of matter; whereby it will appear that it has no inherent faculty of fense and perception. And I will offer no other but what all competent judges, and even Atheists themselves, do allow of; and which, being part of the Epicurean and Democritean philofophy, is providentially one of the best antidotes against their other impious opinions; as the oil of fcorpions is said to be against the poison of their stings. When we frame in our minds any notion of matter, we conceive nothing elfe but extenfion and bulk, which is impenetrable, and divisible, and paffive; by which three pro-perties is understood, that any one particular quantity of matter doth hinder all other from intruding into its place, till itself be removed out of it; that it may be divided and broken into numerous parts of different fizes and figures, which by various ranging and difpofing may produce an immenfe diversity of furfaces and textures; that, if it once be bereaved of motion, it cannot of itself acquire it again, but it either must be impelled by fome other body from without, or (say we, though not the Atheist) be intrinfecally moved by an immaterial felf-active substance, that can penetrate and pervade it. Wherefore in the whole nature and idea of matter we have nothing but fubftance with magnitude, and figure, and fituation, and a capacity of being moved

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moved and divided. So that no parts of matter, confidered by themselves, are either hot or cold, either white or black, either bitter or fweet, or betwixt thofe extremes. All the various mixtures and conjugations of atoms do beget nothing but new inward texture, and alteration of furface. No fenfible qualities, as light, and colour, and heat, and found, can be fubfiftent in the bodies themfelves, abfolutely confidered, without a relation to our eyes, and ears, and other organs of fense. These qualities are only the effects of our fenfation, which arife from the different motions upon our nerves from objects without, according to their various modification and pofition. For example; when pellucid colourless glass or water, by being beaten into powder or froth, do acquire a very intense whiteness, what can we imagine to be produced in the glafs or water but a new difpofition of parts? nay, an object under the selffame difpofition and modification, when it is viewed by us under differing proportions, doth represent very differing colours, without any change at all in itself. For that very fame opake and white powder of glafs, when it is feen through a good microscope, doth exhibit all its little fragments pellucid and colourless; as the whole appeared to the naked eye, before it was pounded. So that whiteness,

whitenefs, and redness, and coldness, and the like, are only ideas and vital paffions in us that fee and feel; but can no more be conceived to be real and distinct qualities in the bodies themfelves, than roses or honey can be thought to smell or taste their own sweetness, or an organ be conscious of its mufic, or gun-powder of its flashing and noise.

Thus far then we have proved, and it is agreed on all hands, that in our conception of any quantity of body there is nothing but figure, and fite, and a capacity of motion: which motion, if it be actually excited in it, doth only cause a new order and contexture of parts: fo that all the ideas of sensible qualities are not inherent in the inanimate bodies, but are the effects of their motion upon our nerves, and fympathetical and vital paffions produced within ourselves.

II. Our fecond enquiry must be, what it is in the constitution and compofition of a man that hath the faculty of receiving fuch ideas and paffions? Let us carry in our minds this true notion of body in general, and apply it to our own fubftance, and obferve what prerogatives this rational machine (as the Atheists would make us to be) can challenge above other parcels of matter, We obferve then, in this understanding piece of clock-work, that this body, as well as other fenfeless matter,

has colour, and warmth, and softness, and the like. But we have proved it before, and it is acknowledged, that these qualities are not fubfiftent in those bodies, but are ideas and fenfations begotten in fomething else: fo that it is not blood and bones that can be conscious of their own hardness, or redness; and we are still to seek for fomething else in our frame and make, that must receive these impreffions. Will they say that these ideas are performed by the brain? But the difficulty returns upon them again; for we perceive that the like qualities of foftness, whitenefs, and warmth, do belong to the brain itself; and fince the brain is but body, thofe qualities (as we have fhewn) cannot be inherent in it, but are the fenfations of fome other substance without it. It cannot be the brain then, which imagines those qualities to be in itself,

But, they may fay, it is not the grofs fubftance of the brain that causes perception, but the animal fpirits that have their refidence there; which are void of fenfible qualities, because they never fall under our fenfes by reafon of their minuteness. But we conceive by our reason, though we cannot see them with our eyes, that every one of these also hath a determinate figure; they are spheres, or cubes, or pyramids, or cones, or of fome shape or other that is irregular and nameless:

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and all these are but modes and affections of magnitude; and the ideas of fuch modes can no more be fubfiftent in the atoms fo modified, than the idea of redness was juft now found to be inherent in the blood, or that of whiteness in the brain. And what relation or affinity is there between a minute body and cogitation, any more than the greateft? Is a small drop. of rain any wifer than the ocean? or do we grind inanimate corn into living and rational meal? My very nails, or my hair, or the horns and hoofs of a beaft, may bid as fair for understanding and sense, as the finest animal spirits of the brain.

III. But thirdly, they will fay, it is not the bulk and fubftance of the animal fpirits, but their motion and agility, that produces cogitation and sense. If then motion in general, or any degree of its velocity, can beget cogitation; surely a ship under fail must be a very intelligent creature, though while the lies at anchor those faculties must be asleep: fome cold water or ice may be phlegmatic and fenfelefs; but, when it boils in a kettle, it has wonderful heats of thinking, and ebullitions of fancy. Nay, the whole corporeal mafs, all the brute and stupid matter of the universe, must upon these terms be allowed to have life and understanding; fince there is nothing, that we know of, in a state of abfolute reft. Thofe