duty, it is with the voice of unconditional command; and it is with the same voice that it bids us to the performance of every other duty.

We have said the voice of Conscience-it is the same thing, so far as the present point is concerned, to say the command of God. The command of God cannot, any more than the voice of Conscience, be conceived as constituting the difference between right and wrong. The difference between right and wrong is an absolute difference; just as the difference between truth and falsehood is an absolute difference. The voice of Conscience forbids what is wrong because it is wrong; and the voice of God forbids it for the The voice of Conscience and the command of God are therefore so far convertible terms, that every thing which is wrong and forbidden by Conscience, is also forbidden by God; and every thing which is forbidden by God, is thereupon recognized as wrong and forbidden by Conscience.

same reason.

With these views in mind, it is not difficult to perceive the sense in which the Scriptural declaration is to be taken: Whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all. As all the virtues are marked by

one common quality of obligation, and as they are all enjoined by the same authority, the man whose ruling principle of action is a sense of duty, will for that reason be led to the practice of them all. No man can be virtuous who does not act from an habitual regard to the authority of conscience and of God; and as the same authority which enjoins one duty, enjoins all the duties, he who reverences this authority in one case will habitually reverence it in another case, and in all cases. The idea of a sincere reverence for the will of God in one case, and an habitual disregard of it in another case, is scarcely conceivable. It is rather to be presumed, when a person lives in a course of uniform or habitual violation of the will of God in one part of his duty, that in those other cases where the outward form of his conduct coincides with what the will of God prescribes, it is owing merely to an accidental agreement between his sense of duty and his inclination, or even that his actions are determined in those cases to the outward form of virtue by motives of which the sense of duty forms no part. The motive of action which renders our outward conduct truly virtuous and acceptable in the view of reason and of God, is a pure regard to duty. How can a person, who truly regards the authority and com

mand of God as the rule of his actions, live in the habitual neglect of any thing which that authority commands, or in the habitual commission of any thing that it forbids? If it be sincerely taken as the rule of conduct at all, must it not be taken in its full extent? He, therefore, who lives in the habitual violation of any article of his known duty, shows such a disregard of the sacred authority of conscience and of God, as to prove that he cannot have a real and proper regard to that authority in other parts of his duty. He proves that, in those respects in which the form of his outward conduct corresponds with the rule of duty, he is not determined by the inward principle which alone can constitute his conduct virtuous. forfeits his claim in the eye of reason to the title of a virtuous man. Habitual and allowed violation of known duty proves that the radical principle of virtue is wanting. By constantly violating the command of conscience and of God in one respect, he proves that the essential spirit of true obedience is wanting in him-that if it should equally suit his inclinations or his interest, he might equally violate all the other commandsand that the reason why he does not, is something else than a supreme reverence for the divine authority of conscience and of God; in short, in

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the eye of Reason, and of that God "who looketh on the heart," he cannot be regarded as rendering a true obedience in any part of his conduct. In principle he throws off his allegiance to the Supreme Law, by a constant violation of it in one respect, as effectually as by a violation of it in all respects. In this sense I take it, we are to understand the declaration of the sacred writer : Whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all.

In coming to this interpretation, there are two things which have not indeed been left out of account, but which should perhaps be brought more distinctly before the mind. One point essential to the truth of this exposition is, that the violation of duty of which we have been speaking, is a violation of known duty. It is not said that unconscious violation of the rule of duty destroys a person's claim to the character of a virtuous man: or, to express the same thing more precisely, a course of external conduct may be contrary to what the perfect rule of duty would prescribe, and yet it would not therefore necessarily follow that it is pursued in a spirit of wilful violation of known duty. There may be, it is quite supposable, truly conscientious persons, who, in all parts of their

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conduct, act from a sense of duty, and therefore possess the essential principle of a virtuous character, who yet, from the influence of a variety of circumstances, may never have been enlightened as to some particular branch of their duty, and may therefore live in the habitual neglect of it. In such a case, however, the authority of conscience is not disregarded; for conscience has not yet spoken the sentiment of duty is not violated, for it has not been felt. But let their attention be directed to the subject; let their minds be enlightened; let their reason discern the conduct to be wrong; let the moral law within them utter its voice-let conscience forbid it; and then if they continue to live in violation of acknowledged duty, their character for virtue is forfeited and lost. This, however, in such a case, is not supposable ; for the same reverence for the moral law, the same sense of duty, which governed them in other branches of their conduct, would lead them to the performance of their duty in this respect so soon as it should be discerned. A striking illustration in point is found in the life of the late venerable John Newton, who was for several years master of a vessel engaged in the slave trade on the coast of Africa; and during a considerable portion of this time was eminently exemplary in the practice