lectual world in fearch of employment, and who have perhaps been sometimes with-held from attending to the practice of their favourite duty, by their zeal for its advancement, and diligence in its celebration.

The intricacy of this question may be alledged as a proof of that tenderness for mankind which Providence has, I think, univerfally difplayed, by making attainments eafy in proportion as they are neceffary. That all the duties of morality ought to be practifed, is without difficulty discoverable; becaufe ignorance or uncertainty would immediately involve the world in confusion and distress; but which duty ought to be most esteemed or praised, we may debate, without much inconvenience, fo all be diligently performed as there is opportunity or need for upon practice, not upon opinion, depends the happinefs of mankind; and controverfies merely fpeculative are of fmall importance in themselves, however they may have fometimes heated a difputant, or provoked a faction.

Of the divine author of our religion it is impoffible to peruse the evangelical histories, without obferving how little he favoured the vanity of inquifitiveness; how much more rarely he condefcended to fatisfy curiofity, than to relieve diftrefs; and how much he desired, that his followers should rather excel in goodness than in knowledge. His precepts tend immediately to the rectification of the moral principles, and direction of daily conduct; without oftentation, without art; at once irrefragable and plain, fuch as well-meaning fimplicity muft always understand, and of which we cannot

mistake

mistake the meaning, but when we are afraid to find it.

The measure of justice prescribed to us, in our tranfactions with others, is remarkably clear and comprehenfive: Whatfoever ye would that men should do unto you, even fo do unto them. A law by which every claim of right may be immediately adjufted, as far as the private confcience requires to be informed; a law, of which every man may find the expofition in his own breaft, and which may al ways be obferved by honefty of intention, and purity of will.

Over this law indeed fome men have been fubtle enough to throw mifts, which have darkened their own eyes, and found means of perplexing that uni verfal principle upon which every question of juftice, between one man and another, is to be decided. They have inquired, whether a man confcious to himself of unreasonable defires, be bound to gratify them in another? But furely it requires not long deliberation to conclude, that the defires which are to be confidered as the measure of juftice, must be fuch as we approve; that we ought to pay no regard to thofe expectations in another, which we condemn in ourselves, and which, however they may intrude upon our imagination, we know it our duty to refift and fupprefs.

One of the most celebrated cafes which has been produced as requiring fome fkill in cafuiftry to adapt it to this great rule, is that of a criminal afking mercy of his judge; who cannot but know, that if he was in the itate of the fupplicant, he should defire that pardon which he now denies. The dif

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ficulty

ficulty of this fuppofition will vanish, if we remember that the parties are in reality, on one fide the criminal, and on the other the community, of which the magiftrate is only the minifter, and by which he is entrusted with the public fafety. The magistrate therefore, in pardoning a man unworthy of pardon, betrays the truft with which he is invefted, gives away what is not his own, and, without question, does to others what he would not that others fhould do to him. Even the community, whofe right is ftill greater to arbitrary grants of mercy, is yet bound by thofe laws which regard the great republic of mankind; and cannot justify fuch forbearances as may promote wickedness, and leffen the general confidence and fecurity in which all have an equal intereft, and which all are therefore bound to maintain. For this reafon no state has a right to erect a general fanctuary for fugitives, or give protection to fuch as have forfeited their lives by crimes against the laws of common morality, equally acknowledged by all nations; becaufe none can, without infraction of the universal league of focial beings, incite, by profpects of impunity and fafety, thofe practices in another dominion, which they would themselves punish in their own.

One occafion of uncertainty and hesitation in those by whom this great rule has been commented, and expanded, is the confufion of what the cafuifts are careful to distinguish, debts of justice, and debts of charity. The immediate and primary intention of this precept, is, to establish a rule of juftice for the tribunal of confcience; and I know not whether imagination, or fophiftry, can start a fingle difficulty to retard its application, when it is thus expreffed and explained, Let every man acknowledge

knowledge the claim of right which he should think just in the Jame cafe.

The discharge of the debts of charity, or duties which we owe to others not merely as required by justice, but as dictated by benevolence, admits in its own nature greater complication of circumftan ces, and greater latitude of choice. Juftice is indif penfably and univerfally neceffary; and what is ne ceffary, muft always be limited, uniform, and diftinct. But beneficence, though in general equally required by our religion, and equally needful to the conciliation of the divine favour, is yet, for the most part, with regard to its fingle acts, elective and voluntary. We may certainly, without injury to our fellow-beings, allow in the diftribution of kindnefs fomething to our affections, and change the measure of our liberality according to our opinions and profpects, our hopes and fears. This rule therefore is not equally determinate and abfolute with refpect to offices of kindness and acts of liberality; because liberality and kindness, abfolutely determined, would lose their nature; for how could we be called tender, or charitable, for giving that which we are positively forbidden to with-hold?

Yet even in adjusting the extent of our beneficence, no other measure can be taken than this precept affords us : for we can only know what others fuffer or want, by confidering how we should be affected in the fame ftate; nor can we proportion our affiftance by any other rule, than that of doing what we should then expect from others. It indeed generally happens, that the giver and receiver differ in their opinions of generofity; and the fame partiality inclines one to large expecta

tions,

tions, and the other to fparing diftributions. Perhaps the infirmity of human nature will scarcely fuffer a man groaning under the preffure of distress, to judge rightly of the kindness of his friends, or to think they have done enough till his deliverance is completed. It is therefore apparent, that not what we should hope, but what we could demand from others, we are obliged to perform; fince, though we can easily know how much we might claim, it is impoffible to determine what we should hope.

But in all inquiries concerning the practice of voluntary and occafional virtues, it is fafeft for minds not oppreffed with fuperftitious fears, to determine against their own inclinations, and fecure themselves from deficiency, by doing more than they believe strictly neceffary. For of this every man may be certain, that if he were to exchange conditions with his dependent, he should expect more than, with the utmost exertion of his ardour, he now will prevail upon himself to perform; and when our reason has no fettled rule, and our paffions are striving to mislead us, it is furely the part of a wife man to err on the fide of safety.