctrines of the Pythagoreans. How closely the preexistence of the soul was united with the idea of its immortality amongst the ancient philosophers, appears from the following passage in Cudworth. Intell. Syst. B. i. c. 1. s. 31. "It is also further evident, that this same principle which thus led the ancients to hold the soul's immortality, or its future permanence after death, must needs determine them likewise to maintain its προύπαρξις, or preexistence, and consequently its μετενσωμάτωσις, or transmigration. For that which did preexist before the generation of any animal, and was then somewhere else, must needs transmigrate into the body of that animal where now it is. But, as for that other transmigration of human souls into the bodies of brutes, though it cannot be denied but that many of the ancients admitted it also, yet, Timæus Locrus, and divers others of the Pythagoreans, rejected it, any otherwise than as it might be taken for an allegorical description of that beastly transformation that is made of men's souls by vice.Aristotle tells us again, agreeably to what was declared before, ὅτι μάλιστα φοβούμενοι διετέλησαν οἱ παλαιὸι τὸ ἐκ μηδενὸς γίνεσθαι τι προϋπάρχοντος. That the ancient philosophers were afraid of nothing more than this one 'thing, that anything should be made out of nothing preexistent. And, therefore, they must needs conclude, that the souls of all animals preexisted before their generations. And indeed it is a thing very well known, that, according to the sense of philosophers, these two things were always included together in that one opinion of the soul's immortality, namely, its pre-existence as well as its post-existence. Neither was there any of the ancients, before Christianity, that held the soul's future permanency after death, who did not likewise assert its preexistence; they clearly perceiving, that if it were once granted that the soul was generated, it could never be proved but that it might also be corrupted. And, therefore, the assertors of the soul's immortality commonly began here; first to prove its pre-existence, proceeding thence, afterwards, to establish its permanency after death." Cf. Tertullian de Anima. xxiii. p. 275. " Illius (Platonis) est enim in Phædone, quod animæ hinc euntes sunt illuc, et inde huc." Olympiod in Fragm. Orph. p. 510. ed Herm. 'Ορφικός τε γὰρ καὶ Πυθαγόρειος ὁ πάλιν ἄγων τὰς ψυ χὰς εἰς τὸ σῶμα καὶ πάλιν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀνάγων, καὶ τοῦτο κύκλῳ πολλάκις. in Menon. p. 81. Β. καὶ Πίνδαρος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν, ὅσοι θεῖοί εἰσιν – φασὶ – τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι ἀθάνα M τον καὶ τότε μὲν τελευτᾷν, ὃ δὴ ἀ- ζώντων. That as well the living were made out of the dead, as the dead out of the living; and that this was the constant circle of nature. Moreover, the same philosopher acquaints us, that some of those ancients were not without suspicion, that what is now called death, was to men, more properly, a nativity or birth into life, and what was called generation into life, was, comparatively, rather to be accounted a sinking into death; the former being the soul's ascent out of these gross terrestrial bodies, to a body more thin and subtile, and the latter its descent from a purer body to that which is more gross and terrestrial: Τίς οἶδεν εἰ τὸ ζῆν μὲν ἐστι κατθανεῖν, τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν." Intell. Syst. B. 1. c. 1. 