made, the character of the people for whom it was made, and the character of the persons to whom the editing of the Laws of the Twelve Tables was confided. We have already mentioned how vague the laws were before the commissioners were sent into Greece; and it is certain, that at the time when the Twelve Tables were enacted, the most violent contests had been carried on between the patricians and plebeians for political power. It is easy therefore to conceive that the decemviri would be careful to insert into the new code, and to retain all such laws as were likely to perpetuate the, power of the aristocracy. Of this disposition, we have a conclusive evidence in their insertion of the law, which forbade the patricians and plebeians from intermarrying with each other. The arguments which Livy puts into the mouths of the consuls who urged the senate not to accede to the motion of C. Canuleius, show how tenacious the patricians were of their usurpations, and how anxious they were to draw an eternal line of separation between themselves and the people. The speech of Canuleius, too, one of the most valuable relics of ancient Roman oratory, must strike every reader of true feeling with the highest pleasure and admiration, whether for the manliness of its eloquence, the liveliness of its irony, or the cogency of its arguments; and well deserves to be remembered, as an example worthy of imitation, in all succeeding ages and governments, when and wherever the like attempts shall be made to lay such unnatural restraints upon the common privileges of humanity and social union.

Thus, it was the interest of the decemviri to insert into the laws of the Twelve Tables a Law which would infallibly extend their power over the people; and as this knot of tyrants engaged, by a most solemn oath, to support each other against all opposition, it is natural to suppose that they would secure the rights of the creditor, as instruments of political power, to the full extent granted by the ancient Laws.

There is yet another consideration, perhaps, the most important that can be alledged on this topic: it is the great error into which the commentators and Lawyers seem to have fallen, in treating upon the Roman Law of debtor and creditor. They all appear to consider the law merely as a civil obligation, not as a penal statute: whereas, if they would but give themselves the trouble of reading the early part of the Roman history with philosophical attention, they would find that the act of accruing debt without possessing the means of payment, was regarded in as criminal a light as the highest offence of which any one could be guilty. In modern Europe, no

criminal imputation is attached to the insolvent debtor; but, in ancient Rome, an act of insolvency was an act of felony, and the life of the insolvent debtor became forfeited. The manner in which he was put to death, and the members of his body disposed of, have nothing whatever in impeachment of our principle. For, we have seen, even in modern times, capital punishments fully as barbarous as this of Rome. Modern legislators have not been satisfied with the bare privation of the criminal's life; they have sometimes proceeded to torment and dismember him while living. The sentence of our English Law of high treason, which is too indelicate to be repeated, literally authorises the tearing asunder the limbs of the criminal while he is alive; a sentence which has been often carried into effect, even in refined and enlightened epochs. But we have no evidence of the Roman Law having been ever practised; and we know that the death of the insolvent debtor must have preceded the dismemberment of his body, because it was the distinguished privilege of the Roman citizens to be exempted from torture of any kind. Now if in England a sentence, equally, if not more, barbarous, has been often carried into execution, even in times of great urbanity, why should we hesitate in believing the existence of this barbarous Law in ancient Rome, at a period when its population had scarcely emerged from the condition of robbers and savages ? Some ages hence, it will be easier to admit the probability of this law, than to believe that in an enlightened and in the freest nation of the world the forgery of another man's hand was almost uniformly visited by death. Furthermore, as no one denies that the Roman Law gave the creditors the power of selling the debtor, we can more easily pass to the idea of their having a power over his life. In fact, all difficulty disappears, the moment we bring ourselves to consider that insolvency was esteemed a felonious act, at the time the Twelve Tables were enacted. And, if we reason by analogy, which we have a right to do for want of direct evidence, and find that, according to the Law De Jure Patrio, the father had a right to kill his son; that this right was actually exercised by one of the Roman senators on his son Fulvius; which fact is recorded by historians of undoubted veracity;' and that other writers make mention of a

' Valerius Maximus, lib. 5. c. 8. n. 5. and Sallust. in Catilin. c. 40. Sallust relates the fact as a matter of course; as an ordinary transaction, not requiring even a comment. He says, In his erat A. Fulvius, senatoris filius, quem retractum e itinere pater necari jussit.

similar exercise of this power:' when all these points are taken into consideration, it cannot reasonably be contended, on the bare ground of the monstrous inhumanity of the law, and there is no other ground on which the meaning of the law is disputed, that therefore, the received interpretation by the ancients, which Dr. V. has ably supported, originated in the mistake of a metaphor for a fact.

