undertaking was void in point of law, through non-compliance with the Statute of Frauds. Nevertheless the court enforced performance of the agreement by him, their own officer, who had made it, and enforced it most justly." (P. 307.)

The directions to attornies and solicitors how to keep their clients' monies at their bankers, are useful, without pretending to originality. The precepts are backed by authority, and rendered interesting by example. This, indeed, is the character of the work throughout, and what imparts to it its value.

"Beware how you mingle your clients' money with your own, at your bankers; for if those bankers should fail, you will have to make good the loss to your clients. Of this the case of Robinson v. Ward, Ryan & Moody, 271., is a miserable example: for there the attorney, a gentleman of the highest respectability and honour, had to make good to his client no less a sum than 5300l.! Lord Tenterden lamented the hardship of the case, but applied the rule of law firmly. That misfortune arose out of Fauntleroy's forgeries. The sum in question being the produce of the sale of an estate belonging to the defendant's client, was deemed by the former too large a sum to be kept in his own house. He therefore paid the whole in the identical notes which he had received from the purchaser of the estate into the bank of Marsh and Company, in which Fauntleroy was a partner; but he paid it in, together with 1167. 9s. 11d. of his own, to his own private account. Three weeks afterwards the bank stopped with 16001. of the attorney's own money, beyond his client's 53007.; and the unfortunate attorney, 'upon whose conduct,' said Lord Tenterden, not the slightest suspicion could rest,' had to make good to his client the whole sum of 53001. You ought to have two distinct accounts with your banker; one your own private account, the other you might style your professional account,' or trust account;' specifying always the name of the client whose money you pay in;

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appear in the writing; and his ruling has been followed in the common law courts. But we do not recollect any case decided upon that reasoning in equity, and in Hammersley v. De Biel, 12 Cla. & Fin. 61. n., it would rather appear that Lord Cottenham gave it the go bye.

See also the later cases of In re Fairthorne, 3 D. & L. 548., and Titterton v. Shepherd, ibid. 775., as instances of the extent to which the Courts go on these occasions.

but, at all events, in some way or other, keep your own and your client's money perfectly distinct and separate from each other." (P. 361.)

Mr. Warren deserves very high praise for what he has said about the duty cast on attornies and solicitors of deciding the question of a testator's competency to make a will. On this difficult subject we think the following suggestions no less useful than prudent:

the

"I doubt whether, in the whole range of your duties there be one, the discharge of which is attended wih greater anxiety and responsibility, than that which is often cast upon you, — of determining on the mental competency of a testator to make a will. Pray bear in mind, when called to this exercise of your discretion, the ordeal through which you may afterwards have to pass, severe scrutiny to which your decision may be subjected in a court of justice. Let this reflection serve as an incentive to circumspection. Only consider what caution is requisite ! Suppose, for instance, you should, in your conscience, believe your client incapable of making a will, while he, and those about him, think otherwise: what will you do? Suppose you should refuse to be concerned and death intervene, followed by intestacy; even the medical attendant concurring with the relatives and attendants, in thinking that the testator was capable of making a will? Well, gentlemen, even in an extreme case like this, I conceive it to be your duty to act firmly in conformity with the dictates of your own conscience, and refuse to carry into effect what you believe to be only spurious wishes and intentions. If you should unfortunately have erred in your judgment, it will be an honest error, provided you really exerted your faculties to the utmost, in coming to your conclusion. You may be consoled by reflecting that the intestate's own negligence and procrastination conduced to the disappointment of his wishes, and the wishes and hopes of those whom he meant to benefit; and also devolved on you an unfair amount of responsibility, in determining, comparatively without assistance, so momentous a question as that of his capacity, or incapacity, to dispose of his property. He has yet cause to be thankful that the law is at hand to supply his omission! In a case of this description, you should be guided, to a great extent, by the opinion of the medical attendant, especially if he be a person of established character for ability, experience, and honour. Your own strongest impressions might well give way before his,

