THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASSOCIATION, v. THE

LIBERAL.

We shall not be suspected of any especial admiration of "the Liberal;" but our dislike or contempt of that production must not blind us to the nature of the prosecution which has been commenced, and its consequences upon the public mind. On this, as on all other questions, we shall deliver our own free, fearless, and unbiassed opinions, without thinking for a moment who is for us, or who is against us. When we are sitting at the tribunal of our council-table, we shall look with a fixed and steady eye to the simple and unalterable principles of equity and reason, which must govern us as judges, without altering a tittle of our decision on account of the rank or opinions of the parties, who are brought before us, and expect sentence at our hands.

It is a common mistake of a vast proportion of the community, both male and female, that, in the heat of their disapprobation against any person or thing, they become careless as to the manner in which that thing or person is attacked, they are hurried into error and injustice by the excess of their zeal, their good feelings, and their conscientious detestation of profligacy or folly. They forget that it is a very bad way to put down one wrong by the commission of another: and they may even rush into that most pernicious of all doctrines, that the end can sanctify the means. It is thus, that the infringement of a law ought to be guarded against with the most resolute earnestness, when he, who suffers from that infringement, is most culpable in a moral point of view. For in other cases, the character of the party aggrieved will help to vindicate and protect the maxims of fundamental equity: the suspicion, which liberty engenders, will be awake and on the alert: but here the jealousy of encroachment upon universal right is lulled asleep and in the horror entertained of the delinquency, men are apt to be regardless of the illegal and unconstitutional method in which the delinquent has been punished. But nothing can be more fatal to freedom or to justice, than the occurrence of such incautious and short-sighted indifference. By this process all despotisms have commenced. Among

other instances, the Greek historians inform us, that the thirty Lacedæmonian tyrants, who were established in Athens after the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, in the first place put to an unjustifiable death, without legal proof of guilt, and often without trial, the most unpopular and execrable of the Athenian citizens. On these occasions the democracy of Athens, a body at least as foolish as any mob of modern times, expressed rather pleasure than indignation. Upon the strength, however, and under cover of this acquiescence, their masters soon proceeded to condemn and execute in the same summary method, the most beloved and virtuous persons in the state: and it was only when torrents of innocent blood had been shed, and dreadful enormities had been committed, that the people opened their eyes and understandings, and rose in resistance with that unconquerable energy, which freedom possesses when it is armed against oppression. We put an extreme case: but extreme cases are the truest tests of the principle of a thing. We need pursue the argument no farther. It would be an insult upon the common sense of our readers. Already, perhaps, our preliminary observations have been too grave, too elaborate, and too extended for either the dignity of the persons, of whom we must now speak, or the importance of the contest, which we are about to discuss.

The Constitutional Association has, it appears, preferred an indictment before the grand jury of Middlesex, against the publishers of "the Liberal" for an alleged libel in the "Vision of Judgment:" and the grand jury has found a true bill. Here, then, three questions come to be considered: the first, Whether "the Liberal" is a fit subject for legal prosecution? the second, whether it be good policy to prosecute it? the third, whether the members of the Constitutional Association are the most proper persons to undertake the task?

A vast deal of nonsensical invective has been sputtered forth, as usual, upon both sides of the question. It is our business to hold the balance even between the parties. We shall hope, at any rate, to place the matter in a clearer light; to strip it of those adventitious circumstances, which can only perplex and encumber the real questions to be settled; and speak in honest sincerity, without the interposition of factious motives, or personal feelings.

First, then, is "the Liberal" a fit subject of legal prosecution? This is a question, it may be urged, which the great law officers of the kingdom are more competent to settle than ourselves and moreover, that, besides their superior competence of judgment, the point more immediately belongs to his Majesty's attorney-general and solicitor-general. But, unfortunately, if the attorney and solicitor-general have decided it in one way, the Constitutional Association has decided it in another; and public opinion, the supreme and ultimate tribunal, is left to decide between the two. The grand jury of the county has also given its opinion by returning a true bill. Under these circumstances, there can be no impropriety or presumption in the delivery of our sentiments. Moreover, the attorney and solicitor-general formed their judgment, not upon the single question which we are now discussing, but upon the whole circumstances of the case.

Nor can the delivery of our sentiments upon the point, whether "the Liberal" is a fit subject for prosecution, be fairly construed into an attempt to bias or anticipate the verdict of a court of law. Whether any passages in the "Vision of Judgment" constitute, or do not constitute, a blasphemous or seditious libel, a jury of twelve honest Englishmen will best and more conscientiously determine. We only inquire, whether the poem is of such a nature as to merit legal indictment?

