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have long been understood in thefe enlightened parts of the world; and mankind, in the time that is paft, have had more truth under their confideration, than they will probably have in the time to come. Yet he who makes thefe fciences the study of his life, may perhaps collect particulars concerning their evidence, which, though known to a few, are unknown to many; may fet fome objects in a more ftriking light, than that in which they have been formerly viewed; may devife methods of confuting new errors, and expofing new paradoxes; and may hit. upon a more popular way of displaying what has hitherto been exhibited in too dark and mysterious a form.

It is commonly acknowledged, that the fcience of human nature is of all human fciences the moft curious and important. To know ourselves, is a precept which the wife in all ages have recommended, and which is enjoined by the authority of revelation itself. Can any thing be of more confequence to man, than to know what is his duty, and how he may arrive at happiness? It is from the examination of

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his own heart that he receives the first intimations of the one, and the only fure criterion of the other. What can be more useful, more delightful, and more fublime, than to contemplate the Deity? It is in the works of nature, particularly in the constitution of the human foul, that we discern the first and most confpicuous traces of the Almighty; for without fome previous acquaintance with our own moral nature, we could not poffibly have any certain knowledge of His. Deftitute of the hope of immortality, and a future retribution, how contemptible, how miferable is man! And yet, did not our moral feelings, in concert with what our reafon discovers of the Deity, evidence the neceffity of a future ftate, in vain should we pretend to judge rationally of that revelation by which life and immortality have been brought to light.

How then is this fcience to be learned? In what manner are we to study human nature? Doubtlefs by examining our own hearts and feelings, and by attending to the conduct of other men. But are not the writings of philofophers useful towards the attainment

attainment of this fcience? Moft certainly they are for whatever improves the fa-* gacity of judgement, the fenfibility of moral perception, or the delicacy of tafte;' whatever renders our knowledge of moral and intellectual facts more extenfive; whatever impreffeth us with ftronger and more enlarged fentiments of duty, with more affecting views of God and Providence, and with greater energy of belief in the doctrines of natural religion; —every thing of this fort either makes us more thoroughly acquainted, or prepares us for becoming more thoroughly acquainted, with our own nature, with the nature of other beings, and with the relations that they and we bear to one another. But I fear we fhall not be able to improve ourselves in any one of thefe refpects, by reading the modern fyftems of fcepticism. What account then are we to make of thofe fyftems, and their authors? The following differtation is partly defigned as an anfwer to this question. But it has a further view. It propofes to examine the foundations of this fcepticifm, and to fee whether thefe be confiftent with what all mankind muft acknowledge to be

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the foundations of truth; to inquire whether the cultivation of fcepticifm be falutary or pernicious to fcience and mankind;. and whether it may not be poilible to devife certain criteria, by which the abfurdity of its conclufions may be detected, even by those who may not have leifure, or fubtlety, or metaphyfical knowledge, fufficient to qualify them for a logical confutation of all its premifes. If it be confeffcd, that the prefent age hath fome tendency to licentioufnefs, both in principle and practice, and that the works of fceptical writers have fome tendency to favour that licentioufnefs; it will alfo be confeffed, that this defign is neither abfurd nor unfeasonable.

A celebrated writer on human nature hath obferved, that "if truth be at all "within the reach of human capacity, it "is certain it muft lie very deep and ab"frufe:" and a little after he adds, "that "he would eftcem it a ftrong prefump"tion against the philofophy he is going

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to unfold, were it fo very cafy and ob

* Treatife of Human Nature, vol. 1. p. 3. 4.

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"vious." I am fo far from adopting this opinion, that I declare, in regard to the few things I have to fay on human nature, that I fhould esteem it a very strong prefumption against them, if they were not eafy and obvious. Phyfical and mathematical truths are often exceedingly abftrufe; but facts and experiments relating to the human mind, when expressed in proper words, ought to be obvious to all. I find, that thofe poets, hiftorians, and novelists, who have given the most lively difplays of human nature, and who abound most in fentiments easily comprehended, and readily admitted as true, are the most entertaining, as well as the most ufeful. How then fhould the philofophy of the human mind be fo difficult and obfcure? Indeed, if it be an author's determined purpofe to advance paradoxes, fome of which are incredible, and others incomprehenfible; if he be willing to avail hinfelf all he can of the natural ambiguity of language in fupporting those paradoxes; or if he enter upon inquiries too refined for human understanding; he muft often be obfcure, and often unintelligible. But my views are very different,

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