had, certainly, many grievances to complain of, but he had no petitions to fign, nor novels to review.

It is not easy to difcover the plan of the author of the volumes before us, however, we will endeavour to give him, or her, fair play—.

Lady Lucy is first introduced under the name of Lucy Greville, and in the character of an upper fervant to Mifs Cleaveland, who lives with her brother. This brother falls in love with Lucy, and offers her marriage; but not chufing to inform her fifter of his defigns, wants to marry her privately. After fome demurring the clofes with his propofal. In the mean while a Mr. Wilder comes to vifit to Mr. Cleaveland, and being alarmed at hearing that he intended to marry Lucy, as he knew that fuch an alliance must be detrimental to him, and as he had taken a violent fancy to Lucy himself, bribes Le Four, Cleaveland's valet, to fill her with fufpicions against his master. Le Four prevails on her to elope with him, and promises to conduct her safe to a Mifs Berkley's, with whom the correfponds. When they are, by themselves, in a post chaise upon the road, he takes very great liberties with her. She is refcued by Mr. Cleaveland, with the affiftance of his attendants, who conveys her to a feat of his in the west of England: he reproaches her for having left him to put herself into the hands of his fervant: Lucy, however, believing that he was only fcheming her ruin, liftens to one of his maid fervants, who brings her a letter with the fuperfcription of which she is quite unacquainted. This letter contains an offer of protection from a lady in the neighbourhood, as fhe is told. This lady proves to be mother to the Mr. Moreton who accompanied Wilder in his vifits to Mr Cleaveland, at the time Lucy waited on his fifter.-Moreton behaves to her with ftill more infolence than Cleaveland or Le Four had done. In ftruggling the feizes his piftol and wounds him; runs away, and gets into other families. Still expofed to infults from the men, she is, at length, recommended, as a fervant, to lady Conftantia BelSoon after Mifs Greville's entering into lady Conftantia's family, Cleaveland, who vifits her ladyfhip, discovers her, begs pardon for having fufpe&ted her virtue, and tells her, that Le Four being feized with a dangerous diforder, wifhed to fee him, and had confeffed that Wilder engaged him to carry her off, not only to fecure her for himself, but to prevent him from marrying her, hoping, that he would then make a Mifs Bafil his wife. Wilder, it feems, is particularly interested in the marriage between Cleaveland and Mifs Bafil, being then entitled to the third part of an old lady's eftate, aunt both to him and Mifs Bafil, and vehemently averfe to

mont.

any

any connections with Cleaveland and his family. This affair being cleared up, Cleaveland is received by Lucy as the man who is to be her husband. Wilder attacks Cleaveland-Cleaveland wounds him dangerously, and flies to France.-Wilder, at length, recovers, and Lucy falls ill of a fever, occafioned, in a great measure, by her anxiety about Cleaveland. While fhe is in this condition the nurse who attends her discovers, by a picture and a mole, that she is the fifter of the marquis de L, and not Julia Belmont, who dies before this denoüement. The marquis himself proves to be an English earl, whofe father went abroad after the rebellion, recovers his title and eftate, and expreffes great uneafinefs concerning Cleaveland's behaviour to lady Lucy Layton, his new fifter. Soon afterwards Cleaveland returns from France, and explains the cause of his long abfence and filence-It appears by that explanation that Wilder had followed him to France, encouraged a Spanish gentleman, who was there at that time, to fufpect him of an improper intimacy with his wife, and to get him affaffinated. An attempt is made against his life, but his wounds happen not to be mortal, During his confinement Wilder intercepts all the letters which were dispatched to him by lady Lucy, and by him to her. Cleaveland comes to the knowledge of Wilder's perfidious behaviour by the information of Mr. Beverly, a friend of his. Cleaveland had faved this Beverly's life when fome country fellows had almoft overpowered him, for endea vouring to carry off a fine girl-In return for fo fignal a fervice Beverly discloses all he knows relating to the villainy of Wilder, who is drowned, coming from Calais in an open boat. With the marriage of Cleaveland, and lady Lucy, with the tacking together of feveral other perfonages, not of confequence to be mentioned, the piece concludes.

We have given the outlines of this curious performance, full of marvellous events, related in a marvellous style, because we would not be accufed of proceeding to execution before the trial is over we cannot, however, help thinking that it will be transported in a little while to the regions of obli

vian.

XII. An Eighth Letter to the People of England. On the Power of Lifqualification in the Commons; in which it is fhewn, that the Subject is not fufficiently understood by those who have written on either Side of the Question. 8vo. Pr. 25. Robinson and Roberts.

THE

HE expulfion and difqualification of Mr. Wilkes from fitting in the houfe of commons during this parliament, have multiplied political noftrums, pro and con, to an amazVOL. XXIX. January, 1770.

E

ing

ing degree. Each has the true fecret of cure without confine ment, and each boasts of the number of patients who have recovered under his hand. That political, as well as natural, ailments, may be removed by different applications, may be true; but a practitioner has no right to condemn another perfon's method, because it is not the fame with his.

We have already reviewed several pamphlets on the fame fubject as that before us; and though we agree in opinion, in a great measure with this author, yet we cannot retract any thing we have faid with regard to others. Abundance of the law does not deftroy the law; and we look upon what he has advanced, as being not contradictory to, but as corroborative of, the inherent right of difqualification that refides in the commons of Great Britain, as exercised in the cafe of Mr. Wilkes.

- Why this publication is called an Eighth Letter to the People of England, is not very material to enquire. It has, indeed, no marks of an epiftolary addrefs; and therefore, without minding a trifling impropriety, we shall proceed to its fubstance.

