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been attended with the most alarming consequences, and which may one day prove fatal to the liberties of Europe, unless another is formed to counteract its force.

But it will be proper, before I investigate the principles of the family compact, to trace the leading steps of the negociation between France and England, which immediately produced it. The first proposal of the court of Versailles was, "that the two crowns shall remain in possession of what they have conquered one from the other:" and as France had assuredly been the greatest loser, such a proposition from that haughty power, appeared to the more dispassionate part of the British ministry, an instance of singular moderation, if not humility. A better foundation of treaty could not possibly be offered. But the great commoner, who directed all things, did not treat this proposition with that attention which its apparent fairness deserved.

It had already been intimated by the duke de Choiseul, the French minister, "that the situation in which they "shall stand at certain periods, shall be the position "to serve as a basis for the treaty that is to be concluded "between the two powers." And he proceeded to settle the periods; namely, the first of May in Europe, the first of July in Africa and the West Indies, and the first of September in the East Indies; observing, at the same time, that as those periods might seem too near or too distant for the interests of Great-Britain, the court of Versailles was extremely willing to enter into an explanation on that subject. Mr. Pitt, however, haughtily declared, that his Britannic majesty would admit of no other epoch but that of "the signing of the peace."

To this blunt and singular declaration the court of Versailles replied, with that coolness and temper which ought to govern all such transactions, "that if not those, already named, at least some fixed periods, during the war, ought to be agreed upon; as the uti possidetis, or mutual retaining of possessions, could not reasonably have a reference only to the time of signing the peace."

For

For if the contrary principle should be admitted, it would become difficult to know, or even to guess at the value of the possessions that might be given away, as it could not possibly be ascertained what might in the interval, be lost or gained. And if these difficulties occurred, it was added, in the simplicity of a possessory article, they must be increased ten-fold upon every other, and would come to such a height, as to preclude all possibility of negociation, on things of so intricate a nature as changes and equivalents1.

This dispute occasioned delay, and afforded the French ministry, if they had been so disposed, a decent pretext for breaking off the negociation. In the meantime hostilities were every where carried on as if no such negociation had subsisted. But the campaign was dis

tinguished by few memorable events.

The war which had been carried on so long and so fruitlessly in Westphalia, at an immense expense, was as indecisive as ever. For although prince Ferdinand, by taking the field in the month of February, gained several advantages over the French, who are little fitted for a winter campaign, the duke de Broglio obliged him to abandon all the places he had taken or invested before the first of April; to raise the blockade of Ziegenhayn and the siege of Cassel, to expose anew the landgraviate of Hesse, and retire behind the Dymel.

Broglio having afterward passed the Dymel, and formed a junction with the French army under Soubise, who commanded on the Lower-Rhine, attacked the allies at the village of Kirch Denkern, on the 16th of July, but was repulsed with the loss of five thousand men, killed or made prisoners. In consequence of this advantage, prince Ferdinand, having extended his army toward Hammelin, was enabled to secure the course of the

1. Account of the negociation published by the court of France, and aacitly admitted by that of England.

2. Lond. Gazette, July 23, 1761.

Weser,

Weser, and to protect the electorate of Hanover notwithstanding the superior force of the enemy. But he had the mortification to see them ravage Westphalia, and East-Friesland.

The king of Prussia, seemingly fatigued with ineffectual efforts, and mortified by indecisive victories, acted solely on the defensive, he himself taking post in Silesia, and his brother Henry in Saxony. Yet this defensive campaign was not more exempt from misfortune than those in which he most freely indulged the ardour of his genius. The Austrians took Schweidnitz by surprise, and the Russians made themselves masters of Colberg. By the loss of these two important places, the illustrious Frederic found himself in a worse situation than at the close of any former season of action. The Russians wintered in Pomerania, and the Austrians in Silesia.

These events were little suitable to the haughty tone of the English minister, in his negociation with France. But several actions happened at sea between single ships and small squadrons, greatly to the honour of the British flag. And a naval armament, which had excited the highest hopes, while its destination remained unknown, was prepared early in the season, and crowned with signal success.

