that it was at once unprofitable, and founded in uncertainty; and employed the rest of his life in the cultivation of moral philofophy, a fcience which to him feemed more fatisfactory in its evidence, and more useful in its application *. So far was he from being fceptical in regard to the principles of moral duty, that he inculcated them with earneftnefs where-ever he found opportunity, and thought it incumbent on all men to make themselves acquainted with them. In his reafonings, indeed, he did not formally lay down any principle, because it was his method to deduce his conclufions from what was acknowledged by his antagonist: but is this any proof, that he himself did not believe his own conclufions? Read the story of his life; his conduct never belied his principles: obferve the manners of our fceptics; their conduct and principles do mutually and invariably bely one another. Do you feek ftill more convincing evidence, that Socrates felt, believed, and ayowed the truth? Read the defence he

made before his judges. See you there a

Xenoph. Memorab. lib. 1. cap. 1. et lib. 4. cap. 7.

1

ny figns of doubt, hesitation, or fear? any
fufpicion of the poffibility of his being
in the wrong? any diffimulation, fophi-
ftry, or art? See you not, on the con-
trary, the utmost plainness and fimplicity,
the calmest and most deliberate fortitude,
and that noble affurance which fo well be-
comes the cause of truth and virtue? Few
men have shown fo firm an attachment to
truth, as to lay down their life for its fake:
yet
this did Socrates. He made no exter-
nal profession of any philofophical creed;
but in his death, and through the whole
of his life, he fhowed the fteadieft adhe-
rence to principle; and his principles were
all confiftent. Xenophon has recorded
many of them; and tells us, in regard to
fome of them, that Socrates fcrupled not
to call thofe men fools who differed from
his opinion *.-The fophifts of his age
were not folicitous to difcover truth, but
only to confute an adverfary, and reafon
plaufibly in behalf of their theories. That
they might have the ampler field for this
fort of speculation, they confined them-
felves, like our modern metaphyficians,
to general topics, fuch as the nature of

Xenoph. Memorab. lib. 1. cap. 1. paffim.

good,

good, of beauty, and fuch like; on which one may say a great many things without meaning, and offer a great many plausible arguments without one word of truth, Socrates did much to difcredit this abufe of fcience. In his converfations he did not trouble himself with the niceties of artificial logic. His aim was, not to confute an adversary, nor to guard against that verbal confutation which the fophifts were perpetually attempting, but to do good to those with whom he conversed, by laying their duty before them in a ftriking and perfuafive manner *. He was not fond of reasoning on abstract fubjects, efpecially when he had to do with a fophift; well knowing that this could anfwer no other purpofe than to furnish matter for endless and unprofitable logomachy. When, therefore, Ariftippus afked him concerning the nature of good †, with a view to confute, or at least to teafe him, with quibbling evafions, Socrates declined

Αρίσιππε δὲ ἐπιχειροῦντος ἐλέγχειν τον Σωκράτη, - βυλόμενος της συνόντας ὠφελῶν ὁ Σωκράτης ἀπεκρίνατο, εχ ὥσπερ οἱ φυλαττόμενοι, μη ὁ λόγος ἐπαλλαχθῆ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν πιπεσμένοι μάλισα προττσιεν τα δέοντα.

+ Id. Ibid,

Xenoph. Memorab. lib. 3. cap. 8.

to

to answer in general terms; and defired the fophift to limit his question, by confining the word good to fome particular thing. Do you afk me, fays he, what is good for a fever, for fore eyes, or for hunger? No, fays the fophift. If, replies he, you afk me concerning the nature of a good which is good for no particular purpose, I tell you once for all, that I know of none fuch, and have no defires after it. In like manner, he answers to the general queftion concerning beauty, by defiring his adverfary to confine himfelf to fome particular kind of beauty. What would the great moralist have thought of our modern metaphysical treatifes, which feem to have nothing else in view, but to contrive vain and questionable definitions of general ideas! Simple, certain, and ufeful truth, was the conftant, and the only, object of this philofopher's inquiry.

True it is, he fometimes faid, that he knew nothing but his own ignorance. And furely the highest knowledge that human reafon can attain is extremely limited. Yet man knows fomething: Socrates was confcious that he knew fome

thing; otherwife Xenophon would not
have afferted, that his opinions concern-
ing God, and Providence, and Religion,
and Moral Duty, were well known to all
the Athenians *. But Socrates was hum-
'ble, and made no pretenfions to any thing
extraordinary, either in virtue or in know-
ledge. He profeffed no fcience; he in-
structed others, without pedantry, and
without parade; exemplifying the beauty
and the practicability of virtue, by the in-
nocence and integrity of his life, and by
the charms of an inftructive, though most
infinuating, conversation †. I fhall al-
low our modern fceptics to avail them-
felves all they can of the authority of DES
CARTES and MALEBRANCHE, of Pyrrho
and Anaxarchus; but let them not pre-
fume to fanctify their trash with the vene-
rable names of Socrates and Aristotle.

Cicero feems to have been an Academic rather in name than in reality. And I am apt to think, from several paffages in his works, that he made choice of this de

* Xenoph. Memorab. lib. 1. cap. 1.

† Ibid. cap. 2.

See particularly De Officiis, lib. 3. cap. 4. De Fate,

cap. 2.

nomination,