The author fets out with an opinion, that preceding writers have miftaken the cafe of this difqualification; and he quotes Sir Edward Coke in refutation of what the advocates of Mr. Wilkes have offered. His reafoning upon this head, is, we think, ftrong and conclufive; but it would suffer by being parcelled out. It is fufficient to say, that the author thinks, the houfe of commons does, at once, poffefs both a legislative and executive authority in all thofe matters which may arife concerning themfelves. It includes a legislative power, because the maxims and the methods, on which they proceed, are not defined and afcertained by any particular law, and are refident in themselves alone.' To prove this, the author brings various inftances, both from law and practice; from the latter it feems, as if, where not fpecifically mentioned and described, that the commons deem themselves, refpecting their own affairs, unobliged by the whole legislative authority, excepting in those concerning treafon, felony, and breach of the peace. In confirmation of this doctrine, our author inftances the exemption which members enjoy, not only for their own perfons, but their fervants, from arrefts, and other law proceedings, to which other subjects are liable; and the punishments inflicted, without any course of law, on those whom they may deem to have acted disrespectfully to a member or to the house.

On what authority, fays this writer, a writ of Habeas Corpus is denied to the fubject, who may be taken into cuftody by power of the commons, I know not. It cannot be on the

reafon

reafon already related, that the judges cannot be authorised by the executive power to carry the common law into execution; because this writ of right is by ftatute law. And it seems extremely fingular that the commons, who have confented to this ftatute of the Habeas Corpus, fhould think themselves fuperior to the law which they have enacted, without excepting that right to themselves: and that the judges fhould not grant that writ, to every fubject who applies for it in the above fituations; fince the power that made the law unexceptionably enables the executors of it to carry it into execution. In fact, though the laws and cuftoms of parliament, which are confe cutive of its legislative authority, are to be learned out of the rolls of parliament, and other records and precedents, and from continual experience; yet thefe can no more limit the legislative authority of the commons, in relation to their own affairs, than the common or ftatute law can circumfcribe the authority of the whole legiflature. Each of them can inftitute new laws, alter, explain, and abrogate the old, when the exigency of the cafe requires it: otherwife they would be bound to follow erroneous laws, without the power of remedying their mischief: and in new cafes be unable to provide any remedy at all: both which are incompatible with the idea of all legislative authority. Whenever the legislative autho rity of either house, in affairs relating to themfelves, is either altered, circumfcribed, explained, or abrogated by the autho rity of the whole legislative body, in thofe inftances it is rendered inoperative, in all others it remains in plenary power.'

We have given this quotation at large, because we are doubtful whether a writ of Habeas Corpus, upon a commitment of the commons, ought to be denied. This point was strongly agitated in the cafe of the Ailefbury men, when many able lawyers were of opinion, that they had a right to their Habeas Corpus: three of the judges, however, were of a contrary opinion, but the great lord chief juftice Holt thought a general warrant of commitment for breach of privilege was of the nature of an execution; and, fince the ground of complaint was specified in the warrant, he thought it plainly appeared, that the prifoners had been guilty of no offence, and that therefore they ought to be difcharged. Without entering into the validity of this opinion, it is certain, that Mr. Lechmere said that he believed, in the rolls of precedents, there might be found a cafe where bail had been allowed by the court of King's Bench, upon a commitment of the houfe of commons. This author therefore, ought rather to have queftioned, whether it was a prudential, or a legal confideration, which influenced judges to deny the writ of Habeas Corpus on fuch commitments. What

the author means by the words each of them, in the above quotation we know not. He boldly concludes, however, from the premifes, that the arguments which have been drawn from precedents, confidered as the fole origin and guide in the refolutions of the houfe of commons, respecting the Middlesex election, whether on one fide or the other, are fo far from being conclufive, that they are of very little import.

This author is of opinion, that the commons, and the right of electing them alfo, were created by the crown; and that the very existence of the house, as well as their electors is derived from the very fame fource; but he does not intend to infinuate, that the reprefentatives are poffeffed of an unbounded power to exert their authority as they pleafe, but in matters relative to themselves alone. He thinks, that if the commons cannot make their own powers of difqualification, which are are not defined by law, because they did not make themselves it then follows that the electors cannot make their powers of election, which are not defined by law, because they did not make themfelves. And thus the powers of the elected and electors standing alike on this fallacious ground of not being lawful, because they did not make themselves, muft fink, and all fall in together. Nor do the ill confequences of the preceding principle terminate in this place: it must proceed to more fatal effes. For if the commons, because they did not make their own power, cannot exercife the authority of disqualifying a member by their own refolutions, it follows that they cannot exert that power in conjunction with the crown and the house of peers. For if the power of disqualification be injurious both to the electors and the elected, that power can no more be legally exercised in conjunction with the king and lords, than by the commons folely in their own house. For to affert that the commons, because they did not make their own powers, have not the right to difqualify a member by their own refolutions, without depriving the electors of their right of election, the member of his right of reprefentation, and rifquing the ruin of the conftitution itself; and yet to allow that thefe very commons can effect the fame thing in a more extenfive degree, with more injurious effects, and without violating the rights of the member, the elector, and the conftitution, conjoined with the two other legiflative eftates, is to affert, that the fame act which is criminal when committed by themselves, is lawful when tranfacted in company. What pofition can be more replete with abfurdity than this, that the fame men both have and have not the fame right? That they poffefs it where it can do the most mischief, and are not invefted with it where it can do the leaft. That they can ref