The object of this armament, consisting of ten ships of the line, under commodore Keppel, and near ten thousand land forces, commanded by major-general Hodgson, was Belleisle on the coast of France. Before that island, which lies within four leagues of the pointof Tiberoon, between port Lewis and the mouth of the Loire, and is about twelve leagues in circumference, the British fleet appeared on the seventh of April. A descent was immediately attemped at three different places, but without effect. The invaders were repulsed, in spite of their most vigorous efforts, with the loss of five hundred men. They were not however discouraged, but resolutely persevered in their purpose. At length the troops, surmounting every ob

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APRIL 25.

stacle,

stacle, made good their landing; drove the enemy from their lines before Palais the capital of the island: entered the town, sword in hand, and obliged the garrison to take refuge in the citadel. That fortress, built by the famous Vauban, and defended by three thousand men, under the chevalier de St. Croix, an able and experienced officer, made a gallant defence. But after it had been invested about six weeks, and a practicable breach made in thê works, St. Croix, seeing no prospect of relief, judged it prudent to capitulate, in order to avoid the danger of an assault: and the whole island submitted to his Britannic majesty'.

JUNE 7.

The taking of Belleisle, which was celebrated with bon-fires, illuminations, and every expression of triumph and tumultuous joy, contributed greatly to elate the pride of the English populace, and was no small mortification to France. But the expedition having failed in its ultimate aim, which was to oblige the French to weaken their army in Westphalia, in order to defend their own coasts, and by that means to enable prince Ferdinand to strike some decisive blow; and the island itself, which is literally speaking, a barren rock, being found to have no harbour for ships of force, the chief circumstance that could make it valuable to Great-Britain, the possession of it was thought by the more intelligent part of the nation, dearly purchased with the lives of two thousand brave men, beside an immense expenditure of naval and military stores. The ministry, however, represented it as a place of great importance, from its position, while they highly and justly extolled the valour of the troops employed in reducing it. Yet, as this conquest had not been attended with the expected consequences, and as no other enterprise was planned from which any important advantage could be expected during the summer, Mr. Pitt condescended to name certain epochs, to which the reciprocal holding of possessions, should refer, and the negociation with France was resumed.

3. Lond. Gazette, April 30, and June 14, 1761.

The

The epochs named by the British minister were, the first of August for Europe, the first of September for Africa and America, the first of November for the East Indies. To these epochs France agreed, though reluctantly, on account of the nearness, as she had now hopes of acquiring some important advantage in Westphalia before the close of the campaign. She also agreed, that every thing settled between the two crowns, relative to their particular disputes, should be finally conclusive and obligatory, independent of the proceedings of the congress to be held at Augsburg, for settling the disputes of Germany. And she farther agreed, that the definitive treaty of peace between the two kingdoms, or preliminary articles to that purpose, should be signed and ratified before the first of next August.

France even gave up the point of honour, and made frankly an offer of what places she was willing to cede and exchange; namely, in her final answer, (after certain difficulties had been removed, and certain claims relinquished) to guarantee Canada to England, in the utmost extent required, including as dependencies the islands of Cape-Breton and St. John; to demolish Dunkirk, provided the right of fishing and drying fish on the banks of Newfoundland shall be confirmed to her; to restore Minorca for Guadaloupe and Marigalante; to evacuate Hesse, Hanau and Gottingen, provided one settlement in Africa should be guaranteed to her for the convenience of the Negro trade; to remit the settlement of affairs in the East Indies to the companies of the two nations, and to leave England in possession of Belleisle, until some equivalent shall be offered and accepted. But she persisted in demanding the restitution of the trading vessels taken before the declaration of war, and obstinately refused to give up Wesel and Gueldres which she had conquered from the king of Prussia.

England, with no less obstinacy, refused to restore the disputed captures, yet insisted on the restitution of those two places. Nor would the British minister, astonishing

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