and elementary principles and affections in which they have their origin. It is quite possible for us to separate the combinations of thought and feeling which exist in our mind into what may be truly called their elementary parts; and by repeating this analytic process, to arrive at conclusions of equal importance and certainty as those which are obtained in the physical sciences by the most rigorous induction.

In connexion with this subject, I may notice an objection which has been more recently made to the utility of moral philosophy. It has been said that this is a science in which no discoveries can ever be hoped to be made, since the rudest clown, in every age of the world, could tell us what it is to know, and feel, and think, and hear, and see, as well as the most skilful and accomplished metaphysician can. This ob jection, however, proves too much, since it may be said of all sciences that its elementary principles are known equally to all. Are not the numbers and the figures that form the basis of the mathematical sciences understood by many, who cannot tell either the nature or the objects of mathematical reasonings? And is the study of these to be regarded as useless, because the elements of which they are composed are known to the multitude almost as well as to the philosopher? It is so far from being true that the human mind is so narrow in the range of its phenomena as to render an investigation of its operations, with the hope of augmenting the sum of our knowledge, an abortive undertaking, that there is no branch of science more extensive, or which presents more pleasing and useful results than that which it offers to our contemplation.

If we were to follow the history of one passion, from its earliest workings in the mind through the whole progress of life, how numerous and diversified are the circumstances which we should find resulting from it! We should observe the same passion producing dissimilar effects, according to the different situations in which it is developed. The child who wished to be distinguished in the domestic circle, and whose very love of distinction seemed to be the pleasing omen of future eminence, cannot be viewed with the same feelings, when, at a future period, he is impelled by the same passion to all the atrocities of lawless ambition. The human character, in both situations, is influenced by the same common principle of our common nature; but that very principle, when modified by a change of circumstances, and stimulating to the attainment of dissimilar objects, as in the present case, exhibits phenomena extremely different.

With the inductive method of philosophizing, as taught by Lord Bacon, and exemplified in the school of Newton, we cannot be too familiar; since it bears as close a relation to the acquisition of real knowledge, as the characters and grammar of any language to an understanding of its idiom and use. To know accurately the best means which we should employ for the attainment of a particular end, is in any case a useful attainment. But in the present instance this acquisition is the more valuable, since the experience of the dark, as well as of the enlightened ages, affords incon

proof, that the only way of advancing in our

ce either with the phenomena of matter or

1

of mind, is by a careful and patient comparison and observation of facts, and by a cautious induction of inferences.

4. Having noticed the process of analysis, it may be proper in this place to make a few observations on the nature of synthesis, as contrasted with it. Analysis simply signifies, unless it be in geometry, where its meaning is somewhat peculiar, a resolution of any combination, whether of matter or of thought, into its component parts. There is no science in which we have more beautiful illustrations of this process than in chemistry. A single experiment in which any substance is decomposed, and resolved into its constituent elements, impresses its nature and its use upon the mind more effectually than any other mode whatever. Here we see the several substances existing in a compound, which no mechanical force can separate, passing through a certain process by which they are as perfectly removed from each other as if they had never been combined. It is by an analogous process, also called analysis, that we must proceed in every branch of philosophy in ascertaining the simple and general laws on which the complicated phenomena of the universe depend. Before we can come

The word is derived from avaλów, resolvo: in mathematics it denotes that process" by which a proposition is traced up, through a chain of necessary dependence, to some known operation, or some admitted principle. It is alike applicable to the investigation of truth in a theorem, or the discovery of the construction of a problem. Analysis, as its name imports, is thus a sort of inverted form of solution. Assuming the hypothesis advanced, it remounts step by step, till it has reached a source already explored. The reverse of this process constitutes synthesis or composition, which is the mode usually employed for explaining the elements of science. Analysis, therefore, presents the medium of invention, while synthesis naturally directs the course of instruction."

ciently obvious, admit of explication. "No word," says the eminent philosopher to whom I have already alluded, " can be logically defined, which does not denote a species, because such things only can have a specific difference; and a specific difference is essential to a logical definition. On this account there can be no logical definition of individual things, such as London or Paris. Individuals are distinguished, either by proper names, or by accidental circumstances of time and place, but they have no specific difference; and, therefore, though they may be known by proper names, or may be described by circumstances or relations, they cannot be defined. It is no less evident, that the most general words cannot be logically defined, because there is not a more general term, of which they are a species. Nay, we cannot define every species of things, because it happens sometimes that we have not words to express the specific difference. Thus, a scarlet colour is, no doubt, a species of colour; but how shall we express the specific difference by which scarlet is distinguished from green or blue? The difference of them is immediately perceived by the eye, but we have not words to express it.

"There is no subject in which there is more frequent occasion to use words that cannot be logically defined than in treating of the powers and operations of the mind. The simplest operations of our minds must all be expressed by words of this kind. No man can explain by a logical definition what it is to think, to apprehend, to believe, to will, to desire. Every man who understands the language has some notion of the meaning of these words; and every man

who is capable of reflection, may, by attending to the operations of his own mind, which are signified by them, form a clear and distinct notion of them; but they cannot be logically defined *.'

Of what importance it is to be familiar with these very obvious and elementary truths, the history of science sufficiently shews. How frequently have men of eminence perplexed and darkened the subjects they discussed, by pretending to give demonstrations of things which were self-evident, and by attempting to define that which admits of no explication! They have often presented to us the first principles of human knowledge in the form and language of mathematical demonstration; and we have found, after following their reasonings, that our ideas respecting them were not more accurate, nor our impressions of their truth stronger, than before. Nor can I help remarking in this place, that the mode of arraying moral science, whether elementary or otherwise, in the dress appropriated to pure mathematical truth, is worse than puerile, since it tends to confound, especially in the minds of the uninitiated, kinds of evidence so very different, and to impair, it is probable, in such cases, the impressions which moral evidence alone makes on the human mind. I proceed now to make a few observations on some terms which frequently occur in inquiries connected with Moral Philosophy; and which, though they may already be familiar to us, require, from the important facts and truths with which they are connected, a clear elucidation.

1. The word law very frequently occurs in the

*Reid's Essays, vol. i. ch. i.

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