in which they had been bred, and in the diffusing of which they had grown up to popularity, and raised themselves to power, considered Hanover as a useless and expensive appendage to the crown of Great-Britain, and all continental connexions as inconsistent with our insular situation.

+ APRIL 5.

The popular ministers were deprived of their employments, for daring to oppose the will of their sovereign in council. And although it was too late to adopt new measures for the campaign with any probability of success, the duke of Cumberland was sent over to command an army of observation, as it was called, intended for the defence of Hanover. This army, which consisted of forty thousand Hessians and Hanoverians, including a few regiments of Prussians, attempted in vain to obstruct the progress of mareschal d'Etrees. The duke of Cumberland, after some unsuccessful skirmishes was obliged to retire behind the Weser; and the French passed that river without opposition.

If the duke of Cumberland's situation now seemed desperate, that of the king of Prussia, after making every allowance for his own superior talents, and the valour and discipline of his troops, did not wear a more favourable aspect at the opening of the campaign. An army of one hundred and thirty thousand Russians was on the borders of Lithuania, and in full march to invade the kingdom of Prussia. The Swedes were ready to enter Pomerania, in hopes of recovering their former possessions in that country. The empress-queen, having made vast preparations during the winter, had augmented her army to one hundred and eighty thousand men22; yet did she resolve to act only on the defensive, until her allies could take the field. Then, she flattered herself, the king of Prussia would be obliged to divide his forces into so many bodies, that he would be unable, any where, to make a vigorous resistance.

22. Lloyd's Campaigns, vol. i.

Conformable

Conformable to this defensive system, the Austrian army was broken into four divisions; the first of which, commanded by the duke d'Aremberg, was posted at Egra; the second, under mareschal Brown, at Budyn; the third, under count Konigseg, at Reichenberg; and the fourth, under mareschal Daun, in Moravia. By these dispositions, mareschal Brown, who commanded in chief, thought he could effectually cover Bohemia, which was understood to be the first object of the enemy, and stop their progress, should they attempt to advance.

The king of Prussia, however, having resolved to penetrate into that kingdom, was not diverted from his purpose by this formidable force, or the strong positions it had taken. He therefore ordered his army, in like manner with the Austrians, to assemble in four divisions: one under prince Maurice of Anhalt Dessau, at Chemnitz; another, under himself and mareschal Keith, at Lockwitz; the third, under the prince of Bevern, at Zittaw; and the fourth, under mareschal Schwerin, in Silesia. As each of these divisions was strong, he thought he might safely order them to enter Bohemia separately; but with instructions to unite as soon after as possible, for mutual support, and to form an entire junction in the neighbourhood of Prague.

The Prussian plan of operations being thus concerted, prince Maurice quitted his station at Chemnitz in the beginning of April, and marched by Zwickaw and Plawen, toward Egra; as if he intended to attack the place, or at least to penetrate that way into Bohemia. And in order to confirm d'Aremberg in this opinion, he commanded his light troops to make a feint upon the duke's quarters at Wildstein. The Austrian general, taking the alarm, threw himself into Egra; while prince Maurice returned to Averback, and marched with great celerity, by Brix and Billin, to Liney, where he joined the king of Prussia.

Not thinking it practicable to force the camp at Budyn, which way very strong, his Prussian majesty

passed

passed the river Egra higher up, near Koschtitz. Here his light troops and van-guard met those of the duke d'Aremberg, who was on his march to join mareschal Brown. On seeing the Prussians, however, they fell back upon Welwarn; and mareschal Brown, finding the enemy had passed the Egra, and were encamped on his left flank, judged it necessary to quit his position at Budyn, and retire to Prague23. Thither he was followed by the king of Prussia; who encamped on the Weissenberg, to the left of the Moldaw, which the main body of the Austrians, now commanded by prince Charles of Lorrain, had quitted, and removed to the other side of that river.

