tional differences in the frame of different minds. 3. Some men are distinguished by an uncommon acutenefs in difcovering the characters of others: they feem to read the foul in the countenance, and with a fingle glance to penetrate the deepest receffes of the heart. In their prefence, the hypocrite is detected, notwithstanding his fpecious outfide; the gay effrontery of the coxcomb cannot conceal his infignificance; and the man of merit appears confpicuous under all the difguifes of an unaffuming and ungainly modefty. This talent is fometimes called Common Sense; but very improperly. It is far from being common; it is even exceedingly rare: it is to be found in men who are not remarkable for any other mental excellence; and we often fee those who in other refpects are judicious enough, quite deftitute of it. 4. Neither ought every common opinion to be referred to common fenfe. Modes in dress, religion, and converfation, however abfurd in themfelves, may fuit the notions or the taste of a particular people : but none of us will fay, that it is agreeable to common fenfe, to worship more gods than one; to believe that one and the fame body body may be in ten thousand different placés at the fame time *; to like a face the better because it is painted, or to diflike a perfon because he does not lifp in his pronunciation. Laftly, The term Common Sense hath in modern times been used by philofophers, both French and British, to fignify that power of the mind which perceives truth, or commands belief, not by progreffive argumentation, but by an inftantaneous, inftinctive, and irresistible im+ pulfe; derived neither from education nor. from habit, but from nature; acting independently on our will, whenever its object is prefented, according to an esta→ blifhed law, and therefore properly called Sense; and acting in a fimilar manner upon all, or at least upon a great majority of mankind, and therefore properly called Common Senfe. It is in this fignification that the term Common Senfe is used in the prefent inquiry. That there is a real and effential difference between thefe two faculties; that Tranfubftantiation. For the circumflances that characterife a Senfe, Lee. Dr Gerard's Effay on Tafle, part 3. fect. 1. Note. common common fenfe cannot be accounted for, by being called the perfection of reason, nor reafon, by being refolved into common fenfe, will perhaps appear from the following remarks. 1. We are conscious, from internal feeling, that the energy of understanding which perceives intuitive truth, is different from that other energy which unites a conclufion with a first principle, by a gradual chain of intermediate relations. We believe the truth of an investigated conclufion, because we can affign a reason for our belief; we believe an intuitive principle, without being able to affign any other reafon for our belief than this, that the law of our nature determines us to believe it, even as the law of our nature determines us to fee a colour when presented to our open eyes at noonday. 2. We cannot difcern any neceffary connection between reason and common sense they are indeed generally connected; but we can conceive a being endued with the one who is deftitute of the other. Nay, we often find, that this is in fact the cafe. In dreams, we fometimes reafon without common fenfe. Through a defect of common fenfe, we F adopt adopt abfurd principles; but fuppofing our principles true, our reasoning is often unexceptionable. The fame thing may be obferved in certain kinds of madnefs. A man who believes himself made of glass, may yet reafon very juftly concerning the means of preserving his fuppofed brittlenefs from flaws and fractures. Nay, what is ftill more to the purpose, we fometimes meet with perfons, whom it would be injurious to charge with infanity, who, though defective in common fense, have yet, by converfing much with polemical writers, improved their reafoning faculty to fuch a degree, as to puzzle and put to filence those who are greatly their fuperiors in every other mental endowment. 3. This leads us to remark a third difference between these two faculties, namely, that the one is more in our power than the other. There are few faculties, either of our mind or body, more improveable by culture, than that of reasoning; whereas common fenfe, like other instincts, arrives at maturity with almoft no care of To teach the art of reafoning, or rather of wrangling, is eafy; but it is impoffible to teach common fense to one who ours. wants wants it. You may make a man remember a fet of first principles, and fay that he believes them, even as you may teach one born blind to fpeak intelligibly of colours and light; but neither to the one, nor to the other, can you by any means communicate the peculiar feeling which accompanies the operation of that faculty which nature has denied him. A man defective in common fenfe may acquire learning; he may even poflefs genius to a certain degree: but the defect of nature he never can fupply: a peculiar modification of fcepticism, or credulity, or levity, will to the very end of his life distinguish him from other men. It would evidence a deplorable degree of irrationality, if a man could not perceive the truth of a geometrical axiom; fuch inftances are uncommon but the number of felf-evident principles cognifable by man is very great, and more vigour of mind may be neceffary to the perception of fome, than to the perception of others. In this refpect, therefore, there great diversities in the measure of common fenfe which different men enjoy. Further, of two men, one of whom, though he acknowledges may be |