The arguments adduced on the other side of the question may be all resolved into the apparently glaring inhumanity of the Law; and the authority of great names is also brought forward in support of this opinion. But these authorities are only secondary and subordinate; they prove nothing, and serve only, according to the degree of estimation in which they are held, to confirm opinions: and, after all, what does Bynkershoek say? He terms the Law inefficient, ineptam," because by the debtor's death the creditors would lose the fruits of his labors. He might as well have alleged the inefficacy of hanging a highway robber for having deprived another of his purse, when by sparing his life, he might have refunded its contents by his labor. Is not this another proof of the justice of our remark, that our opponents have all fallen into their mode of thinking, from not having considered insolvency as a crime? The other argument of Bynkershoek is a very weak one. He says, if this power of killing and of dividing the members did exist, why should it be permitted to many creditors only, and not as well to only one creditor? But this question carries its own answer with it. The reason it was not given to a single creditor, was obviously be. cause he could dispose ad libitum of the insolvent debtor's person, without the fear of dispute. He could reduce him to slavery, or sell him with ease; but it was not so easy for many parties to concur respecting the use to be made of him at home; and therefore, the Law gave the alternative of dismembering his person, as each creditor could not have the whole body, or of selling him to strangers, and of making a fair distribution of his price. As to the authority of Montesquieu, though we are at all times ready to bow respectfully to the opinions of that great and profoundly learned interpreter of Laws, yet we cannot find that he is directly against us. He no where discusses the subject: on the contrary, in the text of of the 29th book, ch. 2. of his Spirit of Laws, he gives from Aulus Gellius the ground on which Cecilius justifies the power of the creditors to cut the insolvent debtor into pieces; and in a short note

Senec. de Clemen. I. 1. c. 14 and 15. Dion. lib. 37. Suetonius in Claud,

of three lines he merely says, "the opinions of some civilians that the Law of the Twelve Tables meant only the division of the money arising from the sale of the debtor, seems very probable.” But here is no reason assigned; we have only authority, against which we can adduce authorities of no less weight. Independently of Mr. Gibbon' and Ferguson, we have the authority of all the old civilians, and of most of the modern, not forgetting Gravina, the most eminent of the whole list; besides the concurrent testimony of Favorinus, Cecilius, Fabius, and Gellius. Lastly, to crown the whole, we receive this law in its literal sense, upon the most obvious grounds of analogy. We reason from the undoubted severity of the Roman Laws in other respects, in justification of our acceptation of the Law before us; and also from the acknowledged severity of all the ancient penal Laws of every nation. The Laws of Moses punished with death, nay, with the most cruel kinds of death, blasphemy, profanation of the sabbath, and cursing father or mother, &c. The other Laws of the Twelve Tables were full of cruel institutions: capital punishments are assigned for almost every offence; even defamation was punished with death. Let us therefore only look upon insolvency as a capital offence and every difficulty will instantly disappear. To prove that a thing is improbable, is not a sufficient proof that it is false. Has not experience often shown us, that what is true is not always likely? Because a fact contradicts a favorite hypothesis, is this a sufficient reason to reject it? Can metaphysical reasoning destroy historical evidence? Mankind are not condemned to the hard necessity of fluctuating in perpetual doubts about the principal facts which have been transmitted to us by history and tradition. The most important events, such as the formation of nations, the origin of Laws, arts, and sciences, are known. We must not think that these things are quite imperceptible, even in the remotest ages of antiquity. All that is related about them, is by no means arbitrary, uncertain, and problematical. Ingenuity of mind and integrity of heart would suffice to convince us of this precious truth, if we could but impose silence on our

1 Dr. V. has noticed an inaccuracy in Gibbon, in appealing to the authority of Favonius, "Who this Favonius was, whose authority is here represented of such weight by the historian (chap. 44. note 178.) does not appear. Cicero mentions an active person of that name, (Orat. pro Mil.-Epist. ad Attic. 1. 14.) who is not recorded to have delivered his opinions on the Laws of the Twelve Tables. Perhaps the historian means to allude to Faronius, a Philosopher introduced by A. Gellius in the chapter already quoted, holding a conversation with Sext. Cecilius. See also Noct. Att. 9. 8-10. 12-17.10. &c."

presumptuous vanity, and guard against our little prepossessions, which often mislead us a great deal more than we imagine.

Here we close our observations; and we trust that no apology is necessary to our readers for the length of our reasoning upon a topic of very remote antiquity, and which has excited a difference of opinion among men of great learning and distinction in the world. The subject is curious, and we hope it will satisfactorily fill a space in that unprecedented chasm in our usual labors, which the dearth of all public intelligence has occasioned. Having stated our reasons for assenting to the interpretation of the passage as given by Dr. V. we strongly recommend that learned writer's observations to the perusal of all who make the science of jurisprudence their study, as well as of the critical scholar.

Y.

ON H. STEPHENS'S GREEK THESAURUS.

The Noble writer of the following letter having, after much solicitation, permitted the publication of it, the Editor has much pleasure in laying before his readers those learned and judicious suggestions, which will not be less gratifying to them, than useful to the Compilers of the Thesaurus.

SIR,

Dropmore, Oct. 19th, 1811.

THE republication of STEPHENS'S GREEK THESAURUS

would no doubt be a work of essential service to the cause of Greek Literature. I have no hesitation in expressing my desire to become a Subscriber to it, and to promote its success by all the means that may be in my power.

The reception which the proposal may meet with will much depend on the Prospectus. It has, no doubt, already occurred to you that the mere reprint of such a work, however desirable, would fall short both in credit and in real utility of what might be accomplished, and as I should hope, without too great a sacrifice of time and labor.

To make such an undertaking as useful as possible, must doubtless be the ambition of those who have sufficient zeal