venting the sorrow you and every Cossaque would feel at the loss of a guest perishing in your service.""

This is a specimen of the sentiments and conduct of a people, of whom the 44th Bulletin of the French army, dated Warsaw, December 21, 1806, does not scruple to speak in the following

terms:

There are no men so wretched and cowardly as the Cossaques : they are a scandal to human nature. They pass the Bug, and violate the Austrian neutrality every day, merely to plunder a house in Gallicia, or to compel the inhabitants to give them brandy, which they drink with great avidity. But since the late campaign, our cavalry is accustomed to the mode of attack made use of by these wretches; and notwithstanding their numbers and their hideous cry upon these occasions, they await them without alarm; and it is well known that 2000 of these wretches are not equal to the attack of a squadron of our cavalry.'

Those who know any thing of the French cavalry, will be well able to appreciate the truth of the latter observation: and we wish we could bring before the eyes of Buonaparte the following pas

sage:

'Terror preceded the charge, and in vain discipline endeavoured to present an impediment to the protruding pikes. The Cuirassiers alone preserved some confidence, and appeared to baffle the arm and the skill of the Cossaque: but in the battle of Preuss Eylau, when the Cuirassiers made their desperate charge on the Russian centre, and passed through an interval, the Cossaques bore down on them, speared them, unhorsed them, and in a few moments 530 Cossaques re-appeared in the field, equipped with the spoil of the slain.'-p. 27.

Many other instances of similar courage and superiority are recorded in this volume, and we have no hesitation in saying, that the testimony of Sir Robert Wilson is at least as valuable as the bulletins of the French Emperor. Indeed the coarse language in which Buonaparte speaks of the Cossaques, is with us a strong proof of the injury which they did to him; for we have observed that he is abusive and contemptuous in proportion as he has reason to hate or fear; whether the object be the beautiful and highminded Queen of Prussia, the daring Cossaque, the enthusiastic resistance of Spain and Portugal, the skill and judgment of Lord Wellington, the vigorous exertions of the British government, or the freedom of the British people, which gives them a spirit to despise his menaces, and an arm to retaliate his aggressions.

Sir Robert introduces many curious traits of the Cossaques in general, and, in describing their Attaman Platow, draws a most striking picture of that noble and distinguished chief. He appears to have risen from the ranks, and the detail of his services fully

justifies

justifies the author's observation-Proud and happy may his country be, if she always finds a chief with equal mind and virtues.' If indeed the most undaunted courage, the most incessant activity and perseverance, and the most consummate coolness in the midst of difficulty and danger, are characteristics of an eminent warrior, Platow will not shrink from a comparison with the most distinguished of his rivals.

"It was in this retreat (after the opening of the campaign of 1807) that Platow evinced a trait of that superior mind which attained his station, and which, if he had received a liberal education, would have rendered him one of the first men of the age, as indisputably he is one of the most eminent warriors. After Buonaparte had brought up a second corps of his army (the brigades of Pajol, Durosnel and Bruyères, and the division of heavy cavalry under the orders of General Nansouty) supported by the whole body he advanced with rapidity, resolved to overwhelm the rear-guards of Platow and Bragration, before they passed the bridges of the river which flowed behind them, and to which they had to descend. The Cossaques saw the impending danger, and began to press back in confusion. Platow checked, but found the disorder increasing he immediately sprang from his horse, exclaiming to the Cossaques, "Let those who are base enough, abandon their Attaman." The corrected lines paused. He gradually moved, and with a waving hand kept back those who had trespassed, sent his orders with calmness, reached the town in order, halted at the bridge until every man had passed, destroyed it, and (still on foot) proceeded on the other side of the town, struggling above ancle deep through the heavy sand: nor could the most tremendous cannonade, and the incessant fire of the French battalions, crowning the opposite heights, and who commenced their vollies as they formed successively, accelerate his pace, or induce him to mount his horse, until the object was attained, and superior duty obliged him, for the direction of other operations. His mien, his venerable and soldier-like appearance, his solemn dignity of manner, combined with the awful incidents of the scene to render this one of the most imposing and interesting sights that could be witnessed.' It is afterwards stated of him, that at Tilsitz, when the French generals sent to request leave to present their compliments to him in person, he answered "There might be peace between his Sovereign and Buonaparte, but no civilities between him and them," and he ordered his sentries to admit no French whatever in their circle.'

We confess that we are oldfashioned enough to admire the proud refusal of this sturdy veteran to share in the contaminating connexion which had infected many of those around him; and we are happy to believe that there were other noble minds, besides Platow, which deeply felt the degradation that had fallen upon their Sovereign and their country. Sternness and severity, however, are not the only features in the Attaman's character: he appears the following occasion, to have graced the ruggedness of mi

upon

E 4

litary

litary heroism, with all the tenderness of friendship and affection; at the funeral of Colonel Karpow, a distinguished Cossaque officer, who had been killed in a most gallant affair with a body of Polish infantry at Omilow.

'Platow reproached the Colonel's party for not having revenged his death and devoted themselves to sacrifice the enemy; and when he kissed the forehead (according to custom) previous to the lid of the coffin being closed, he could not refrain from tears: wiping them away, he observed" that he did not weep for the lot of mortality, but that friends could not go together out of the world."

We could dwell with pleasure upon the good qualities of the Cossaque nation and their Attaman; but we must hasten to the consideration of other subjects; and we have still a few observations to make upon the remainder of what relates to the component parts of the Russian army.

