presented, by the dissatisfied part of the nation, as the most dangerous enemies of the state. The attention of the public was, however, called off from that object, for a time, by the news of the invasion of the island of Minorca by a French armament, under the duke de Richelieu. This measure was immediately followMAY 18. ed, on the part of Great-Britain, by a declaration of war against France, which was answered by a counterdeclaration from the court of Versailles.

The English populace, who, in all great political contests may be said to direct the resolutions of the throne, were pleased with that indication of spirit in the government, as well as with the treaty with the king of Prussia; which was also approved by parliament, and industriously represented by the court as essential to the support of the protestant interest in Germany. But certain unfortunate events revived the clamour against the ministry, and increased the national despondency, for which there was but too much cause; the martial spirit of the people being almost extinct, and the councils of the sovereign divided. These matters will require some explication.

Various causes had contributed to the extinction of the martial spirit in Great-Britain. The long peacethat succeeded the treaty of Utrecht, the establishment of a standing army, and the consequent neglect of the militia, all had a tendency to estrange the people of England from the use of arms. The citizen having delivered his sword into the hands of the hireling soldier, cheerfully contributed to the expenses of government, and looked up for safety to a band of mercenaries, whom he considered as dangerous to public liberty.

That disinclination to arms, increased by a lucrative commerce, was encouraged by the court; which, during the whole reign of the first, and great part of that of the second George, was under perpetual alarm on account of the intrigues of the adherents of the house of Stuart. The war between Great-Britain and Spain, which began in the year 1739, and afterwards involved all

Europe,

Europe, revived, in some degree, a martial spirit in the British army and navy. But the body of the people of England, as appeared on the irruption of the Highlanders, in 1745, had relinquished all confidence in themselves. Being accustomed to pay for protection, though jealous of their very protectors, they trembled before a small body of desperate mountaineers.

Many motions were made in parliament that the militia might be put on a respectable footing, for the general security of the kingdom. But the jealousy of government long prevented any effectual step being taken for that purpose; while the peace that followed the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, by relaxing still farther the manners of the nation, had made the people yet less warlike. And as the small standing army, widely dispersed over the extensive dominions of the empire, was evidently insufficient for its protection, the unarmed and undisciplined inhabitants of Great-Britain were justly filled with terror and apprehension at the prospect of a French invasion.

In this extremity a militia-bill, on the same principles with the law now in force, was framed by the honourable Charles Townshend, and passed the house of commons, but was rejected by the house of peers. Thus deprived of the only constitutional means of defence, by a government that owes its existence to the suffrage of the people, and a family which reigns but by their voice, England submitted to the indignity of calling in foreign mercenaries, for her defence against an enemy who had often trembled at the shaking of her spear, and who was now more her inferior than in any former period, in every naval and military resource.

That indignity was keenly felt by all orders of men in the state, and the national despondency, and the orderly behaviour of the foreign troops, only could have prevented a popular insurrection. The principal servants of the crown, on whom the public indignation

chiefly

chiefly fell, were severely blamed for exposing the kingdom to such an indelible disgrace. The ministry, indeed, had never been properly settled since the death of Mr. Pelham, in 1754. That minister, though sufficiently disposed to gratify his sovereign in his passion for German alliances and continental politics, was believed to be at bottom a sincere friend to his country, and to the liberties of the people. His brother, the duke of Newcastle, who succeeded him as first commissioner of the treasury, and who was no less compliant to the court, possessed neither his virtues nor his talents; and Mr. Fox, who had lately been appointed secretary of state, was considered as the ostensible minister, though a man of abilities, was supposed to be void of principle. He was besides, very unpopular, as he had made the motion in the House of Commons for bringing over the Hanoverians and Hessians, instead of adopting any vigorous measure for internal defence.

