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"fon of ideas, and from the difcovery of "fuch relations as are unalterable fo long (c as the ideas continue the fame: but "the only relations* of this kind are re

femblance, proportion in quantity and "number, degrees of any quality, and

contrariety; none of which is implied "in the maxim, Whatever begins to exift, proceeds from fome caufe:-that maxim "therefore is not intuitively certain."; - This argument, if it prove any thing at all, would prove, that the maxim is not even certain; for we are here told, that it has not that character or quality from which all certainty arifeth.

But, if I mistake not, both the premifes of this fyllogifm are falfe. In the first place, I cannot admit, that all certainty arifes from a comparifon of ideas. I am certain of the exiftence of myself, and of the other things that affect my fenfes; I

There are, according to Mr HUME, feven different kinds of philofophical relation, to wit, Refemblance, Identity, Relations of time and place, Proportion in quantity or number, Degrees in any common quality, Contrariety, and Caufation. And by the word Relation he here means, that particular circumftance in which we may think proper to compare ideas. See Treatife of Human Nature, vol. 1. p. 32.

am

am certain, that "whatever is, is ;" and yet I cannot conceive, that any comparifon of ideas is neceffary to produce these convictions in my mind. Perhaps I cannot fpeak of them without ufing words expreffive of relation; but the fimple act or perception of the understanding by which I am confcious of them, implies not any comparison that I can difcover. If it did, then the fimpleft intuitive truth requires proof, or illuftration at least, before it can be acknowledged as truth by the mind; which I prefume will not be found warranted by experience. Whether others are confcious of making fuch a comparison, before they yield affent to the fimpleft intuitive truth, I know not; but this I know, that my mind is often confcious of certainty where no fuch comparison has been made by me. I acknowledge, indeed, that no certain truth can become an object of fcience, till it be expreffed in words; that, if expreffed in words, it must affume the form of a proposition; and that every propofition, being either affirmative or negative, must imply a comparison of the thing or subject, with that quality or circumstance

which is affirmed, or denied, to belong to, or agree with it: and therefore I acknowledge, that in fcience all certainty may be faid to arife from a comparison of ideas. But the generality of mankind believe many things as certain, which they never thought of expreffing in words. An ordinary man believes, that himself, his family, his houfe, and cattle, exift; but in order to produce this belief in his mind, is it abfolutely neceffary, that he compare thofe objects with the general idea of existence or non-existence, fo as to difcern their agreement with the one, or difagreement with the other? I cannot think it: at least, if he has ever made fuch a comparison, it must have been without his knowledge; for I am convinced, that, if we were to ask him the question, he would not understand us.

Secondly, I apprehend, that Mr HUME has not enumerated all the relations which, when discovered, give rife to certainty. I am certain, that I am the fame perfon today I was yesterday. Mr HUME indeed will not allow that this is poffible *. I cannot help it; I am certain notwithstand

See part 2. chap. 2. fect. 1. of this Effay.

ing; and I flatter myself, there are not many perfons in the world who would think this fentiment of mine a paradox. I fay, then, I am certain, that I am the fame person to-day I was yesterday. Now, the relation expreffed in this propofition is not refemblance, nor proportion in quantity and number, nor degrees of any common quality, nor contrariety: it is a relation different from all thefe; it is identity or fameness. That London is contiguous to the Thames, is a propofition which many of the most sensible people in Europe hold to be certainly true; and yet the relation expreffed in it is none of those four which our author fuppofes to be the fole proprietors of certainty. For it is not in respect of resemblance, of proportion in quantity or number, of contrariety, or of degrees in any common quality, that London and the Thames are here compared, but purely in refpect of place or fituation.

Again, that the foregoing maxim is neither intuitively nor demonftrably certain, our author attempts to prove from this confideration, that we cannot demonstrate the impoffibility of the contrary. Nay, the contrary, he fays, is not inconcei

vable: "for we can conceive an object

Can

non-existent this moment, and exiftent "the next, without joining it to the idea "of a caufe, which is an idea altogether "diftinct and different." But this, I prefume, is not a fair ftate of the cafe. we conceive a thing beginning to exift, and yet bring ourselves to think that a caufe is not neceffary to the production of fuch a thing? If we cannot, (I am fure I cannot), then is the contrary of this maxim, when fairly ftated, found to be truly and properly inconceivable.

But whether the contrary of this maxim be inconceivable or not, the maxim itself may be intuitively certain. Of intuitive, as well as of demonftrable truths, there are different kinds. It is a character of fome, that their contraries are inconceivable: fuch are the axioms of geometry. But of other intuitive truths, the contraries are conceivable. "I do feel a hard

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body ;”—“ I do not feel a hard body;"

thefe propofitions are equally conceivable: the firft is true, for I have a pen between my fingers; but I cannot prove its truth by argument; therefore its truth is perceived intuitively.

Thus