ARBITRATION WITH AMERICA

THERE may possibly be two opinions as to the course that Lord Salisbury has taken in making public the correspondence with the Government of the United States, in an intermediate stage, while negotiations are still pending. It may be said by some that both the petty question (and it will be ridiculous or criminal if it ever becomes more than a petty question) of Venezuela, and the great question of a general treaty of obligatory arbitration in all or some classes of dispute between ourselves and the United States, are matters which the executive power should deal with on its own responsibility, and should make up its own mind without seeking outside counsel in the middle of the voyage as to the tack on which they would do best to sail. 'We have need to know,' Lord Salisbury explained to the House of Lords (July 17),' what is the trend of public opinion on these matters. We desire, in a question which is certainly not one of party, that the best intellects that we have on both sides should apply themselves to a matter that affects the welfare of the human race in a singular degree, and especially the good relations of a State with which we so desire to be on good terms as the United States of America. Therefore we have laid the papers on the table, and we hope to derive from such attention as noble lords on both sides of the House may devote to them, much guidance with respect to the subsequent conduct of the negotiations that we have to pursue.' All this would have made Lord Palmerston and the Foreign Office of his day gasp with horror, and I do not know that one could pay Lord Salisbury a higher compliment.

The Prime Minister would hardly have taken this unusual though perfectly defensible step, or have invited public discussion of negotiations still pending, unless he believed that the two governments were approaching pretty closely within sight of one another, and that public discussion would supply whatever momentum may be required for overcoming the obstacles that still remain. The papers themselves confirm this impression. They deal with two matters-first, the dispute with Venezuela, and second, proposals for a general scheme of arbitration, which the question of the Venezuelan

boundary brought once more into prominence. On the first of these issues, as can easily be shown, the difference between the British and American Governments has become so narrow, that a rupture would be preposterous and intolerable. On the second, though the principles at stake go deeper, and demand a wider survey, yet things have advanced far enough to justify Mr. Olney's hope in the closing despatch of the series (June 22) that 'persistent effort in the line of the pending negotiations will have results which, if not all that the enthusiastic advocates of international arbitration anticipate, will be a decided advance upon anything heretofore achieved in that direction.'

In spite of the promising aspect of either of the two questions, Lord Salisbury's speech, his publication of the papers, and the papers themselves, all indicate that, both in the narrower and the broader issue, a miscarriage of the event is still possible. This would not be the first time in history that a favourable moment had been allowed to pass; that an indolent assumption that things were sure to turn out well, was the very circumstance that ensured their turning out ill; that an excessive fear of a too rapid or summary decision ended in smothering the whole faculty of decision; and that an easy-going trust in Providence and a fatalistic confidence in the wisdom of Downing Street lulled the nation into a slumber from which they awoke to find a very disagreeable storm whistling about their ears. What is important for us at the present hour is that as many people as possible in this country should know both plainly and precisely how matters stand between ourselves and the American Government, what position is taken by Lord Salisbury and what by Mr. Olney, and what are the definite points on which the Prime Minister desires to ascertain the trend of public opinion.'

Whatever may be said for it or against it, we must bear in mind that the American position on the question of Venezuela is not affected by proposals for a general scheme of arbitration. The American Government stands in that matter just where it stood before. Writing so late as the 12th of June, Mr. Olney says with some emphasis: 1

I deem it advisable to recall attention to the fact that, so far as the Venezuela boundary dispute is concerned, the position of this Government has been plainly defined, not only by the Executive but by the unanimous concurring action of both branches of Congress. A genuine arbitration issuing in an Award, and finally disposing of the controversy, whether under a special or a general Treaty of Arbitration, would be entirely consistent with that position, and will be cordially welcomed by this Government. On the other hand, while a Treaty of General Arbitration providing for a tentative decision merely upon territorial claims, though not all that this Government deems desirable or feasible, might nevertheless be accepted by it as a step in the right direction, it would not, under the circumstances, feel at liberty to include the Venezuelan boundary dispute within the scope of

1 Enclosure 3 in No. 24.

such a Treaty. It is deemed advisable to be thus explicit in the interest of both Governments, that the pending negotiations for a general Treaty of Arbitration may proceed without any misapprehension.

We shall see more particularly what Mr. Olney means by the distinction between a genuine arbitration issuing in an award, and a merely tentative decision on territorial claims. Meanwhile, whatever form the general treaty may ultimately take, it is well to remember that the secondary but more dangerous question still confronts us, as it confronted us six months ago. The telegram of the correspondent of the Times (July 19) contains a comment on the above passage which ought not to be overlooked, to whatever determination we may incline ultimately to come:

That is equivalent to saying that, in the event of a report from the present Commission adverse to the British claims and a refusal of Great Britain to accept that report and retire from the territory declared to be Venezuelan, the menace of the President's Message would become operative.

There is reason to believe that this contingency is kept steadily in view in Washington, and that the President, with the memories of last December fresh in his mind, still thinks that, should the need arise, a reassertion of his former warning would be supported by the multitudes who supported him before. He is still President, and will remain President till next March. His personal influence has waned, but the authority of his great office is what it was. If he tried to use it to revive the animosities of last winter, he would probably fail. Still, few Americans wish to see such an experiment tried or would be perfectly confident of the result.

A series of despatches is seldom very easy reading, and in the present instance the arrangement tends to confuse two questions which, though not wholly unconnected, are practically distinct, and ought to be considered separately. It may be useful, therefore, to set out pretty briefly the contents of these most interesting and important papers. Three or four pages will suffice to present the Venezuelan question, and the question of a permanent tribunal of arbitration, as each of them now stands. The former is, for various reasons, much the more pressing, contains more elements of real and actual peril, and ought less than any other to be allowed to drift.