on the maxim, cuique suâ arte credendum. Your diffidence should be great, in proportion to his confidence, in a matter so peculiarly within his province- so frequently the subject of his observation and experience. It is possible that a conscientious practitioner might, under such circumstances, be unwilling to incur the vast responsibility of refusing to carry into effect the wishes of his client and his family; and might, as it were, under protest, prepare the will, expressly warning those concerned, that if it should be questioned, he would declare his opinions openly in court, leaving a jury to decide whether the will was, under the circumstances, valid, or not. This, however, is obviously a suggestion requiring the greatest caution in acting upon it, as well to prevent cowardly mental compromises on the part of honourable but timid practitioners, as to avoid affording a pretext and opportunity for innumerable and disastrous frauds, to the unscrupulous. It is difficult, if not impossible, to lay down a general rule on the subject, for each case must depend on its own circumstances. The responsibility, after all, rests with yourselves, of surrendering your conscientious judgment, or adhering to it with unjustifiable pertinacity. In such cases, I think I should be guided not a little by the nature of the will which it was proposed to make. If its provisions appeared reasonable, just, and suitable to the position of the testator and his family, -in duly consulting the interests, for instance, of his wife, children, and near relations, or old and valued friends, that of itself would afford most cogent evidence that the testator possessed a true disposing mind. If, on the other hand, he proposed to make an unjust, a cruel, or capricious disposition of his property, - disinheriting a child or children, making no provision, or a grossly inadequate one, for a deserving wife, — or alienating his property for absurd, unworthy, or disreputable purposes;-I should be strongly disposed to let that circumstance turn the scale, and should refuse to be any party to framing an instrument which would act so unjustly, unreasonably, or tyrannically. Nay, I question whether I would give any assistance to a testator, however mentally sound, if so morally unsound; gravely pausing, at all events, before I gave irrevocable operation to deathbed caprices, prejudices, and antipathies. I knew a gentleman, a London attorney of eminence, and very high honour, who acted thus, on a particular occasion, and refused to make a will, by which a client intended to disinherit his son. The testator lived to think better of it; expressed great thankfulness to the gentleman in question, for his firmness and high principle; and ulti

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mately made a will in conformity with the dictates of nature and religion. To return, however, to your client's chamber. In cases of doubt, such as that above supposed, remembering the public scrutiny to which the transaction, and particularly your share in it, will be exposed, secure good evidence of the true state of things, by having some disinterested witness present, the medical man, the clergyman, if within call, some respectable neighbour or friend of the dying person, some one, in short, whose name will not appear in the will, otherwise, possibly, than as witnesses. Above all, use your utmost exertions to secure efficient attesting witnesses-persons of character, intelligence, and firmness, such as are not likely to be shaken by the most violent cross-examination to which they may be exposed by counsel engaged on behalf of persons deeply interested in nullifying their testimony; and of such respectability and probity as will bid defiance to all attempts to tamper with them." (Ps. 376-382.)

In taking leave of Mr. Warren, we cannot abstain from saying, that the cause of "Law Lectures" has received a lift from the success of his experiment. They have been tried, and found to answer well in the case of articled clerks. But Mr. Warren doubts whether lectures could give any help to "students for the bar." This, we take leave to say, looks very like a freak of the understanding. If attornies and solicitors, men of practice, gain by lectures, much more certainly will the same object be obtained when the recipients of instruction have wider views and higher aims. The objection usually taken to lectures is, that they cannot of themselves make men of business. Hence it is that "students for the bar," immediately on quitting the university, are put to copying precedents with conveyancers, pleaders, or equity draftsmen. No reasonable being desires to alter this ancient and well-approved system. But the question is, whether lectures ought not to be superadded? The great body for whose benefit the present work has been prepared, and who owe a debt to the author, have answered this question by their own triumphant experience. Those sagacious individuals, who are wiser in their generation than the children of light, saw, upwards of twenty years ago, the necessity which had come for setting their house in order.

With the sanction of the Judges and Parliament, indeed, but without collateral aid or endowment of any kind, they have, entirely out of their own funds, erected a great and prosperous institution, for the better government of their society, and the more liberal culture of its junior members. The good which this establishment has already effected, in the way of superintendence and controul, is probably but little, when compared with that which may be expected hereafter to flow from it. We do not say that the Inns of Court have been inattentive spectators of these proceedings on the part of the attornies and solicitors; but we pray them to remember, that to whom much is given, from them also something is expected ; and that it is not enough for men who hold large possessions upon the express trust of legal education', to follow tardily, not to say reluctantly, in the wake of those to whom nothing was given, but who have themselves given everything.

III.—The Text-Book of the Constitution. Magna Charta, the Petition of Right, and the Bill of Rights. With Historical Comments, and Remarks on the present Political Emergencies. By E. S. CREASY, M. A., Barrister-at-Law; Professor of History in University College, London; late Fellow of King's College, Cambridge. London: Richard Bentley. 1848.

It is well in these days to have placed before us the landmarks of our constitutional rights. So much practical liberty of thought, word, and action is enjoyed in England (we rather dear for it, it must be confessed), that we are apt pay to forget how and when we acquired it. Professor Creasy, then, has done well to furnish us with this well-timed little treatise to remind us of these matters. It is a thoughtful, learned, and eloquent production, which, familiar as we suppose ourselves with its subject matter, may be read with great instruction by all; and we are not surprised to learn that it has already attracted the attention of foreign jurists,

This was shown by documentary authority in a former number of this Review.