fute but this apology may be perfectly confiftent with fincerity and candor, and with that principle of which Pope fays, that " though no fcience, it is fairly worth "the feven." Thus far we have endeavoured to diftin Their guish and afcertain the feparate provinces of Reason and Common Senfe. connection and mutual dependence, and the extent of their respective jurifdictions, we now proceed more particularly to investigate.- I ought perhaps to make an apology for thefe, and fome other metaphorical expreffions. And indeed it were to be wifhed, that in all matters of science, they could be laid afide; for the indifcreet ufe of them has done great harm, by leading philofophers to mistake verbal analogies for real ones; and often, too, by giving plaufibility to nonfenfe, as well as by difguifing and perplexing very plain doctrines with an affected pomp of highfounding words and gaudy images. But in the philofophy of the human mind, it is impoffible to keep clear of metaphor; because we cannot speak intelligibly of immaterial things, without continual allufions to matter, and its qualities. All I need need to fay further on this head is, that I mean not by these metaphors to impofe upon the reader, and that I fhall do my utmost to prevent their impofing upon myfelf. It is ftrange to obferve, with what reluctance fome people acknowledge the power of instinct. That man is governed by reason, and the brutes by instinct, is a favourite topic with fome philofophers; who, like other froward children, fpurn the hand that leads them, and defire, above all things, to be left at their own difpofal. Were this boaft founded in truth, it might be fuppofed to mean little more, than that man is governed by himfelf, and the brutes by their Maker *. But, luckily for man, it is not founded in truth, but in ignorance, inattention, and felfconceit. Our inftincts, as well as our rational powers, are far fuperior, both in number and dignity, to those which the brutes enjoy; and it were well for us, on many occafions, if we laid our fystems afide, and were more attentive in obferving * And Reafon raise o'er Inftinct as you can, Pope's Elay on Man, Ep. 3. ver. 99. thefe thefe impulfes of nature in which reafon has no part. Far be it from me to speak with difrefpect of any of the gifts of God; every work of his is good; but the best things, when abused, may become pernicious. Reason is a noble faculty, and, when kept within its proper fphere, and applied to useful purposes, proves a mean of exalting human creatures almost to the rank of fuperior beings. But this faculty has been much perverted, often to vile, and often to infignificant purposes; fometimes chained like a flave or malefactor, and fometimes foaring in forbidden and unknown regions. No wonder, then, if it hath been frequently made the inftrument of feducing and bewildering mankind, and of rendering philosophy contemptible. In the science of body, glorious difcoveries have been made by a right use of reafon. When men are once fatisfied to take things as they find them; when they believe Nature upon her bare declaration, without fufpecting her of any design to impofe upon them; when their utmost ambition is to be her fervants and humble interpreters; then, and not till then, will philofophy philofophy profper. But of those who have applied themselves to the fcience of Human Nature, it may truly be said, (of many of them at leaft), that too much reafoning, hath made them mad. Nature fpeaks to us by our external, as well as by our internal, fenfes; it is ftrange, that we fhould believe her in the one cafe, and not in the other; it is moft ftrange, that fuppofing her fallacious, we fhould think ourfelves capable of detecting the cheat. Common Senfe tells me, that the ground on which I ftand is hard, material, and folid, and has a real, feparate, independent existence. EERKELEY and HUME tell me, that I am impofed upon in this matter: for that the ground under my feet is really an idea in my mind; that its very effence confifts in being perceived; and that the fame instant it ceases to be perceived, it must alfo cease to exift; in a word, that to be, and to be perceived, when predicated of the ground, the fun, the starry heavens, or any corporeal object, fignify precifely the fame thing. Now if my common fenfe be mistaken, who fhall afcertain and correct the mistake? Our reafon, it is faid. Are then the inferences of reafon in this inftance clearer, and more decifive, G decifive, than the dictates of common fenfe? By no means: I ftill truft to my common fenfe as before, and I feel that I must do fo. But fuppofing the inferences of the one faculty as clear and decifive, as the dictates of the other, yet who will af fure me, that my reafon is lefs liable to mistake than my common fenfe? And if reafon be mistaken, what fhall we fay? Is this mistake to be rectified by a fecond reafoning, as liable to mistake as the firft? In a word, we must deny the distinction between truth and falfehood, adopt univerfal fcepticism, and wander without end from one maze of error and uncertainty to another; a ftate of mind fo miferable, that Milton makes it one of the torments of the damned; or else we must fuppofe, that one of these faculties is naturally of higher authority than the other; and that either reason ought to fubmit to common fenfe, or common fenfe to reafon, whenever a variance happens between them. It has been faid, that every inquiry in philofophy ought to begin with doubt; that nothing is to be taken for granted, and nothing believed, without proof. If this be admitted, it must alfo be admitted, that reafon is the ultimate judge |