in virtue, and formalifts in good-breeding; wife only when we follow the ancients, and foolish whenever we deviate from their footsteps. Such violent fenti→ ments are generally wrong: and therefore I am difpofed to adopt the notions of those who may be confidered as forming an intermediate clafs; who, though not blind to the follies, are yet willing to acknowledge the virtues, both of paft ages, and of the prefent. And furely, in every age, and in every man, there is something to praife, as well as fomething to blame.

When I furvey the philofophy of the prefent age, I find much matter of applause and admiration. Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural History, in all their branches, have rifen to a pitch of 'perfection, which doth fignal honour to human capacity, and far furpaffeth what the most fanguine projectors of former times had any reafon to look for: and the paths to further improvement in those fciences are fo clearly marked out, that nothing but honesty and attention feems requifite to enfure the fuccefs of future adventurers. Moral Philofophy and Logic

have not been fo fortunate: yet, even here, we have happily got rid of much pedantry and jargon; our fyftems have more the appearance of liberal fentiment, good tafte, and correct compofition, than those of the fchoolmen; we disclaim (at least in words) all attachment to hypothefis and party; profefs to ftudy men and things, as well as books and words; and affert, with the ut most vehemence of proteftation, our love of truth, of candour, and of found philofophy. But let us not be deceived by appearances. Neither Moral Philofophy, nor the kindred fciences of Logic and Criticism, are at prefent upon the moft defireable footing. The rage of paradox and system hath transformed them (although of all fciences these ought to be the fimpleft and the cleareft) into a mafs of confufion, darkness, and abfurdity. One kind of jargon is laid afide; but another has been adopted, more fashionable indeed, but equally frivolous. Hypothefis, though verbally difclaimed, is really adhered to with as much obftinacy as ever. Words have been defined; but their ambiguity continues. Appeals have been made to experience; but with fuch mifreprefentation

1

and equivocation, as plainly fhow the authors to have been more concerned for their theory, than for the truth. All fciences, and especially Moral Philofophy, ought to regulate human practice: practice is regulated by principles, and all principles fuppofe conviction: yet the aim of our most celebrated moral systems is, to diveft the mind of every principle, and of all conviction; and, confequently, to difqualify man for action, and to render him as ufelefs, and as wretched, as poffible. In a word, SCEPTICISM is now the profeffion of every fashionable inquirer into human nature; a fcepticifm which is not confined to points of mere fpeculation, but hath been extended to practical truths of the highest importance, even to the principles of morality and religion. Proofs of all these affertions will appear in the fequel.

I faid, that my prejudices are all in favour of truth and virtue. To avow any fort of prejudice, may perhaps ftartle fome readers. If it fhould, I must here intreat all fuch to paufe a moment, and afk of their own hearts thefe fimple questions.

Are

Are virtue and truth useful to mankind? Are they matters of indifference? Or are they pernicious? If any one finds himfelf disposed to think them pernicious, or matters of indifference, I would advife him to lay my book afide; for it doth not contain one fentiment in which he can be interested, nor one expreffion with which he can be pleased. But he who believes, that virtue and truth are of the highest importance, that in them is laid the foundation of human happiness, and that on them depends the very existence of human fociety, and of human creatures, that perfon and I are of the fame mind; I have no prejudices which he would wish me not to have: he may proceed; and I hope he will proceed with pleasure, and encourage, by his approbation, this honeft attempt to vindicate truth and virtue; and to overturn that pretended philofophy, which fuppofeth, or which may lead us to fuppofe, every dictate of confcience, and every impulfe of understanding, questionable and ambiguous.

This fceptical philofophy (as it is called) feems to me to be dangerous, not becaufe

cause it is ingenious, but because it is fubtle and obfcure. Were it rightly un derstood, no confutation would be neceffary; for it does in fact confute itself, as I hope to demonstrate. But many, to my certain knowledge, have read it, and admitted its tenets, who do not understand the grounds of them; and many more, fwayed by the fafhion of the times, have greedily adopted its conclu→ fions, without any knowledge of the premifes, or any concern about them. An attempt therefore to expose this pretended philofophy to public view, in its proper colours, will not, I hope, be cenfured as impertinent by any whose opinion I value: if it should, I fhall be fatisfied with the approbation of my own confcience, which will never reproach me for intending to do good.

I am forry, that in the course of this inquiry, it will not always be in my power to fpeak of fome celebrated names with that deference, to which fuperior talents, and fuperior virtue, are always entitled. Every friend to civil and religious liberty, every lover of mankind, every admirer