quickly dies if mealies, or some other kind of grain foods, are not given him. Donkeys answer well in places where there is good veldt, but given the hard work of haulage and no grain, they very soon break down. The result is that in the case of mules, and to some degree donkeys also, enough grain food has to be taken on the wagon to supply them for a journey of nearly six hundred miles, and thus proportionately less of human food-stuffs can be taken. In some instances the experiment has been tried of endeavouring to push the mules and donkeys up country as fast as possible, and then shooting them or leaving them to perish on arrival, but this plan seldom succeeds. In the majority of cases the animals fall before they have accomplished two-thirds of the distance.

Nature has placed yet another difficulty in the way of transport, for during the wet season, from November to February, mule sickness is very prevalent, and one of the partners of the firm of Zeederberg and Co., who run the coach service with the greatest pluck and spirit between Mafeking and Bulawayo, and who own over fourteen hundred mules, informed me that they expect every year to lose from fifty to sixty per cent. of their live stock during this period. Then there are diseases affecting oxen, horses, and mules which seem to be peculiar to South Africa, such as 'gall sickness,' 'red water,' and 'lung sickness.' There are also one or two poisonous plants, notably the poisonous lily, which, when eaten, causes almost certain death. This poisonous lily comes up just before the grass, and consequently there is always the risk of its being eaten by hungry animals. It will thus be seen under what difficulties transport work has to be carried on, even in normal times, and when, as now, there are only about five to ten oxen left for every hundred that previously existed the difficulty is enormously and immeasurably increased. The weight usually carried by mule or donkey wagon is also from 25 to 30 per cent. less than that taken by ox wagon. A span of sixteen oxen can reach Bulawayo from Mafeking with from seven to eight thousand pounds weight of food-stuffs, whereas by mule or donkey wagon seldom more than five thousand pounds weight is taken with eighteen donkeys or ten to twelve mules. 'Rinderpest' in this way has been, and will be for some time, a greater enemy to the progress of Rhodesia than the native rebellion. Two years ago the plague was rampant in Uganda and Central Africa, and where this fell disease will stop it is impossible to say, cases having been already reported as far south as Bultfontein, a place near Kimberley. As the infection is largely carried by flies, it is doubtful if even the cattle of Cape Colony, with the most vigorous policy of isolation and destruction, can be saved. In about five per cent. of the cases the animals recover, but amongst all the so-called cures nothing has yet been found really effective, and, as far as can be seen, the only practical means of stopping the plague is to adopt, cost what it may, the most drastic policy of exter

minating the cattle, diseased and healthy alike, in all districts in which the disease appears. This policy of course entails compensation in some form or other, but even the most generous, and even lavish, treatment which may be accorded to those who have lost healthy oxen may be cheaper in the long run than a pestilence which in England, twenty or thirty years ago, cost the nation upwards of seven millions before it could be eradicated. But even if this vigorous policy be adopted the difficulty still remains of dealing with the cattle of chiefs who cannot be controlled, such as Sekhome, chief of the N'Gami tribes, the chiefs of the Gazaland district, and along the Portuguese border. If in three years the country is free from this plague, we may rightly consider South Africa lucky. In two years, however, the railway will have relegated the trek ox to the more distant parts of Rhodesia, and the chief mining. districts will be in touch with civilisation and independent of the transport rider.

The

It might be as well to give the reader some idea of the present means of communication between Bulawayo and the south. first 114 miles of the road-namely, from Mafeking to Gaberones-is, for the most part, fairly good-that is, good for an African road—and the coaches, when the mules are in good condition and not overworked, as at present, owing to the constant strain put upon them by extra coaches and ammunition wagons, perform the journey at the rate of four to five miles an hour, with changes of spans' about every ten miles. The next section, from Gaberones to Palla, which is about 120 miles further, is, perhaps, the worst section of the road, the sand in some places being nearly a foot deep, the country monotonous, and there being either bad water or none at all. From Palla to Palapye, another 120 miles, the road is rather better, but the last ten miles into Palapye is heart-breaking work for animals through almost the deepest part of the road, sand in dry weather and mud in wet, finishing up with two or three miles of rock and boulders, which severely try the strength of any team, the nerves of the passengers, and the fabric of all vehicles. Three wagons were hopelessly stuck five miles out of Palapye on this section when I passed on the road returning south. From Palapye to Tati, about 120 miles, is perhaps the best of the road, with the exception of one or two deep 'spruits," or drifts where there are river beds about as wide as the Thames at Richmond, dry in the autumn, winter, and spring, but roaring torrents in the summer, from November to February, and only crossed then with the utmost difficulty. From Tati to Mangwe, sixty miles, the road is fair, but there is heavy sand in places, and one or two deep drifts. From Mangwe to Figtree, which is at the northern end of the Mangwe Pass, thirty miles in length, the road passes through grand scenery, but the difficulties are consequently greater. Tremendously steep gradients, sand, and almost every species of

difficulty to locomotion is met with. The coach-drivers and transport riders are, however, wonderfully skilful in handling their teams, and it is certainly marvellous that so few accidents occur. From Figtree to Bulawayo, thirty miles, the road is comparatively good.

