doctrine." To impartial and earnest study of the sources of sacred truth, let there be joined fervent prayer, and a humble, hearty giving up of the will to God. Let the seeker of truth and peace adopt the sacred poet's prayer: "Show me thy ways, O Lord; teach me in thy paths; lead me in thy truth and teach me ; unveil mine eyes, that I may behold the wondrous things of thy law." Let him make practical trial of Christianity and of its promise. There is abundant motive for this trial, if the childlike spirit be not entirely wanting. It is found in the sense of want, of guilt, corruption, bondage and inward contradiction, which he must find, if he truly looks within himself; in the attitude of the Gospel, as coming to meet those wants, and promising to bring forgiveness, holiness, freedom, and harmony to his soul; in the high and holy character of the Saviour, and the pure and elevated spirit of his moral teaching; in the outward tokens of his divinity; in the positive testimony of thousands in every age who have tried Christianity, and found its promise fulfilled in them, while not one has tried and found it fail. With such motives as these, he cannot without guilt reject the trial. Let him then turn to CHRIST, the REDEEMER, even as the little child turns to its mother's arms for refuge and repose, as the sick ror. man casts himself on his physician's faithfulness and skill, Thus shall he be kept from all fatal erThus shall he be led into the knowledge of the truth as it is in Jesus. The God of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Father of Glory, shall give him the spirit of wisdom, and revelation in a sound mind, to the acknowledgment of him. He shall be brought into the living knowledge of those high and holy truths which are open only to the pure in heart. He shall in this way comprehend, with all saints, the height and depth and length and breadth of the love of God in Christ, which passeth any other kind of knowledge. Endeavour thus to live; these rules regard; WORDSWORTH. THE NATURE OF MORAL OBLIGATION. In observing what passes in our minds, we find that there are certain actions which we qualify in our judgment as right or wrong. It is not necessary at this moment to give a complete description of the actions to which this judgment is applied. It is enough for the present purpose to observe, that among the intentional or voluntary actions of men, there are some, of which we predicate a quality that we term moral, in distinction from others which we regard as morally indifferent. This moral quality, however, we always consider as essentially residing in the intention or will of the agent, and not in the external form of the action. The judgment which we pass upon actions as right or wrong always at the bottom refers to the intention or motive, in other words, to a pure act of the will. We can conceive of acts of the will which we should qualify as right or wrong, although they should never pass into the sphere of the external world-never assume a form in speech or outward action, or in any other mode of expression and on the other hand we regard the same external form of action as right or wrong, or simply as indifferent, just according to the intention or will of the agent. : The judgment of actions as right or wrong does not, however, exhaust the complex fact we are endeavoring to analyze. With the judgment of an action as right or wrong there is also connected another judgment, which we express in the familiar terms that we ought or ought not to do it. This judgment, inasmuch as it is not constituted by the mind, but announces and imposes itself as a determining principle for the will, that is, as a principle of action, is called the Moral Law, the Law of Reason or the Law of Conscience. With reference to the subject, that is, to the mind that passes it, this judgment is spoken of as a conviction of Obligation or of Duty. It is to be noted, however, that the words Obligation and Duty, and particularly the latter, are also frequently used in application to the objects in regard to which the conviction is felt, that is, to the acts commanded by conscience or the moral law; and moreover, when applied in this objective sense, they are used in a two-fold relation, either to the internal acts of the will, or to the external actions which are (or should be) their form and expression. This variety in the application of the words creates a liability to error; and not a little confusion has been introduced into moral discussions from not discriminating the different relations in which the terms may be taken. Again: when we contemplate an action as right or wrong, when we consider duty or the moral law as fulfilled or violated, there is connected a judgment of merit or demerit which we pass in regard to the agent. With right or wrong doing we connect the ideas of good or ill desert. We pronounce that the man who does right, who obeys the moral law, deserves well, ought to be happy; that he who violates the moral law, who does wrong, ought not to be happy, that he deserves punishment. It is not from any effect which the view of moral actions has upon us as sensitive or as sympathetic beings that we pass this judgment; it is as rational beings that we thus judge. The judgment of an action as right or wrong, is a judgment of reason; and the judgment of merit or demerit which attaches to it, is also a judgment of reason. Lastly besides this rational conviction of merit and demerit, there is also, in the contemplation of |