Sentiments *

66

; and fays of them, "That they are known by their own evidence†; "that except fome first principles be taken "for granted, there can be neither reafon

Αξιωμαία, Αρχαι, Κοιναι δεξαι - Λέγω δὲ ἀποδεικτικας, και τας κοινάς δόξας, ἐξ ὧν ἀπανίες δάκνουσι· οἷον, ὅτι πᾶν αναγκαῖον ἡ φάναι, ἢ ἀποφάναι καὶ ἀδυναίον ἅμα είναι και μὴ εἶναι.

Metaphyf. lib. 3. cap. 2.

Of thefe first princi

Analytic. lib. 2. cap. 16. pies, a French Peripatetic, who wrote about the beginning of the last century, expreffeth himfelf thus; "Ces

principes portent le nom de communs, non feulement "parce qu'ils fervent à plufieurs fciences, mais aufii "parce que l'intelligence en eft commune à tous. On les appelle auffi dignitez, et notions communes à fçavoir, dignitez, quafi comme dignes entre toutes les autres "qu'on y adioufte foy, à caufe de la grande excellence "de leur clarté et evidence; et notions communes, pour "; ce qu'ils font fi connus, qu' aufi-toft que la fignifica"tion des termes dont ils font compofez eft entenduë,

fans difcourir ny argumenter davantage deffus, chacun "entend naturellement leur verité; fi ce n'eft quelque

hebeté privé de raifon; lequel je renvoye à Aristote, "qui prononce, que ceux qui doutent, qu'il faut reverer "les Dieux, ou aymer les parents, meritent d'eftre pu"nis; et que ceux qui doutent que la nege eft blanche

ont befoin de fens: et à Averroes, qui dit, que ceux

qui ne fçauroient diftinguer ce qui eft connu par foy "d'avec ce qui ne l'eft pas, font incapables de philofo"pher; et que ne pouvoir connoiftre ces principes, pro"cede de quelque defaut de nature, ou de peu d'exercice, ou d'une mauvaife accouftumance enracinée." Corts de toute la Philofophie de Theophreßte Boujou, p. 79.

66

nor

nor reafoning *; that it is impoffible "that every truth fhould admit of proof, "otherwife proof would extend in infini

tum, which is altogether incompatible "with its nature +; and that if ever men attempt to prove a firft principle, it is "because they are ignorant of the nature "of proof ‡."

The word Reafon is ufed in feveral different fenfes. 1. It is used to fignify that quality of human nature which diftinguishes man from the inferior animals. Man is called a reasonable being, and the brutes are faid to be irrational. But the faculty of reafon, taking the word in a ftrict fenfe, is perhaps not more characteriftical of the nature of man, than his moral faculty, or his imagination, or his

* Μηδεν γαρ τιθεντες, ἀναιρῶσι το διαλέγεσθαι, και όλως λόγον.

Ariftot. Metaphyf. lib. 2. cap. 6.

Η Όλως μεν γαρ άπαντων ἀδύνατον ἀπόδειξιν είναι εις απειρον γαρ αν βαδίζει ώσε μηδ' όντως είναι ἀποδειξιν.

Ariflot. Metaphyf. lib. 4. cap. 4. fub initio.

Η Αξιούσι δε και τῖτο ἀποδεικνύναι τινες δι ̓ ἀπαιδευσίαν ἔτι γαρ ἀπαιδευσία, το μη γινώσκειν τίνων δὲ ζητῶν ἀποδειξιν, και τίνων ου δ..

Ib. Ind.

I cite thefe authorities, that I may not be fufpected of affecting either an uncommon doctrine, or uncommon modes of expreflion.

power of artificial language, or his rifibility. Reafon, in this acceptation, feems to be a general name for all the intellectual powers, as diftinguifhed from the fenfitive part of our constitution. 2. Every thing that is called truth is fometimes faid to be perceived by reafon: by reafon we are faid to perceive, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles; and we are also faid to perceive, by reafon, that it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be. But thefe truths are of different kinds; and therefore the energies of understanding to which they are referred ought to be called by different names. 3. The power of invention is fometimes afcribed to reafon. Thus LOCKE. tells us, that it is reafon which difcovers and arranges the feveral intermediate proofs in an argument; an office which, according to the common ufe of words, is to be referred, not to reafon, but to imagination. 4. Reason, as implying a faculty not marked by any other name, is ufed by thofe who are moft accurate in diftinguifhing, to fignify that power of the human mind by which we draw inferences, or by which we are convinced,

vinced, that a relation belongs to two ideas, on account of our having found, that thefe ideas bear certain relations to other ideas. In a word, it is that faculty which enables us, from relations or ideas that are known, to investigate fuch as are unknown; and without which we never could proceed in the discovery of truth a fingle ftep beyond first principles or intuitive axioms. And it is in this laft fenfe we are to use the word Reafon in the course of this inquiry.

The term Common Senfe is alfo ufed in feveral different fignifications. 1. Sometimes it feems to be fynonymous with prudence. Thus we fay, that a man poffeffeth a large flock of common fenfe, who is quick in perceiving remote confequences, thence intantaneously determining concerning the propriety of prefent conduct. 2. Common fenfe, in certain inftances, feemeth to be confounded with fome of the powers of tafte. We often meet with persons of ftrong fagacity in most of the ordinary affairs of life, and who are very capable of accurate reasoning, who yet, without any bad intention, commit the most egregious blunders with regard to decorum;

both

both faying and doing what is offenfive to their company, and inconfiftent with their own character: and this we are apt to impute to a defect in common fense. But it feems rather to be owing to a defect in that kind of fenfibility, or fympathy, by which we fuppofe ourselves in the fituations of others, adopt their fentiments, and in a manner perceive their very thoughts; and which is indeed the foundation of good-breeding *. It is by this fecret, and fudden, and (to those who are unacquainted with it) inexplicable, communication of feelings, that a man is enabled to avoid what would appear incongruous or offenfive to others. They who are prompted by inclination, or obliged by neceffity, to study the art of recommending themselves to others, acquire a wonderful facility in perceiving and avoiding all poffible ways of giving offence; which is à proof, that this kind of fenfibility may be much improved by habit: although there are, no doubt, in refpect of this, as well as of all other modifications of perception, original and constitu

See Smith's Theory of moral fentiments, fect 1.