While these things were passing on the side of Saxony, where his Prussian majesty had spent the winter, and whence he still drew supplies, the prince of Bevern having put his division in motion, marched from Zittaw to Reichenberg. He there found count Konigseg, with a body of twenty thousand men, encamped in

APRIL 21. a valley formed by two very high mountains. Through the middle of that valley runs the river Neiss, into which fall many torrents from the neighbouring mountains. The sides of those mountains are covered with thick woods, which are almost impassible. The Austrian general, therefore, occupied only the valley between, extending his wings no farther than the foot of the mountains.

The prince of Bevern, who, by pursuing this route, had but himself under the necessity of fighting, in order to join mareschal Schwerin, had now no choice left but the mode of giving battle. Taking advantage of the disposition of the enemy, (after an unsuccessful attack upon their cavalry in the centre, which were strongly supported by their infantry and artillery on the two wings) he sent several battalions as high as possible in the mountain on his right, in order to come on the flank and rear

23. Id. Ibid.

of

of the Austrians posted in the wood at the foot of that mountain. His commands were punctually executed, and attended with full effect. The Austrians abandoned the wood; the prince renewed his attack upon their cavalry; which, unable to sustain the fire of the Prussian infantry, were forced to give way. On this advantage, he ordered his whole right wing to occupy the ground the Austrian cavalry had quitted, and obliged count Konigseg to retire toward Libenaw, with the loss of a thousand

men.

APRIL 28.

The prince of Bevern marched to that place, but found the Austrians so advantageously posted, that he did not think it prudent to attack them; more especially as he knew the advance of the army under mareschal Schwerin would suddenly force them to retire. It so happened. Having received intelligence of Schwerin's approach, Konigseg quitted his camp next day, and marched with precipitation to Prague.

Meanwhile Schwerin, informed of the action at Reichenberg, and the retreat of the Austrians, wisely changed his route. He marched on the Iser, hoping still to be able to cut off Konigseg before he could reach Prague. And, although he failed in that attempt, he was so fortunate as to seize an immense magazine, which the enemy had formed at Jungbuntzlaw". Being afterward joined by the prince of Bevern's division, he proceeded to Brandeiss, where he continued till the fourth of May. He then passed the Elbe, and encamped on the other side, in order to concert measures with the king before he advanced farther.

His Prussian majesty, who had thrown a bridge over the Moldaw, near Podbaba, passed that river with part of his army in the night, leaving the remainder under mareschal Keith, on the Weissenberg. Next morning, at break of day, he formed a junction with Schwerin; and, having reconnoitred the enemy

24. Lloyd, ubi sup.

MAY 6.

from

from one of the highest hills on the other side of Brosiz, he resolved to give them battle.

The Austrians, amounting to about eighty thousand men, were encamped with their left wing toward Prague, on the Ziskaberg, and their right extending beyond the village of Conraditz, on a hill near Sterbohli. The mountains before the Austrian camp were so steep and craggy that no cavalry or artillery could possibly ascend them, and the deep valley at their foot was wholly occupied by hussars and Hungarian infantry. Yet was the king of Prussia, regardless of these difficulties, inclined to attack the enemy in front. But, through the persua sion of mareschal Schwerin, he changed his opinion, and permitted that able general to make the attack on their right, where the ground falls gradually, and where the infantry could pass over certain meadows, and the cavalry and heavy artillery over dams 5.

The action began about eleven o'clock; when, the Prussian cavalry having passed the dams, the Austrian generals perceived that the king's intention was to attack their right flank, and ordered all their cavalry thither from the left. It came with great celerity, and formed itself with that on the right in one hundred and four squadrons, in three lines, with intervals equal to the front of a squadron. This movement was made with so much promptitude, that the prince of Schonaich, the Prussian lieutenant-general of horse, who had only sixty-five squadrons, afraid of being out flanked, judged it necessary to attack the enemy instantly, without waiting for the cavalry of the right wing, which the king had ordered to reinforce him. The attack was accordingly made with vigour; but the Prussian cavalry being outflanked by eight squadrons, was twice repulsed, in spite of its most strenuous efforts. In the third attack, however, the Austrian cavalry was entirely broken, by the bravery of

25. Letter from count Schwerin, general-adjutant, to the mareschal of that name, who was present at the consultations.

twenty