After some account of the Basquiers, the author proceeds to describe the officers, the staff, the commissariat, and the hospitals of the Russian army, and concludes this division with some general remarks. It is in these particulars that we discover the great and leading defects of their military system. Sir Robert observes that with partial exceptions, the inferior officers of the infantry are disqualified by the neglect of education, and the absence of those accomplishments which should distinguish officers, as well as the sash and gorget. If the Russian troops had better regimental aids, they would, from their disposition to obedience, and habits of temperance, be as distinguished for their discipline, as they are for their courage.' On the artillery officers, he observes that those of inferior rank have not the same title to estimation as in the other European services, for their education is not formed with the same care, and their service does not receive the same encouragement.'

No mention, we remark, is made of the engineers; nor does it appear throughout the course of the narrative, that this branch, so eminently essential in a defensive war, was ever brought much into play, except, perhaps, at the battle of Heilsberg; we doubt, indeed, whether during any part of the campaign any precautions were taken for covering the passage of rivers by têtes-de-pont, and other defences, of which Buonaparte knows so well how to avail himself, and by which he is always careful to provide for the security of his retreat. The insufficiency of the Russian staff is a most serious evil in their army, and we are not surprized at the anxiety which Sir Robert represents them to have expressed for the services of General Anstruther, an officer of distinguished merit, who fell a victim to his zeal and exertions with the army in Spain, under the command of the late Sir John Moore. We

apprehend,

apprehend, indeed, that the Russians have always felt their deficiency in this respect; for we believe that under Suwarrow, in Italy, their Quarter Master General was an Austrian; and in the campaign of 1805, the duties of that station were discharged by Austrian officers: first by General Schmidt, who was unfortunately killed in an action near Crems on the Danube; and afterwards, at Austerlitz, by General Weyrother.

The Commissariat and Hospital Departments also appear to labour under many defects; and it is obvious how such deficiencies must tend to cripple the operations of an army, and that whilst they render victory more doubtful, they greatly increase the difficulty of following it up, when courage and perseverance have obtained it. It is, however, but just to remark, that these are not insurmountable evils; and if we may judge by the improvements which have been made in the British army of late years in these essential branches, there can be no reason to suppose that those who direct the military councils of Russia, will be slow to take advantage of their late experience, and to extract from former failure the means of future success: indeed we have heard that their attention has for some time been particularly directed to improvements in these important objects.

We are now brought to the account of the campaigns of 1806 and 1807, in which the prowess and patience of the Russian troops were put to a most severe trial, and in which, notwithstanding the eventual want of success, these qualities were exhibited with peculiar lustre. We are ready, in the outset, to do justice to the clear detail which Sir Robert Wilson has given of these operations, and to the interesting, and in many respects new point of view, in which he has placed them. We were prepared to find that the conduct of the Russians had been highly creditable to their steadiness and courage; but we were not altogether aware how much their activity and enterprize had annoyed the enemy, and, in some degree at least, compensated for their inferiority of numbers. It is due also to General Lestoque, and the Prussian corps under his command, to point the attention of the reader to the useful and honourable part which they performed in these campaigns, and to the proofs which they exhibited (under circumstances the most discouraging) of that spirit which had been created by the genius, and kept alive by the example of the great Frederick; a spirit indeed which was not confined to General Lestoque and those who shared in the operations described by Sir Robert Wilson, but which had been previously manifested by General Blucher, and the brave men who accompanied his glori ous retreat, after the battle of Jena.

The first striking feature in these campaigns was the battle of Pultusk.

Pultusk. Various affairs of more or less consequence had previously taken place, but this was the first occasion on which the main bodies of the contending armies came in contact with each other. Upon perusing Sir Robert's account of this affair, together with the more minute details of it, which are contained in the Appendix, and illustrated with plans, and comparing them with the statements of the French Bulletins, it is, we think, quite obvious that the victory on that day was with the Russians and although a variety of unfortunate circumstances concurred in rendering it impossible for General Benningsen to take advantage of his success, yet we entirely agree in the opinion expressed by Sir Robert of the consequences of the battle, and which we lay before the reader in his own words.

'The result of this affair made a very favourable impression for the character of General Benningsen, and on the Russians. It was the first check which Buonaparte had experienced on the continent, a 'charm was broken, and the French army foresaw that their future combats would be no longer chaces of pleasure. The Russian Generals resumed confidence. The stain of Austerlitz was effaced from their escutcheons, and the soldiers recognised themselves as not unworthy of the companions of Suwarrow. It was in vain that Buonaparte denied the victory. It was in vain that he boasted the trophy of some cannon which the Russians had abandoned, in consequence of the state of the roads, on their subsequent march: he could not deceive the army. He was not able even to rally his interrupted operations, so as to pursue the offensive, until he had possessed himself of what yet remained of Prussia; and thus, if he could not render the battle equivocal in history, diminish the mischievous consequences of its loss. It was in vain that he announced the entire destruction of the Russian army, and his consequent return to Warsaw, and here to repose until he chose to renew the campaign. His march had been arrested, all his enterprizes discomfited, and he had scarcely proclaimed that he had repelled the Russians eighty leagues, when the same Russians re-appeared in the field, to assure him with terrible evidence of their existence.'

After this battle, the French army went into winter quarters; but we find that the Russians, instead of wandering with the hope of saving themselves behind their frontier, defeated, disgraced, and fugitives, without artillery, means of transport, or baggage, and with the loss of 30,000 men,' as represented in the French Bulletins, undertook what Sir Robert Wilson justly calls, a hardy and active movement;' beat up the cantonments of the French left, and having gained various advantages in the field, and relieved the important fortress of Graudentz, compelled Buonaparte to abandon his winter quarters, and assemble his whole forces for offensive operations. In referring to this part of the campaign,

We