riod: a day of retribution and freedom will at last arrive; and nothing, we are convinced, but the rash and premature attempts of individual nations can retard it. We sincerely wish to the continent, as the only means of ultimate redemption, an uninterrupted continuance of its present sullen subjection, till the measure of suffering is full; till a simultaneous movement of indignation shallexcite Prussia, Austria, Holland, and Germany; till they shall be prepared to strike, at once and in concert, at the colossal despotism which bestrides them. For that hour England will anxiously watch; at that hour she will be prepared to put forth all her strength; to pour, even with a prodigal liberality, all her power and all her resources to the succour of the continental insurrection-an insurrection which, so made and so succoured, must be successful.

A conduct similar to that which we think good policy dictates to the Germanic powers, would also be the interest of Russia-she,' we own, may come to hostilities with France without risking her exist ence; and she might, perhaps, single-handed, carry on a war troublesome and expensive to the enemy without endangering her own security; but situated as she is in all respects, political, moral, and physical, we cannot hope that her single efforts can make any serious impressions on France, while it is doubtful whe-' ther France might not be able to inflict great injury on her. It is therefore to be desired that she too may for some time avoid hostilities, and may employ herself in repairing her losses and in collecting her strength, till an opportunity shall occur of making an effort in conjunction with her neighbours. This, we are convinced, is her wisest policy, and that which offers the best prospect of the deliverance of Europe. In the mean while we doubt, whether, with these views, it would be prudent to pursue towards Russia the measures which Captain Pasley recommends of making her feel and dread our power.' Undoubtedly if we considered Russia to be zealously and irrevocably the ally of France, we should endeavour to enforce this proposition to its full extent; but we cannot believe Russia to be so blind to her best interests, and so besotted in her thraldom: and as long as any reasonable hope remains of her returning to better councils, it would not be prudent either to exasperate or to weaken her, to deprive her at once of the wish and of the means of joining in the general effort. We admit that this forbearance may be pushed too far; but we should regret to see the chance of the cooperation of Russia prematurely cast away. One false step on the side of rashness might be more injurious to the general interests than a thousand errors of delay.

On the subject of Sweden we more implicitly agree with Captain Pasley with him, we own that we feel neither pity for, nor confidence

VOL. V. NO. X.

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confidence in the rulers of that country, who have broken their faith with every body-with their legitimate sovereign-with their allies— with the usurper whom they themselves set up-nay with their own countrymen, by resigning to Russia the finest province of Sweden. The leading men have been long considered as the pensioners of Russia and France; and with enemies of this description no half measures should be pursued. It is to be hoped, too, as Captain Pasley observes, that the people cannot approve of, and that they will not long submit to, their country being betrayed or sold by the cowardice and villany of a few; we ought therefore to carry the war into Sweden, not as enemies but as deliverers, stretching forth our protecting arm to save her from the bondage that awaits her, and to aid her in avenging her wrongs; and when by our assistance the Swedes have got rid of their base usurpers, let them decide whether they will reinstate their former government or not; for any attempt upon our part to force it on them, would be not only highly impolitic, but in execution absolutely impossible.' -p. 429.

Probably their wish will be to re-establish their lawful sovereign, who alone, of all the continental princes, has not disgraced his illustrious ancestry, by truckling to the upstart tyrant of France. But Captain Pasley thinks it not impossible that they may prefer a federal union with Great Britain-we are inclined, on the other hand, to think Sweden the only part of the North of Europe where such an union would be opposed by a high-minded love of independence, such as it behoves us to hold sacred. The character of the Swedes induces us to look to an alliance with them, like that which unites us to the Portugueze and Spaniards, founded upon mutual esteem and correspondent honour-all that is good and estimable in human nature, and therefore all that can be per

manent.

All these considerations with regard to Sweden impress themselves the more strongly upon us from the conviction we feel that Buonaparte's chief object in placing his creature on her throne, was the check which he thus hoped to obtain upon Russia; a check which it will be found he has obtained, and which we cannot but believe it to be of the utmost importance, nay of absolute necessity, to remove, before we can expect any efficient co-operation from that power against the common enemy. We are aware that we cannot, at this crisis of the war in Spain, (for to Spain Lord Wellington has again removed the war,) spare an adequate force for a regular Swedish campaign; nor, if we could, should we wish to see it so employed. Naval hostilities, with that portion of land enterprise which we know can be connected with naval operations, would be sufficient for our object. Our quarrel is not with Sweden but its rulers;

and

and by harassing the coast and annihilating their commerce, we should, if we can trust our informants, raise upon those rulers the vengeance of the Swedes themselves. That government cannot long go on without some degree of confidence and support from the people: the constitution affords the latter more influence on the public councils than it possesses in any other country in Europe except our own. A maritime war would cripple the custom revenues of the Swedish government, and oblige it to have recourse to internal taxation; and, for that purpose, to the popular and representative assemblies, from whom we should be inclined to expect some of those honest and honourable energies, which cannot but exist in a country that has never yet been absolutely enslaved.

But we have already exceeded the limits which we had proposed to ourselves, and we must hasten to a conclusion by a short summary of the reflections to which Captain Pasley leads us.

