"Wherefore let this proportion of our strength with the commandments of God's law be no more enforced, as if the Lord had measured the rule of justice, which he purposed to give in his law, according to the rate of our weakness." "The Lord commandeth those things that we cannot do, that we may know what we ought to ask of him.". "Faith obtaineth that which the law commandeth, yea, the law therefore commandeth that faith may obtain that which was commanded by the law." "Again let God give what he commandeth, and command what he will."

B. 2. ch. 5. sec. 7.

4. Before the fall man had, not merely the capability of being the subject of volitions, but the power of choice, in relation to both good and evil.

Since the fall man has the power of willing evil only, until God by the supernatural

OTHERS.

4. "Man by his fall into a state of sin, hath wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good."

Before the fall he had power to will and to do both good and evil. Since the fall he has only the power of willing and doing evil, until he is enabled by grace. Say. Plat. Con. C. Scot. and Con. P. C. U. S. ch. 9. sec. 1, 2, 3, 4. Also, Con. R. D. C. Art. 14. The same doctrines are taught in the Confessions of England, France, Helvetia, Basil, Bohemia, Belgia, and Auspurge.

subject, that there are two very different kinds of inability; so different that the one, however great, does not lessen moral obligation in the least; whereas the other, so far as it obtains, destroys obligation, and takes away all desert of blame and punishment entirely. These two kinds of inability, as I hinted, have commonly been distinguished, by calling one a natural, and the other a moral inability. Which distinction may be briefly stated thus: Moral inability consists only in the want of a heart, or disposition, or will, to do a thing. Natural inability, on the other hand, consists in, or arises from, want of understanding, bodily strength, opportunity, or whatever may prevent, our doing a thing, when we are willing, and strongly enough disposed and inclined to do it. Or in fewer words, thus: whatever a man

HOPKINS,

4. Moral action consists in voluntary exercises, or choice. Whoever has choice, without any reference to the cause or efficient agent of that choice, is a moral agent. Herein consists man's freedom that his choice is a choice; or his will is a will. Although he be not the cause, original mover, or efficient agent of the choice, yet it is his, being produced in him. Syst. Vol. 1. ch. 4.

4. "A moral action is an exercise of the will, or heart of man. For the heart of man is the only source of moral exercise. It is the heart of man which God requires; and with the heart we obey or disobey the divine commands." "In other words, a moral action is a volition of a moral agent; and not any animal, intellectual, visible or external motion. For the law of God, which is the only standard of moral exercise, requires the heart."

Spring's Disquisitions, p. 54. "The heart consists in voluntary exercises; and voluntary exercises are moral agency."

Emmons, p. 337.

could not do, if he would, in this, he is under a natural inability; but when all the reason why one cannot do a thing, is because he does not choose to do it, the inability is only of a moral nature.”

"Some account for God's suspending our salvation upon impossible conditions, and condemning men for not doing what it is not in their power to do, by observing, that we lost our power by the fall. Our present weakness and blindness was brought upon us as a righteous punishment for the disobedience of Adam; and God, they say, has not lost his right to command, because man by his own folly and sin, has lost his ability to obey. That is, we ought, it is our present real duty to exert, not only all the strength we actually have but all we should have had, had it not been for the original apostacy. But to this it will be objected, that we never reason and judge in this manner, in any other case. We do not think those who have lost their eyes, are still to blame for not seeing; or those who have lost their reason for not understanding."

"It must, I think, be granted, that we do generally suppose a man's pres sent duty cannot exceed his present strength, suppose it to have been impaired by what means it will." Smalley on moral inability, Ser. 1. God, say the opposers of this last representation, has not suspended man's saivation upon any condition which he can, or ever will perform. The atonement is the only condition on which is suspended the sinner's sal

5. Holiness consists in en

tire conformity to the image of

B. 1, ch. 15. sec. 8. B. 2. ch. 2. God. Larger Cat. Q. 17. and

B. 3. ch. 14. sec, 9. and B. 4. generated person is this; he is a sinner by nature and practice: of a saint this; he is a sinner saved by grace, whose very

The natural man is wholly corrupted in all the faculties of

vation. It is God who gives the principle, the ability, the exercise of faith; and promises that those who receive this gift, who believe, who are made alive, shall be saved.

