other critick under consideration, has been drawn, in undertaking the justification of the Italian writers in the marvellous part of their poetry, is more specious, but not more conclusive: it is besides equally exceptionable from placing the matter under discussion in a wrong point of view. The object of this authour is to establish "that it is erroneous to suppose that poets expect to have their fictions believed; or aim at more than getting their readers to imagine their possibility."-That no capable reader is concerned about the truth, or even the credibility of his fancies; but is most gratified when he is brought to conceive the existence of such things as his reason informs him did not exist, and were not likely to have happened.*

To this theory we may all readily subscribe as far as it asserts, "that no poet expects to have his fictions believed; that no capable reader is concerned about their truth." But with respect to the remaining clauses," that poets only aim at getting their readers to imagine the possibility of their fictions, and that no capable reader troubles himself about the credibility of such fancies,"

• HURD. Ubi supr.

on which the strength of the critick's cause appears to be rested, they demand a little consideration before they can be admitted. It will not indeed require much labour to detect some latent contradictions glossed over in the whole of the critick's reasoning. In the different grounds which he assumes, he advances positions which, if they are consistent in themselves, and reconcileable with each other, do not offer any thing to the purpose.

As to what is advanced by him in the first place, it does not carry the defence of the marvellous part of poetry beyond an irrelevant remark; which after merely setting the difficulty, which it undertakes to remove, in another point of view, leaves it just as it was found. For how is the objection raised against the want of truth and probability in such fictions as the Italians affected by the remark," that the poet has nothing more to do than to bring us to imagine their possibility;" when this is much more than any objector, or indeed any unprejudiced reader can admit they have effected? And this is so far the case, that the very remark, which is offered here in favour of those fictions, might be urged as justifying their being censured:

since it might be assigned as a sufficient cause for rejecting these improbabilities, that they cannot be brought to the standard of any thing which we can conceive possible. The instance which the critick before us has chosen from Tasso to illustrate a different position will at once substantiate and exemplify this remark; I mean the marvellous conveyance of Armida to the happy island: this fiction, it may be remarked, is assailable in its probability, on the very grounds of our not being able to imagine it possible' how any such occurrence could have happened.

As to what is advanced in the second place; that " no capable reader troubles himself about the truth, or even the credibility of these fancies;" and that "he is best pleased

f But the critick may have probably meant by our being brought to imagine the possibility of any thing," our being merely brought to form an idea of it, independent of any positive existence which it could have had, or was likely to have. Thus we may easily form an idea of such an animal as a chimera, or hippogryphin, though we believe it hardly possible such animals could exist in reality. Taking the authour's words in this sense, what he advances in the second place is merely a confirmation of the present explanation, and must of course fall when the second position proves untenable.

when he is made to conceive the existence of such things as his reason tells him did not, and were not likely to exist," I cannot be easily brought to admit it. As the former part of this defence proves nothing, this part would prove too much. For it offers as strong an argument for our being pleased with all the disgusting improbabilities of Mandeville's

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Travels," and Lucian's "True History," as with "the specious wonders" of Shakespeare's magick,, his ghosts, and witches. Our reason tells us that none of the improbabilities contained in those works ever did, or were likely to exist; and yet we can bring ourselves to conceive their existence, as they contain no impossibilities in themselves. But however possible I may find it to conceive such improbabilities as men having dogs heads, animals walking upon the sea, or fishes building nests in the trees, it will require something more than a mere assertion to convince me "that I should not trouble myself about the credibility of such fancies, but be pleased with them because I can be brought to imagine their existence."

Thus it eventually happens that the marvellous fictions of poetry are left as unsupported as they were found by these apolo

gists. One general objection lies against the different modes of reasoning which both criticks have adopted, and it reveals the difficulty which caused their failure. The one endeavoured to establish a closer intimacy between marvellous fiction and truth than their dissimilar nature would admit: the other aimed at severing that relationship by which they should be generally connected. And it is not less on account of having to regret their failure, than having observed the causes from which it originated, that I have been induced to venture another effort in its defence. I know of no means by which the grounds they have assumed may be prosecuted to establish the conclusions which they have failed in supporting; nor do I think such means are ascertainable; and for these reasons which I have just offered in shewing how their respective undertakings have miscarried. If therefore the vindication which they have left in this state is to be made out, I believe it must originate from a different view of the matter, and be prosecuted on different principles.

It cannot be admitted that we believe the marvellous fictions of poetry, for with respect to the machinery of Homer, however