The real question in Rhodesia, as I have pointed out before, for the next year will not be the native question so much as this question of transport and food supply, and this problem remains for the Chartered Company to solve. How can they induce the white population to remain in Bulawayo and Southern Rhodesia, when food-stuffs are at such prohibitive prices, and when there is no work to do, all trades being at a standstill? Naturally no sane individual or wisely managed company is at present building houses, or continuing operations of any sort on a large scale, with prices as they are, knowing that the advent of the railway means cheaper material, cheaper labour, and immunity from native risings. Artisans who were earning ll. a day have now no work, the constructive trades having ceased, and these men are naturally leaving the country. When I was in Bulawayo in May of this year eggs were 40s. or 508. a dozen, tins of condensed milk were sold for 78. 6d. each-strong buyers, as the Stock Exchange would say—and enough bread for breakfast for one cost a shilling. So long as wages were high and regular high prices were willingly paid, but now, except a man is in the Chartered Company's employ, his chance of work is distinctly poor. For the moment fighting at 10s. a day and rations is the best trade, and there are plenty of volunteers at that price. Now that Lord Grey and Mr. Rhodes have settled that 58. a day and rations is ample pay we hear that great dissatisfaction is expressed, and that numbers are leaving the country in consequence. But when the war is over then will come the real pinch, and, unless a system of gratuitous State maintenance is then established at the cost of the Chartered Company, an exodus of the majority of the population must take place. Until, therefore, the railway reaches Bulawayo there can be no real progress in Southern Rhodesia, either in regard to mining, commerce, or agriculture, and no one realises, I feel sure, that a vigorous railway policy is the only solution of the present difficulties more than Mr. Rhodes himself.

Many people will be also tempted to ask, Why is it that Mr. Rhodes, with his wonderful foresight in other directions, has not before now made a point of accelerating the construction of the railway? The Vryburg-Mafeking section was opened in October 1894, and here we are in August 1896, and only another fifty miles is absolutely working-and that only half ballasted as far as Rabatse. If only a small portion of the money spent in mining, development, and housebuilding in Rhodesia had been spent upon railway construction Rhodesia to-day would probably not have been suffering from a native rebellion, would have been comparatively well stocked with food for man and beast, and would also have undoubtedly possessed two or three times as many white inhabitants. It is difficult to imagine what

can have been the reason of this delay, for the Beira railway was stagnant at the same time, and even if it is true, as is reported, that Mr. Rhodes and the Chartered Company had special reasons for favouring the Beira route, as against the Mafeking route, there is no excuse why, in that case, the Beira line should not have been completed, at any rate as far as Salisbury. Another curious feature is observable. In the United States, and in all other parts of the world where a railway is used as a civilising and developing factor outside any commercial value, the railway precedes the population, and the population afterwards agglomerates round the railway. Where the line crosses streams or fertile valleys, spots particularly attractive to the human eye or convenient for trade, towns spring up. But in Rhodesia the opposite seems to be the case. Take the case of Umtali. Nothing can be stranger than shifting a whole township, and giving the population compensation for disturbances, in order to avoid taking the railway line out of its direct course and over a somewhat severe gradient. Surely in Rhodesia too the railway, even if it does not precede, ought at least to accompany and not follow the incoming population. The delay in pushing on the railway will have proved extremely costly to the Chartered Company and the nation. The Chartered Board must now have realised the supreme importance of the railway, for we learn that it is going to give a bonus to the contractor of 200l. for every mile completed in a day.

However, Mr. Rhodes is not the man to be discouraged when the outlook appears bad and possible famine seems to stare the white and black population alike in the face. His personality is worth more, for the moment, in this crisis in Rhodesia, than the agricultural or mineral wealth of the whole country. Rhodesia might to-day be well called Rhodes, Unlimited.'

It is true that Mr. Rhodes has no longer any official position with the Chartered Company. But just as a diamond removed from its setting is a diamond still, so Rhodes, whether in the position of Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, or Managing Director of the Chartered Company, or as an individual, is Rhodes still. The same brain, heart, and vigour remain-the rest is as nothing, a mere official halo.

All Nature has striven against him, and large masses of mankind— drought, locusts, pestilences, and famines on the one side, raids, revolutions, and revelations on the other. Should he emerge, as I believe he will, successfully from these troubles, he will have won, and practically won alone, by his own exertions, a country seven times the size of the United Kingdom in the face of Nature and man.

In this case of Nature v. the Chartered Company and Rhodes, even though the trial last a year more, and to-day the odds be on the plaintiff, the result will to a certainty be a verdict in favour of the defendants.

JOHN SCOTT MONTAGU.

1896

THE BATTLE OF THE STANDARDS

IN AMERICA

I

WAR TO THE KNIFE

THE optimism of the American people blinds them to the approach of any great political crisis until it is close at hand. Up to the very hour when the Secessionists fired on Fort Sumter, the Northern press ridiculed the possibility of civil war. It was conceded that there were a few fanatics in the South who clamoured for secession, and a few fanatics in the North who would welcome civil war, but that the South would secede, and the North fight, was thought to be incredible. But in the flash of the guns of Charleston harbour it was suddenly seen that the whole South was united in defence of the right of secession, and that the North was unanimous in the determination that secession should be crushed on the battlefield.

Two months before the Democratic Convention met last July, the Eastern States fancied that the movement in behalf of free silver coinage was of small importance, and that there was not the slightest danger that the Silverites could triumph in a national election. Today it is apparent that the silver craze has seized upon the entire West and South, and is spreading with ominous rapidity even in the East. As the North was blind to the danger of secession, so the American people have been blind to the steadily growing danger that the Federal Government may, at no distant day, fall into the hands of the Silverites, and that the Eastern States will then be compelled to choose between utter ruin and withdrawal from the Union.

In the early days of the Southern rebellion, an eminent Democratic leader, one of the few Americans of the period who had a right to be ranked as a statesman, said, in the course of a confidential conversation, that the East had signed its death warrant by joining with the West to crush the South. 'When the war is over,' said he, 'the West will dominate the Union. It will rapidly grow in population and power, while the East will remain stationary. In a few years the East will be powerless, and the crazy financial legislation which the ignorance and arrogance of the West is certain to bring