Fallen man has the power of sinning, and for the exercise of it, he will be punished; while it still remains true, that grace alone gives the ability to please God." Can the Ethiopian change his skin ? or the leopard, his spots ? Then may ye also do good, who are accustomed to do evil." "Neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit." "Can the fig-tree bear olive berries?"

HOPKINS, 5. Virtue and vice, or sin and holiness are predicable of nothing but moral actions.

Syst. Vol. 1. p. 129.*

6. Every moral action is either perfectly holy, or perfectly sinful. That is a good or holy moral act or choice, which is conformed to the moral law, and may be resolved into disinterested benevolence. That is an evil moral action which is direct hostility to the moral law, and may be resolved into hatred of it, or which is the same, into self-love, or supreme selfish

ness.

AND

OTHERS.

5. Sin is a wrong choice or volition. Holiness is its opposite; a right choice or volition. Nothing else is sin; nothing

else holiness.

Spring's Disquisitions, p. 16 and 17.

6. "1. Is not sinfulness a sinful act of the will? 2. Is not goodness a good act of the will? 3. Is the same identical act of the will both a holy and a sinful act? 4. Is a holy volition a sinful volition? If then sinfulness is a sinful volition; if holiness is a holy volition; and if the same identical volition cannot be holy and sinful both, does it not inevitably follow that holiness and sin are never mixed in

Syst. Vol. 1. Part 1. ch. 4. the same volition? If this is and Part 2. ch. 4.

not demonstration, I will thank Mr. T. to point out the fallacy.", Spring's Disquisitions, p. 179.

* "As the law requires love, and nothing but love, it may be determined with great certainty that sin consists in that which is contrary to that love which the law requires, be it what it may. There can be no neutral moral exercises, which are neither conformable to the law of God, nor contrary to it; therefore every exercise of the heart of a moral agent, which is not agreeable to the law of God, is contrary and opposed to it. It must also be observed, and kept in mind, that sin, as does holiness, consists in the motions or exercises of the heart or will, and in nothing else. Where there is no exercises of heart, nothing of the nature of moral inclination, will or choice, there can be neither sin nor holiness." Syst. Vol. I. p. 344. Of course, it is as suitable to speak of a sinful horse, as of a sinful human nature, or of the criminality of wanting original righteousness.

Hopkins' System abounds with such violations of the laws of the English language, for which the writer of the Contrast is not accountable.

his soul, so that he is a sinner righteousnesses are as filthy by nature. This is his charac- rags: of a glorified saint this; ter. When the work of regen- he is perfectly restored to the eration has been commenced, image of God? and is immuand he has some saving know- tably free to the choice of good ledge of God, and some free- only. dom of will to good, he is of a inixed character. When the image of God shall be completely restored, he will possess a perfect character.

Inst. B. 4. ch. 15. sec. 11. and B. 4. ch. 15. sec. 10, 11, 12. et passim.

Say. Plat. Con. C. Scot. Con. P. C. U. S. ch. 6. sec. 3. ch. 16 and 17. ch. 9. sec. 5.

8. Although no man has ability to keep the moral law, yet, it is of use to show us the will of God, exhibit our duty and obligations, convince us of our sinful pollution and disability, humble us under a sense of our sin and misery, awaken our consciences to flee from the wrath to come, drive us to Christ, excite our gratitude to him for obeying in our stead, and render the accursed inexcusable.*

Larger Cat. Q. 95, 96, 97. Con. C. Scot. Con. P. C. U. S. Say. Plat. ch. 19. sec. 5, 6.

* The whole of the Heidelbergh Catechism is founded upon this view of the moral law. It teaches, that by the moral law we are convinced of our misery; and thence are directed to seek deliverance by the Redeemer. Calvin's views of the law were the same. He proves, that the observing of the law is, since the fall, utterly impossible: B. 2. ch. 7. sec. 4. That the ceremonial law was given to nourish the hope of Christ until his coming and that the ten commandments were also given to prepare men to seek Christ. B. 2. ch. 7. sec. 1, 2. He says there are three uses of the moral law. 1, To restrain the unrenewed and the reprobate. B. 2. ch. 7. sec. 10, 11, 12. 2, To show us the righteousness which God will accept, that we being convinced of sin, imbecility, and accursedness may be moved to seek that perfect righteousness in Christ. B. 2. ch. 7. sec. 7, 8, 9. 3, To