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beside the enormous supplies demanded for maintaining twenty-five thousand British troops in Westphalia. And all these troops and subsidies, it must be owned, were necessary for the defence of the electorate of Hanover, and in order to enable the king of Prussia to support his declining fortune against the Austrians, Russians, Swedes, and the army of the empire. But why the people of Great-Britain should burden themselves for such purposes, with between five and six millions of debt annually, is a question that no good citizen could answer with temper, and which a quiet subject would not chuse to investigate. It will, therefore, be enough to say, that such was the wish of the monarch, and the will of the minister, who governed the populace and the parliament with absolute sway; and who had the address to convince both, that it would be ungenerous in Great-Britain, and unworthy of her glory, to desert an illustrious ally in distress, after having encouraged him to engage in so arduous a struggle; or to permit the electoral dominions of her sovereign, how small soever their value, to fall into the hands of an enemy whom she had vanquished in every other part of the world.

The people of France were no less generous to their king. As the ordinary resources of the state had failed, the principal nobility and gentry, in imitation of his example, threw their plate into the public treasury, in order to enable him to support with vigour the war in Germany; conscious that the strength of the kingdom could there, on its own frontier, be exerted to the greatest advantange, and that of Great-Britain with the least. effect. The French army in Westphalia was accordingly augmented to one hundred thousand men, under the duke de Broglio, now honoured with a mareschal's staff, and entrusted with the chief command; while an inferior army, consisting of near thirty thousand good troops, was formed upon the Rhine, under the count de St. Germain.

The

The allied army, under prince Ferdinand, was less numerous than that under Broglio, but the troops were in better condition. The allies, however, very prudently acted chiefly on the defensive. Yet if Broglio and St. Germain had not quarrelled, and come to an open rupture, in consequence of which the latter left the service, prince Ferdinand would have found himself under the necessity of hazarding a general action, or of suffering himself to be surrounded. Before this quarrel, which happened about the middle of the campaign, and disconcerted all their plan of operations, the progress of the French arms had been very rapid. Broglio, paying no regard to the places of strength possessed by the allies in his front, pushed into the landgraviate of Hesse with the grand army, leaving detachments to reduce the castles of Marpurg and Dillenburg; while St. Germain penetrated through the duchy of Westphalia, and the two armies formed a junction near a place called Corbach, on the tenth of July.

Ignorant of this junction, and desirous to prevent it, prince Ferdinand, who had fallen back with the allied army from Fitzlar, and was retreating toward the river Dymel, sent the hereditary prince, with a strong detachment before him to Saxenhausen, where he meant to encamp. Continuing to advance, that gallant youth found a body of French troops formed near Corbach; and concluding them to be St. Germain's van-guard, as they did not seem to exceed ten battalions, and fifteen squadrons, he attacked them with great fury. But the French stood their ground with firmness; and being continually reinforced with fresh troops from the main army, the hereditary prince was obliged to retire in some disorder, and with considerable loss 23. A few days after, however, he severely retaliated upon the enemy, by surprising a French detachment, under M. Glaubitz, at Ermsdorff. Beside killing a great number of all ranks, and

23. London Gazette, July 22, 1760.

taking their artillery and baggage, he made the commander in chief, with one hundred and seventy-seven officers, and two thousand two hundred and eighty-two private men, prisoners of war24.