So far as the Venezuelan question goes, it is hardly possible that Lord Salisbury can have a shadow of doubt as to the trend of public opinion.' A quarrel with America on the question of arbitrating a boundary line that has been in active and lively dispute at intermittent periods for more than half a century, has been viewed from the first with the deepest incredulity and abhorrence. It is safe to say that this feeling will grow a thousand times stronger when the public have mastered, as half a dozen pages of these papers enable them to do, the point to which the controversy has now been contracted.

This is not the place for any inquiry into the merits of the respective claims of the British and Venezuelan Governments to the territory in dispute between them. Whether the Aberdeen line, the

Schomburgk line, the Granville line, the Rojas line, be the boundary best justified by the history of the matter; whether grants from Popes or ancient treaties with aboriginal tribes are of any valid force; to what extent the exploration of streams and tributaries, and the constitution of post-holders by the Dutch, or the recognition by the Spanish of this river or that as the frontier of Spanish possessions -all these and the thousand obscure and intricate questions of fact through which the industrious reader may, if he pleases, thread his way in the heavy jungles of the two bluebooks, are happily not to the purpose now. The more diligently one endeavours to master this entangled mass, the clearer does it become that the whole field of the controversy, settled lands and all, presents matters with two sides to them, and claims for all of which something is to be said, and that if ever there was in the world a set of circumstances proper for arbitration, and if ever arbitration is to be good for any case, this is such a case. The question discussed here is whether there should be an unrestricted arbitration, with a final settlement for its result; or a limited arbitration, with only an optional acceptance of any award that should go beyond these limits.

In his speech in the House of Lords, the Prime Minister seems to have used some language that rather understates the extent to which the correspondence shows him to have been willing to go in meeting the American Government.

The difficulty lies in the fact that the claim of Venezuela embraces a very large proportion-I think two-thirds of the colony of British Guiana, including a considerable quantity of territory that is settled and that has been settled for a great number of years. We have never thought, and we do not now think, that the ownership of that territory is a matter which ought to be submitted to arbitration. At the same time, with respect to the unsettled territory, we have always been willing that that should be submitted to arbitration, but it is necessary, of course, to distinguish between the two. Our view has been that at this stage arbitration is not a suitable remedy; that the first thing which has to be ascertained is the real state of the facts in respect to the past history of Venezuela and of Spain and of Holland in those countries; and, when the facts are fully ascertained by a Commission in which both countries have confidence, I do not myself believe that the diplomatic question that will follow will be one that will be very difficult of adjustment. When once we know what the facts are, I do not think there will be much difficulty in coming to an agreement as to their result. But even if there is, that would then be the time for applying the principle of arbitration. In order that arbitration may be satisfactory, the issue presented to it should be clean, clear, and simple; and when we know enough of the facts to be able to say what are the precise points on which the two Governments differ on the question of boundaries, I think then the question of arbitration will probably be dealt with without difficulty and without involving-what we deprecate-exposing to the hazard of a tribunal which is comparatively untried the long-inherited and longpossessed rights of British colonies.

From the first, says Lord Salisbury, our objection has been to subject to the decision of an arbiter, who, in the last resort, must of necessity be a foreigner, the rights of British colonists who have

settled in territory which they had every ground for believing to be British, and whose careers would be broken, and their fortunes possibly ruined, by a decision that the territory on which they have settled was subject to the Venezuelan Republic.'

It is worth while to note in passing that the papers shed no light on the number, quality, situation, or other particulars of these colonists. Mr. Olney asks for information as to the precise meaning attached by the Government to the expression of settled districts,' and Lord Salisbury promises to communicate this desire to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. So far, the result has not been made public. Yet the point is of much practical importance. The exact magnitude of these colonising operations does not affect the right and wrong of the matters in issue; it does not touch the general duty and obligation of protecting British colonists in their lawful rights. But the magnitude of the colonising operations has much to do with the expediencies of the particular problem. As we shall see in a moment or two, Lord Salisbury does not shut out these colonists from possibility of treatment. And in any event, if public opinion is to be consulted, it is indispensable that we should know, in an exact and concrete way, what is the size of the obstacle to such an arbitration as would finally dispose of the possibilities of a dangerous quarrel. There is no objection to a little rhetoric. But besides rhetoric, we must have arithmetic and mensuration.

Lord Salisbury's proposed basis of settlement is as follows:-2

1. A commission of four, two British and two American, to investigate and report upon the facts of the Dutch and Spanish rights respectively at the date of the acquisition of the Dutch territory by Great Britain.

2. Upon the finding of this commission as to the historic facts, the two governments to try to agree to a boundary line.

3. If they cannot agree, a tribunal of three to be appointed-one nominated by England, another by the United States, and a third nominated by these two, and the three to fix the boundary line upon the basis of the report of the commission of four, and this line so fixed to be binding upon England and Venezuela. Here, however, we come on the fatal proviso: 'Provided always that, in fixing such line, the Tribunal shall not have power to include as the territory of Venezuela, any territory which was bona fide occupied by subjects of Great Britain on the 1st of January 1887.' This is the sharp stumbling-block which at the present moment threatens to break off negotiations.

Lord Salisbury, however, speedily takes a long stride towards its removal by adding a remarkable rider to his proviso. 'In respect he says, 'to any territory with which, by this provision, the Tribunal is precluded from dealing, the Tribunal may submit to the two Powers

2 No. 17, May 22, 1896.