Peace with Buonaparte, or with France under any other ruler, while France possesses its present extent of coast, it is folly, or frenzy, or treason to advise. To carry on a defensive war, is to remain stationary in power, while our enemy is increasing in strength. This also is demonstrably the certain road to ruin. We have an efficient regular army at this moment of upwards of 250,000 men. If we could lay this island alongside France, what then should prevent us from doing it as resolutely as ever Nelson brought an enemy's three-decker to close quarters? What should deter us from meeting Buonaparte any where with equal numbers-from casting the liberties of the world into the scale, and trusting to God and our good cause and our own right hands for the triumphant issue? But we are masters of the sea-uncontrouled, undisputed, absolute lords of the whole ocean. It is in our power therefore to chuse the vantage ground, and to attack the enemy whenever and wherever it is most advantageous for us, with such a force as shall ensure success, were there even no superiority of courage on our part, and if the people whom we go to deliver were to be passive spectators of the contest. With such a force, with such means of augmenting and such resources for supporting it, knowing too, what even the most panic stricken of the tyrant's flatterers in this country dare not deny, that wherever our troops have been fairly tried against his Invincibles, they have uniformly beaten them, what is it that can have occasioned the absurd and mischievous feeling of dismay, which gives ear to any voice rather than the voice of hope, to any counsels rather than those of true patriotism, true courage, and true wisdom? This is a subject too wide and too important to be lightly glanced at. We should be glad to pursue it; but we can only at present in few words illustrate

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the

the principle of husbanding our resources, which is the watch-word of the despondents, and then conclude.

By this precious phrase, it is meant that we ought to save our men and our money till we are actually invaded by the enemy. Now of the policy of husbanding money with such a view, we have an illustrious example in the Greeks of Constantinople, who hoarded up those treasures to be plundered by the Turks, which they would not employ in carrying on the war against them; and the equally wise policy of husbanding an army has been exemplified in our own days by Prussia. Prussia had an army of the best disciplined troops' in the world; they were the admiration of all Europe upon the parade, and they had once been the terror of Europe in the field. But the present army had been husbanded; the consequence was, that in the hour of trial they came to the field like raw militia men opposed to veteran troops; and in a single day the Prussian monarchy was overthrown. The event of the battle of Jena might have been predicted with perfect certainty: for in military science, as in every other science, art, or trade, practice is essential to perfection. The prize-fighter improves both his skill and his muscular power by daily trials and exertions; the more he uses his arms, the more tremendous is the blow which he is able to give with them; while the Hindoo devotee, who sits with his hands before him in the same posture of devotion for weeks and months together, husbands his muscles till he loses the use of them!

6

"Oh woe to thee when doubt comes on!' says a wild German writer; it blows over thee like a wind from the north, and makes all thy joints to quake! Woe indeed will be to the statesmen who doubt the strength of their country, and stand in awe of the enemy with whom it is engaged! and woe will be to us, and to Europe whose deliverance must come from us, and to liberty, and knowledge, and pure morals and true religion, which with us must stand or fall, if the government of this mighty country, in these momentous times, should be entrusted to men,

'Who talk of danger which they fear,

And honour which they do not understand!'

We have been told of the danger of Lord Wellington and his army in language which it is humiliating for an Englishman to read as coming from an English press-language as base as the basest political cowardice could inspire, and as mischievous as the foulest treason could have dictated. But not such is the feeling of the nation. What if the tyrant himself should come with a new army of the North and his legion of honour, to put in execution his old boast of driving the English into the sea? On the banks

of

of the Tagus we can assemble a British force sufficient to cope with any that he can bring against it; and we can supply it there. Would to God that he would come!

One effectual victory, one thorough success pursued to the destruction of an enemy's army, commanded by him, and oh what a spirit would be kindled throughout Europe! nor would the effect which would be produced at home be the least beneficial of its important consequences. We have not yet as a nation learnt to think highly enough of our power. We must exalt ourselves if we would not be humbled by our enemy. This maxim has been established by Captain Pasley. We have no hesitation in affirming that this book is one of the most important political works which has ever fallen under our observation. To the ability with which it is written we repeat our already frequent testimony; to the object it proposes we give our unmixed approbation; and though we frequently differ, as we have shown, in the degree to which they ought to be carried, we cordially admit the general validity of the principles which it inculcates.

ART. IX. The Odes of Pindar, in celebration of Victors in the Olympic, Pythean, Nemean, and Isthmean Games, translated from the Greek, not one fourth part of which have ever appeared in English, including those by Mr. West. The whole completed and now first published by Francis Lee, A. M. Chaplain in ordinary to His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, Member of the Asiatic Society, &c. 4to. Miller, London. 1810... All the Odes of Pindar, Translated from the Original Greek. By the Rev. J. L. Girdlestone, A. M. Master of the Classical School of Beccles, in Suffolk. 4to. Bacon, Norwich. Baldwin, London.

To transfer the beauties of Pindar into another language, or in

deed to imitate his beauties at all, was, almost two thousand years ago, considered by a very competent judge, as a wild and hopeless undertaking. We know not whether the authority of Horace have operated very forcibly on the conduct of succeeding poets; or to what other cause we must attribute the circumstance, that no complete version of the Theban Bard has appeared until now, in any modern language. Many indeed are the learned and unlearned names, which, in our own country, have sought to pin their celebrity to some single tatter of his saffron mantle; but if any of these have hoped to perfect the doing of his works into English,' they have all, in their turns, shrunk from the task, and abandoned the unfinished adventure to some future and more fortunate bard.

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Ogilby