The British ministry, however, were blamed for events which it was not altogether in their power to govern, distracted as they were by the national panic. And in order to increase that panic, as well as to conceal their design upon Minorca, the French had marched down large bodies of troops to their maritime provinces, contiguous to the coast of England. Nor were their naval preparations less formidable. Beside a great number of frigates and flat-bottomed boats, which might be employed as transports, they had near forty ships of the line at Brest and other ports on the ocean. It was therefore judged prudent to keep a superior English fleet in the channel; and, as it was conjectured the French could not have above six or eight sail of the line at Toulon, an English squadron of only ten sail of the line, two ships of forty-eight guns, and three frigates, was sent into the Mediterranean.

The command of this squadron was given to admiral Byng, son of the celebrated naval officer of that name, who destroyed the Spanish fleet off Messina, in 1718. When

Byng arrived at Gibraltar, where his squadron was augmented by an additional ship of the line, he learned that the French had already landed fifteen thousand men in the island of Minorca, and were besieging the castle of St. Philip, which commands the town and port of Mahon. Having on board a reinforcement for the garrison of that fortress, he immediately sailed for the place of his destination, after receiving a detachment from the garrison of Gibraltar. He was joined on his way by the Phenix frigate, commanded by captain Harvey; who confirmed his former intelligence, and informed him particularly of the strength of the enemy's fleet. It consisted of twelve sail of the line and five frigates, under the marquis de la Galissoniere.

On the approach of the English admiral to the harbour of Mahon, he had the satisfaction to see the British colours still flying on the castle of St. Philip. But, notwithstanding that animating circumstance, his attempts for its relief were feeble and ineffectual. In a word, Mr. Byng seems to have been utterly discouraged, from the moment he learned the strength of the French fleet, though little superior to his own, and to have given up Minorca for lost as soon as he heard it was invaded. This fully appears, both from his subsequent conduct, and from his letter to the secretary of the admiralty, before he arrived at Mahon. In that letter, (which forms a kind of prelude to the account of his miscarriage) after lamenting that he did not reach Minorca before the landing of the French, he expressed himself thus ;-"I am firmly of opinion, that "throwing men into the castle will only enable it to hold "out a little longer, and add to the numbers that must "fall into the enemy's hands; for the garrison, in time, "will be obliged to surrender, unless a sufficient number "of men could be landed to raise the siege. I am de"termined, however, to sail up to Minorca with the "squadron, where I shall be a better judge of the situa“tion of affairs, and will give general Blakeney all the "assistance he shall require. But I am afraid all com

"munication

"munication will be cut off between us; for if the enemy "have erected batteries on the two shores near the en"trance of the harbour, (an advantage scarce to be "supposed they have neglected) it will render it impossi"ble for our boats to have a passage to the sally-port of "the garrison'."

MAY 20.

Admiral Byng's behaviour was conformable to those desponding ideas. When the French admiral advanced to prevent him from throwing troops into the citadel of Mahon, he disposed his fleet in order of battle; but kept at such a distance, under pretence of preserving the line unbroken, that his division did very little damage to the enemy, and his own noble ship of ninety guns was never properly in the engagement. The division under rear-admiral West, however, the second in command, drove three of the French ships out of the line; and, if supported, would have gained a complete victory. As an apology for not bearing down upon the enemy, Byng is said to have told his captain, that he would avoid the error of admiral Matthews, who incurred the censure of a court-martial by his wrong-headed temerity, in rashly violating the laws of naval discipline!

The consequences of this indecisive action were such as had been foreseen by those acquainted with the sentiments of the English admiral. Byng, though in some measure victorious, as the French admiral bore away to support that part of his line which had been broken by Mr. West, and although the English fleet had lost only about forty men, immediately retired to Gibraltar, as if he had sustained a defeat. The reasons assigned for that retreat, in which a council of war concurred, were his inferiority to the enemy in number of men and guns; his apprehensions for the safety of Gibraltar, and the im

1. Letter from on boord the Ramillies, Gibraltar Bay, to Mr. Cleveland, secretary of the admiralty, May 4, 1756. If I should fail in the relief "of port Mahon," adds he, "I shall look upon the security and protec"tion of Gibraitar as my next object, and shall repair down bere with the squadron. J. B.”

possibility