During these transactions, the duke de Broglio remained encamped on the heights of Corbach. And the chevalier de Muy, who had succeeded the count de St. Germain, as second in command, having passed the Dymel at Stadtbergen, with thirty-five thousand men, (being the reserve of the French army) and extended this body along the banks of that river, in order to cut off the communication of the allies with Westphalia, prince Ferdinand also passed the Dymel to give him battle. He accordingly ordered the hereditary prince and general Sporcken, who had reconnoitred the position of the enemy, advantageously posted near Warburg, to turn their left wing, while he himself advanced against their centre, on the thirty-first day of July, with the main body of the allied army. Thus attacked in flank and rear, and in danger of being surrounded, the French, after a smart engagement, retired with precipitation toward Stadtberg, leaving on the field about fifteen hundred men dead or dangerously wounded. About an equal number were made prisoners in the pursuit, by the British cavalThe loss of the allies was very inconsiderable25. By this advantage, which insured to him the command of the Weser and the Dymel, prince Ferdinand was enabled to maintain his communication with Westphalia, and to prevent the French from penetrating deeply into the electorate of Hanover. But in order to obtain these important ends, he was under the necessity, notwithstanding his success, of sacrificing the whole landgraviate of Hesse. The enemy even reduced Gottingen and Munden, in the dominions of his Britannic majesty, while the people of England were celebrating with bonfires and illuminations the victory obtained

ry.

24. Ibid. July 29.

25. Lond. Gazette, Aug. 9, 1760.

by

by their arms which was immediately followed by all the apparent consequences of a defeat,

Prince Ferdinand, however, regardless of appearances, continued to occupy Warburg, for more than a month after the battle; and the duke de Broglio, overawed by so commanding a position, attempted nothing farther of any consequence during the campaign. In the meantime the hereditary prince undertook a rambling expedition to the Lower-Rhine, and laid siege to Wesel. But he was defeated near the convent of Campen, on the sixteenth of October, by a body of French troops, under M. de Castries, and obliged to return with the loss of near two thousand brave men; including killed, wounded, prisoners, and those who died of fatigue26. Soon after this severe check, both armies went into winter-quarters; the French being left in possession of Hesse, and of the whole country eastward of the Weser, to the frontiers of the electorate of Hanover. The British troops were cantoned in the bishoprick of Paderborn, where they suffered great hardships from scarcity of forage, and provisions. Few campaigns, between armies so numerous and well appointed, have been more barren of memorable events.

The king of Prussia, as usual, was more active then the general of the allies; and the desperate state of his affairs required the most vigorous exertions, He began the campaign, however, on a defensive plan. Having passed the winter in Saxony, he took possession of a very strong camp, between the Elbe and the Mulda, in the month of April. This camp he fortified in every place that was accessible, and mounted the works with two hundred and fifty pieces of cannon. By these means he was enabled to maintain his ground against the grand Austrian army, under mareschal Daun, whose whole attention he engaged, and at the same time to send a

VOL. V.

26. Ibid. Oct. 28, et seg.
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strong reinforcement to his brother Henry, without exposing himself to any danger.

Prince Henry had assembled an army near Frankfort on the Oder, where he took various positions, in order to oppose the Russians, and to protect Silesia, and the New Marche of Brandenburg, which were threatened by different bodies of the enemy. Fouquet, another Prussian general, had established his quarters in the neighbourhood of Glatz. And whilst he covered Silesia on that side, he kept up a communication with prince Henry, and was so posted as to send or to receive succours from him, as either party should happen to be pressed.

Military science could not perhaps have devised a *more complete defensive system. But the wisest precautions may be eluded by cunning, or disconcerted by enterprise. General Laudohn, the most enterprising of all the Austrian commanders, having quitted his camp in Bohemia, (where he had passed the winter) with a strong but light and disencumbered army, threatened alternately Silesia and the New Marche of Brandenburg; Breslaw, Berlin, and Schweidnitz. At length he seemed to fix upon the latter; and general Fouquet, deceived by the artful feint, marched to Schweidnitz with the main body of his troops, and left Glatz uncovered.

No sooner did Laudohn perceive, that this stratagem had succeeded, than he made use of another, and with equal success. He took possession of Landshut, which he discovered a design of securing, and left there a small body of troops. Fouquet alarmed, at so unexpected a movement, quitted Schweidnitz with precipitation, and drove the Austrians from Landshut with great ease. Meanwhile Laudohn had made himself master of several important passes, by which he was in some measure, enabled to surround the little army under Fouquet. The Prussian general did every thing possible, in such circumstances, to defend himself against a superior enemy. But all his efforts were ineffectual.

The

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