Now we state at once, that, upon the very face of Lord Byron's poem, it is and must be of such a nature, as long as the present law of libel continues to be in force.—-As long as passages, which have an apparent tendency to bring Christianity into ridicule or contempt, are indictable in a court of justice-incidents and expressions such as those which are contained in every stanza of his Lordship's "Vision of Judgment," must be proper subjects of such indictment. We look at it in itself; and form our opinion without reference to any previous publication. But here the cry will be opened upon us" look at Mr. Southey's Vision of Judgment." Well!— and what, we ask, is Mr. Southey's "Vision of Judgment" to our present purpose? "Every thing," we shall be told:-and we shall answer-nothing. Which of the two visions is the more blasphemous, the more puerile, the more irreverent, the more unworthy of their talents-that of the peer, or that of the

poet laureate, is a nauseous question, which we rejoice that we lie under no obligation to decide. If what Mr. Southey has written be an excuse for what Lord Byron has written, then, in all cases, one libel may be an excuse for another. Blasphemy may be an excuse for blasphemy; sedition for sedition;—and so on “ad infinitum." If we wish to amuse ourselves with laughing at a coxcomb, he might tell us that it was very wrong, for that he was only a copy of as great a coxcomb as himself, who lived in the next street: or any scoundrel in existence might find a justification in the plea that another scoundrel had done the same villainous actions in the last century. Here, however, it appears to us, that the only difficult question, which can possibly be raised is, which of the two is the more manifest and the more deplorable-the mischief of the principle, or the absurdity? But Lord Byron's " Vision of Judgment" is a mere quiz upon Mr. Southey, "a piece of squibbery” from beginning to end. Be it so: but the real point to be settled is, whether the said piece of squibbery" as it has been ridiculously called, contains the noxious ingredient of blasphemy or sedition? What, in the name of common sense, has the English nation, or an English court of judicature, to do with the personal squabbles of Lord Byron and Mr. Southey? Are we to be inundated with irreligion or radicalism, with trash and rubbish of every imaginable kind, because, forsooth, one poet has a private pique against another? Have all the persons, who are now reading Lord Byron's Vision read Mr. Southey's first? or is it necessary, for the vindication of his Lordship, that they should read it afterwards? Why, in that case, to write one libel may oblige a man to read two. But this is really too absurd. We should not only be deluged with mischievous productions, but we should be impelled to pore over the one half, that we might find an excuse for the delinquencies of the other. The public morality and the public taste would be wonderfully improved by such a system.

In considering, therefore, whether "the Liberal" is a proper subject for legal prosecution, we shall leave the unfortunate hexameters of Mr. Southey-for unfortunate enough they are entirely out of the question. The opposite principle is only fit to be scouted and swept away by the torrent of universal 2 G

VOL. II.

derision. The arguments, which are applicable to the imputed blasphemy, are, of course, as applicable to the imputed sedition. We are disposed, upon the whole, to lay down the doctrine, that the drift and tendency of a work are always sufficiently discernible in the work itself: and that its intrinsic merits or demerits are the only safe grounds of legal investigation. The question, therefore, which we have to decide becomes a matter of opinion with regard to the contents of Lord Byron's "Vision of Judgment," as it appears in "the Liberal :" and that question we are inclined to answer in the affirmative. We mean simply, that the poem contains primá facie as many libellous qualities, as most other works which are indicted in the same manner.

But is it good policy to prosecute the publishers of "the Liberal?" This is a very different question from the former; and this question we would answer in the negative. Our reason is very plain and very old. We think that there is very little wisdom in such prosecutions at all. They are a lever to sedition and blasphemy. They almost imply a suspicion, on the part of the prosecutors, that the established institutions in church and state have not truth and justice on their side. 66 Magna est veritas, et prevalebit," is an axiom, which, though always on the tongue, seems hardly ever impressed upon the heart; else, it must be felt that such indictments are unnecessary. In private libels-in malicious attacks upon individual character-we would almost always advise an appeal, on the part of the injured person, to a court of law :but in matters, which involve general principles, and such points of religion or government as are left open to all,-we we would say in general; let the press be combated by the press. In this country, honourable and constitutional writers must be an overmatch for the dishonest, the factious, and the corrupt. Argument and ridicule will be of far more avail than incarceration or fine. They will make the champions of impiety or revolution victims to their own madness, without causing them to enjoy the reputation of martyrs. If " the Liberal" had been left to its own stupidity, and the efforts of our colleagues and ourselves, it would have been put down in three months, or sunk into utter insignificance; as it is, it may survive for as many more, and do infinite mischief while