33. Εἰ τοῦθ ̓ οὕτως ἔχει, κ. τ. λ.] And if this is indeed the case, namely, that the living are reproduced out of the dead, &c. STALL.-"Αλλο τι; see Apol. Socr. c. 12. init. Μὴ οὖσαι.] i. e. εἰ μὴ ἦσαν: see Matthiæ Gr. s. 608. 5. d. Τοῦ ταῦτ ̓ εἶναι.] i. e. τοῦ τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν ἐκεῖ εἶναι. HEIND. Κατ' ἀνθρώπων.] With regard to mankind. Matthiæ Gr. s. 581. a. Κατὰ ζώων πάντων καὶ φυτῶν.] Olympiod. Τινὲς ἐκ τούτοῦ ῥησιδίου ἀπατηθέντες, ψήθησαν τὸν Πλάτωνα πᾶσαν ψυχὴν ἀθανατίζειν.... ἄμεινον δὲ ὁ φιλόσοφος ̓Αμμώνιος ἐξηγή Whenever crears γίγνεται ἅπαντα, οὐκ ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία, ὅσοις τυγχάνει ὃν τοιοῦτόν τι, οἷον τὸ καλὸν τῷ αἰσχρῷ ἐναντίον που καὶ δίκαιον ἀδίκῳ, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρία οὕτως ἔχει. Τοῦτ ̓ οὖν σκεψώμεθα, ἆρα ἀναγκαῖον ὅσοις ἔστι τι ἐναντίον, μηδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ γίγνεσθαι ἢ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτῷ ἐναντίου. οἷον ὅταν μεῖζόν τι γίγνηται, ἀνάγκη που ἐξ ἐλάττονος ὄντος πρότερον ἔπειτα μεῖζον γίγνεσθαι; Ναί. Οὐκοῦν κἂν ἔλαττον γίγνηται, ἐκ μείζονος ὄντος πρότερον ὕστερον ἔλαττον γενήσεται; Ἔστιν, ἔφη, οὕτως. Καὶ μὴν ἐξ ἰσχυροτέρου γε τὸ ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ἐκ βραδυτέρου τὸ θᾶττον; Πάνυ γε. Τί δαί; ἄν τι χεῖρον γίγνηται, οὐκ ἐξ ἀμείνονος, καὶ ἐὰν δικαιότερον, ἐξ ἀδικωτέρου; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ἱκανῶς οὖν, ἔφη, ἔχομεν τοῦτο, ὅτι πάντα οὕτω γίγνεται, ἐξ ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία πράγματα; Πάνυ γε. Τί δ ̓ αὖ; ἐστι τι καὶ τοιόνδε ἐν αὐτοῖς οἷον μεταξὺ ἀμφοτέρων πάντων σατο τὸ χωρίον τοῦτο, λέγων ὅτι τοῦτο φησι πρὸς τὸ ἐφεξῆς ἐπιχείρημα, τὸ κατασκεύαζον ὅτι τὰ ἐναντία μεταβάλλει εἰς ἄλληλα. "Ιδωμεν.] Videamus. HEIND. Vulg. εἰδῶμεν, sciamus; incorrectly. WYTT. Ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία.] Added in explanation of ούτωσὶ preced. Tr. But-taking the whole in connexion, let us see, whether all things do not mutually originate in the following manner, that is, in no otherwise than the contrary out of the contrary. STALL. Olympiod. Ὅτι γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία μεταβάλλει εἰς ἄλληλα, δείκνυσιν ἡ λέξις τριχόθεν. πρῶτον μὲν, ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς. παρατίθεται γὰρ πολλὰ ἐναντία, ἃ δείκνυσι μεταβάλλοντα εἰς ἄλληλα. δεύτερον, ἐκ τῶν γενεσέων αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ὁδῶν. εἰ γὰρ αἱ ὁδοὶ μεταβάλλουσιν εἰς ἄλληλας, οἷον ἡ λεύκανσις εἰς τὴν μέλανσιν, πολλῷ μᾶλλον καὶ τὰ τέλη μεταβάλλουσιν εἰς ἄλληλα, οἷον τὸ λευκὸν καὶ TO μέλαν. τρίτον, χωλεύοι ἡ φύσις, εἰ ἓν μὲν τῶν ἐναντίων μεταβάλλει εἰς τὸ ἄλλο, ἓν δε οὐ μεταβάλλει. καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ ἐπιλείποι θάτερον τῶν ἐναντίων, ὅτι καὶ οὐδὲν ἐναντίον ἔσται, τὸ λοι- Let Τοῦτ ̓ οὖν σκεψ. ἆρα ἀναγ.] Αὐτὸ γίγνεσθαι.] More accurately, Ἱκανῶς οὖν ἔχομεν τοῦτο.] Are we sufficiently assured of this? Τι δ ̓ αὖ; ἔστι, τ. κ. λ.] Olympiod. ̓Ἐντεῦθεν τὸ δεύτερον ἐπιχείρημα, τὸ ἐκ τῶν ὁδῶν, ὅτι αἱ ὁδοι ἐναντίαι εἰσὶ καὶ μεταβάλλουσι εἰς ἀλλήλας, πολλῷ μᾶλλον καὶ τὰ τέλη. Socrates now proceeds to describe the passage between the two extremes, that is the progress of the change, ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ ἐτέρου ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον, and vice versa ; whence the δύο γενέσεις, or two generations by which the contraries are ১ |