An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, in Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism |
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Page 54
... perfect , or at least a fimpler , kind of proof , than the other ; but both are e- qually convincing . The other kind is call- ed indirect , apagogical , or ducens ad abfur- dum ; and takes place when , by fuppofing a propofition falfe ...
... perfect , or at least a fimpler , kind of proof , than the other ; but both are e- qually convincing . The other kind is call- ed indirect , apagogical , or ducens ad abfur- dum ; and takes place when , by fuppofing a propofition falfe ...
Page 115
... perfect P 2 perfect enjoyment that can poffibly fall to the fhare of th.II.5 . ON TRUTH . 115.
... perfect P 2 perfect enjoyment that can poffibly fall to the fhare of th.II.5 . ON TRUTH . 115.
Page 116
James Beattie. perfect enjoyment that can poffibly fall to the fhare of any created being . Sceptics may wrangle , and mockers may blaf- pheme ; but the pious man knows by e- vidence too fublime for their comprehen- fion , that his ...
James Beattie. perfect enjoyment that can poffibly fall to the fhare of any created being . Sceptics may wrangle , and mockers may blaf- pheme ; but the pious man knows by e- vidence too fublime for their comprehen- fion , that his ...
Page 152
... perfect indiffe¬ rence about it , which fome men are good- natured enough to call moderation , is a principle of great good - breeding , and gives no fort of disturbance , either in private or public life . This is a plea on which fome ...
... perfect indiffe¬ rence about it , which fome men are good- natured enough to call moderation , is a principle of great good - breeding , and gives no fort of disturbance , either in private or public life . This is a plea on which fome ...
Page 188
... perfect . But the evi- dence of fenfe can never be corrected by any reasoning , except by that which pro- ceeds on a fuppofition , that our senses are not fallacious . And all our notions con- cerning the perfection or imperfection of ...
... perfect . But the evi- dence of fenfe can never be corrected by any reasoning , except by that which pro- ceeds on a fuppofition , that our senses are not fallacious . And all our notions con- cerning the perfection or imperfection of ...
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Common terms and phrases
abfurd againſt alfo anfwer appear argument axiom becauſe believe cafe caufe cauſe common fenfe confequence confiftent confutation conviction demonftration difcover difpofed difpute diftinction diſtance doctrine doubt Effay eſtabliſh evidence of fenfe exift exiſtence experience faculties faid falfe fallacious fceptical fcepticiſm fcience feems felf-evident fenfation fentiments feven fhall fhould fight firft firſt fome fometimes foul fpirit ftill fubject fuch fufficient fuppofe fyftem hath himſelf Human Nature HUME HUME's idea impoffible inftance inſtinctive intuitive itſelf judgement leaft leaſt lefs lieve magnitude MALEBRANCHE mankind metaphyfical mind miſtake moft moral moſt muft muſt myſelf neceffary neceffity never obfervation object occafion ourſelves perceive perception perfon philofophy pleaſe poffible prefent principles proof propofition prove purpoſe Pyrrho queftion queſtion reafon refpect rience ſeems ſenſe ſpeak teftimony thefe themſelves ther theſe thofe thoſe tion Treatife of Human true truft truth ture underſtanding univerfal uſe vifible virtue whofe words
Popular passages
Page 74 - fair light, And thou enlighten'd earth, so fresh and gay, Ye hills, and dales, ye rivers, woods, and plains, And ye that live and move, fair creatures, tell, Tell, if ye saw, how came I thus, how here?
Page 74 - Tell, if ye saw, how came I thus, how here? Not of myself, by some great Maker then, In goodness and in power pre-eminent : Tell me, how may I know him, how adore, From whom I have that thus I move and live, And feel that I am happier than I know.
Page 505 - I am apt to suspect the negroes and in general all the other species of men (for there are four or five different kinds) to be naturally inferior to the whites.
Page 296 - Where is the harm of my believing, that if I were to fall down yonder precipice, and break my neck, I should be no more a man of this world? My neck, Sir, may be an idea to you, but to me it is a reality, and an important one too. Where is the harm of my believing, that if, in this severe weather...
Page 273 - For philosophy informs us, that every thing, which appears to the mind, is nothing but a perception, and is interrupted, and dependent on the mind ; whereas the vulgar confound perceptions and objects, and attribute a distinct continu'd existence to the very things they feel or see.
Page 330 - A cause is an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other.
Page 364 - That though man in truth is a necessary agent, having all his actions determined by fixed and immutable laws ; yet, this being concealed from him, he acts with the conviction of being a free agent...
Page 262 - We have, it is true, a livelier perception of a friend when we see him, than when we think of him in his absence. But this is not all: every person of a sound mind knows, that in the one case we believe, and are certain, that the object exists, and is present with us; in the other we believe, and are certain, that the object is not present.
Page 75 - What am I? or from whence? For that I am I know, because I think; but whence I came, Or how this frame of mine began to be, What other Being can disclose to me?
Page 365 - I'm sped, If foes, they write, if friends, they read me dead. Seized and tied down to judge, how wretched I! Who can't be silent, and who will not lie: To laugh, were want of goodness and of grace, And to be grave, exceeds all power of face. I sit with sad civility, I read With honest anguish, and an aching head; And drop at last, but in unwilling ears, This saving counsel, — 'Keep your piece nine years.