4

people of fenfe, except by availing himfelf of expreffions, which either are in themfelves ambiguous, or become fo by his manner of applying them. If the ambiguity be difcernible, the argument can have no force; if there be no fufpicion of ambiguity, the difpute may be continued from generation to generation, without working any change in the fentiments of either party. When fact is difregarded, when intuition goes for nothing, when no ftandard of truth is acknowledged, and every unanswered argument is deemed unanfwerable, true reafoning is at an end; and the difputant, having long ago loft fight of common fenfe, is fo far from regaining the path of truth, that, like Thomson's peafant bewildered in the fnow, he continues 66 to wander on, ftill more " and more aftray." If any perfon will give himself the trouble to examine the whole controverfy concerning liberty and neceffity, he will find, that the arguments on both fides come at last to appear unanfwerable; - there is no common principle acknowledged by both parties, to which an appeal can be made, and each party charges the other with begging the que

ftion. Is it not then better to reft satisfied with the fimple feeling of the understanding? I feel that it is in my power to will or not to will: all you can fay about the influence of motives will never convince me of the contrary; or if I should say that I am convinced by your arguments, my conduct must continually bely my profeffion. One thing is undeniable; your words are obfcure, my feeling is not;

the feeling is univerfally attended to, acknowledged, and acted upon; your words to the majority of mankind would be unintelligible, nay, perhaps they are in a great measure fo even to yourselves.

CHA P.

III.

Recapitulation and Inference.

T

HE fubftance of the preceding illustrations, when applied to the principal purpose of this difcourfe, is as followeth.

Although it be certain, that all just reafoning doth ultimately terminate in the

principles

principles of common fenfe, that is, in principles which must be admitted as certain, or as probable, upon their own authority, without evidence, or at least without proof; even as all mathematical reafoning doth ultimately terminate in felfevident axioms: yet philofophers, efpecially those who have applied themselves to the investigation of the laws of human nature, have not always been careful to confine the reafoning faculty within its proper fphere, but have vainly imagined, that even the principles of common sense are fubject to the cognifance of reason, and may be either confirmed or confuted by argument. They have accordingly, in many inftances, carried their investigations higher than the ultimate and selffupported principles of common sense; and by fo doing have introduced many errors, and much false reasoning, into the moral fciences. To remedy this, it was propofed, as a matter deferving ferious attention, to afcertain the feparate provinces of reafon and common fenfe. And becaufe, in many cafes, it may be difficult to diftinguish a principle of common sense from an acquired prejudice; and, confequently,

quently, to know at what point reafoning ought to ftop, and the authority of common fenfe to be admitted as decifive; it was therefore judged expedient to inquire, "Whether fuch reafonings as have been

profecuted beyond ultimate principles, "be not marked with fome peculiar cha"racters, by which they may be diftin"guifhed from legitimate investigation." To illuftrate this point, the doctrines of the non-existence of matter, and the necessity of human actions, were pitched upon as examples; in which, at least in the former of which, common fenfe, in the opinion of all competent judges, is confeffedly violated; -the natural effects produced upon the mind by the reafonings that have been urged in favour of thefe doctrines, were confidered; -and the confequences refulting from the admission of such reafonings were taken notice of, and explained. And it was found, that the reasonings that have been urged in favour of these doctrines are really marked with fome peculiar characters, which it is prefumed can belong to no legitimate argumentation whatsoever. Of these reasonings it was obferved, and proved, "That

"the

"the doctrines they are intended to efta"blish are contradictory to the general "belief of all men in all ages; -That,

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though enforced and fupported with fin"gular fubtlety, and though admitted by "fome profeffed philofophers, they do not produce that conviction which found reafoning never fails to produce in the intelligent mind; — and, lastly, That really to believe, and to act from a real "belief of, fuch doctrines and reasonings, "must be attended with fatal confequences to fcience, to virtue, to human fociety, and to all the important interefts "of mankind."

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I do not fuppofe, that all the errors which have arifen from not attending to the foundation of truth, and effential rules of reafoning, as here explained, are equally dangerous. Some of them perhaps may be innocent; to fuch the last of these characters cannot belong. If wholly innocent, it is of little confequence, whether we know them to be errors or not. When a new tenet is advanced in moral fcience, there will be a strong prefumption against it, if contrary to univerfal opinion: for as every man may find the evidence of moral